Event Notification Report for September 27, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/26/2003 - 09/27/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
40202402034026640331
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40202
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN TWAROG
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN TWAROG
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/27/2003
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 07:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2003
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 07:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 15 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO RCS LEAKAGE INCREASE GREATER THAN 2 GPM
"Initiated Plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications. TS 3.6.C.1.b limits unidentified primary containment leakage to a 2 gpm increase in any 24 hour period. Leakage increased by approximately 3.6 gpm."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident inspector.
"Initiated Plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications. TS 3.6.C.1.b limits unidentified primary containment leakage to a 2 gpm increase in any 24 hour period. Leakage increased by approximately 3.6 gpm."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40203
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: WAYNE AHO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: WAYNE AHO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/27/2003
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 15:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2003
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 15:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
"Unit 2 will be down powering inverter 2Y-26 for pre-planned maintenance during the Unit 2 refueling outage. This will result in the loss of power to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). This constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The expected SPDS outage duration is 2 hours."
State and the NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the Licensee.
"Unit 2 will be down powering inverter 2Y-26 for pre-planned maintenance during the Unit 2 refueling outage. This will result in the loss of power to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). This constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The expected SPDS outage duration is 2 hours."
State and the NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the Licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40266
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM B. ABRAHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM B. ABRAHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/21/2003
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 01:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2003
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 01:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) ACTUATION DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A).
"On September 27, 2003, at 0118 hours Central Time, while operating at 100 percent power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced an invalid actuation of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System. The invalid signal was the result of an error made while performing a continuity check during a quarterly surveillance.
"The invalid HPCS initiation caused the following systems to actuate: HPCS Pump, Division III Diesel Generator (DG) and Standby Service Water (SSW) 'C' (as designed to support DG operation).
"Each train actuation was complete, HPCS started and functioned as designed and all support systems functioned properly.
"There was an unexpected HPCS pump suction valve transfer to Suppression Pool. The most probable cause of this valve transfer was minor oscillation in Suppression Pool level."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A).
"On September 27, 2003, at 0118 hours Central Time, while operating at 100 percent power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced an invalid actuation of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System. The invalid signal was the result of an error made while performing a continuity check during a quarterly surveillance.
"The invalid HPCS initiation caused the following systems to actuate: HPCS Pump, Division III Diesel Generator (DG) and Standby Service Water (SSW) 'C' (as designed to support DG operation).
"Each train actuation was complete, HPCS started and functioned as designed and all support systems functioned properly.
"There was an unexpected HPCS pump suction valve transfer to Suppression Pool. The most probable cause of this valve transfer was minor oscillation in Suppression Pool level."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40331
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KAPP
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KAPP
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 15:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2003
Event Time: 15:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID PARTIAL SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING AT GINNA
"On September 27, 2003, at 1544 hours Eastern Daylight Savings Time, while In a refueling outage, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Station experienced a momentary invalid partial Safety Injection (SI) signal to the "A" train. The invalid signal was the result of an error made while placing a jumper across a relay during a 24 month surveillance. The invalid partial SI signal caused the following systems to actuate: "A " train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI), "A" train Diesel Generator (DG), trip of MCC G1, full opening of Service Water (SW) AOV-4561 to the containment recirculation fans, and the opening of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) core deluge valve MOV-852A. Each individual actuation was complete, the "A" DG started and functioned as designed, and all support systems functioned properly. The individual slave timers fed from the SI relay did not actuate. The most probable cause of this was the momentary nature of the partial SI signal."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On September 27, 2003, at 1544 hours Eastern Daylight Savings Time, while In a refueling outage, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Station experienced a momentary invalid partial Safety Injection (SI) signal to the "A" train. The invalid signal was the result of an error made while placing a jumper across a relay during a 24 month surveillance. The invalid partial SI signal caused the following systems to actuate: "A " train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI), "A" train Diesel Generator (DG), trip of MCC G1, full opening of Service Water (SW) AOV-4561 to the containment recirculation fans, and the opening of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) core deluge valve MOV-852A. Each individual actuation was complete, the "A" DG started and functioned as designed, and all support systems functioned properly. The individual slave timers fed from the SI relay did not actuate. The most probable cause of this was the momentary nature of the partial SI signal."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.