Event Notification Report for September 19, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/18/2003 - 09/19/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
4020740174401814018240183401844018540176401774017840179
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 40207
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY ROCK ISLAND, IL
Licensee: U.S. ARMY ROCK ISLAND, IL
Region: 4
City: TAHOE CITY State: NV
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Licensee: U.S. ARMY ROCK ISLAND, IL
Region: 4
City: TAHOE CITY State: NV
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 09/30/2003
Notification Time: 17:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003
Notification Time: 17:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
JULIO LARA (R3)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
PART 76.83 - TRANSFER OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
On 9/19/03, the U.S. Army Base at Fort Wainwright, AK sent a shipment of five M-119 Howitzers to the National Forest Service in California to be used for avalanche control. Prior to shipment, the Tritium fire control devices were removed from the Howitzers and placed in boxes. The boxes containing the fire control devices were inadvertently shipped along with the Howitzers. Two boxes, containing a total of 19.4 curies of tritium, ended up at the Alpine Meadows ski resort in Tahoe City, CA. Another 3 boxes, containing a total of 28.2 curies of tritium, ended up at the Mammoth Mountain ski resort in Mammoth Lake, CA.
The National Forest Service will keep the tritium fire control devices in a secure storage location overnight, and they will be picked up by the Radiation Safety Officer from Hawthorne Army Depot on the morning of 10/1/03.
* * * UPDATED VIA FAX ON 10/02/03 @ 1523 EDT* * *
"Fort Wainwright, Alaska was given authority to ship 5 ea M119 howitzers to the National Forest Service in California as part of the avalanche control program. Three of the M119's were to be shipped to Mammoth Lakes, CA and two to Alpine Meadows ski area in Tahoe City, CA. The howitzers were in storage and therefore had their tritium fire control devices removed and placed in their associated BII boxes.
"All of the fire control devices were properly stored in their BII boxes prior to shipment from Alaska. When the shipment was processed the shippers failed to remove the tritium devices from the Bll boxes (a grand total of 47.6 curies). Therefore the tritium devices were inadvertently shipped with the howitzers on 19 Sept 2003. On 29 Sept 2003, two howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Alpine Meadows ski area, Tahoe City, CA and three howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Mammoth Mt. ski area, Mammoth Lake, CA. Upon discovering radioactive commodities had been received, the National Forest Service called the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command [TACOM].
"The TACOM RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] contacted the RSO at Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, CA on 30 Sept 2003 and requested their aid in capturing the radioactive components. On October 1st, 2003 the Hawthorne Army Depot RSO took possession of all the tritium fire control devices. Wipe surveys are being evaluated and disposition of the components will be determined upon receipt of the results."
Notified R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Janosko).
On 9/19/03, the U.S. Army Base at Fort Wainwright, AK sent a shipment of five M-119 Howitzers to the National Forest Service in California to be used for avalanche control. Prior to shipment, the Tritium fire control devices were removed from the Howitzers and placed in boxes. The boxes containing the fire control devices were inadvertently shipped along with the Howitzers. Two boxes, containing a total of 19.4 curies of tritium, ended up at the Alpine Meadows ski resort in Tahoe City, CA. Another 3 boxes, containing a total of 28.2 curies of tritium, ended up at the Mammoth Mountain ski resort in Mammoth Lake, CA.
The National Forest Service will keep the tritium fire control devices in a secure storage location overnight, and they will be picked up by the Radiation Safety Officer from Hawthorne Army Depot on the morning of 10/1/03.
* * * UPDATED VIA FAX ON 10/02/03 @ 1523 EDT* * *
"Fort Wainwright, Alaska was given authority to ship 5 ea M119 howitzers to the National Forest Service in California as part of the avalanche control program. Three of the M119's were to be shipped to Mammoth Lakes, CA and two to Alpine Meadows ski area in Tahoe City, CA. The howitzers were in storage and therefore had their tritium fire control devices removed and placed in their associated BII boxes.
"All of the fire control devices were properly stored in their BII boxes prior to shipment from Alaska. When the shipment was processed the shippers failed to remove the tritium devices from the Bll boxes (a grand total of 47.6 curies). Therefore the tritium devices were inadvertently shipped with the howitzers on 19 Sept 2003. On 29 Sept 2003, two howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Alpine Meadows ski area, Tahoe City, CA and three howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Mammoth Mt. ski area, Mammoth Lake, CA. Upon discovering radioactive commodities had been received, the National Forest Service called the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command [TACOM].
"The TACOM RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] contacted the RSO at Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, CA on 30 Sept 2003 and requested their aid in capturing the radioactive components. On October 1st, 2003 the Hawthorne Army Depot RSO took possession of all the tritium fire control devices. Wipe surveys are being evaluated and disposition of the components will be determined upon receipt of the results."
Notified R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Janosko).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40174
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 01:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 01:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 01:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 01:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SECURITY REPORT INVOLVING LIMITED SUSPENSION OF ICMS
The licensee is implementing a limited suspension of Interim Compensatory Measures (ICMs) due to high sustained winds.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
* * * UPDATE 0455 EDT ON 9/19/03 FROM JIM WILSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee has reimplemented all ICMs due to abatement of the adverse weather conditions. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Gray).
The licensee is implementing a limited suspension of Interim Compensatory Measures (ICMs) due to high sustained winds.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
* * * UPDATE 0455 EDT ON 9/19/03 FROM JIM WILSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee has reimplemented all ICMs due to abatement of the adverse weather conditions. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Gray).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40181
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DUANE SHEPHEARD
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DUANE SHEPHEARD
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2003
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
LOSS OF SIRENS
"A poll of the Surry EWS sirens was conducted to determine operability of the siren system (Reference Hurricane Response Plan - Nuclear, Section 5.6). The poll was conducted from the back-up status logger at Innsbrook due to the unavailability of the primary status logger in the Surry LEOF (see Plant Issue - S-2003-4152).
"45 of the 67 sirens expected to respond to the siren polling are considered inoperable at this time due to power failure as a result of Hurricane Isabel (the status of 2 of these was indeterminate). 22 of the 67 sirens responded satisfactorily and are considered operational.
"This is a reportable event per VPAP - 2802 Attachment 3 d. Early Warning System second bullet "More than 25 percent of all sirens are unavailable" and the third bullet "The capability to alert a large segment of the population does not exist."
This discrepancy was discovered at 1130 EDT on 9/19/03.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as state and local government officials.
**** Update on 09/29/03 at 1524 EDT by Larry Wheeler taken by MacKinnon ****
Currently Surry Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown.
"Surry EWS sirens have been returned to operable status on September 29, 2003 following repairs due to weather related effects of a Hurricane Isabel. Presently 63 of 67 sirens have been returned to service (94%). All sirens located within the 5 miles portion of the EPZ are operable. The current availability of the EWS no longer constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communication capability pursuant to 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Information related to the return to service of these sirens is being transmitted to the State of Virginia and FEMA. This is the final report that will be issued relative to siren system restoration efforts following Hurricane Isabel. Normal siren system status monitoring practices will remain in effect going forward." R2DO (Mark Lesser) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
"A poll of the Surry EWS sirens was conducted to determine operability of the siren system (Reference Hurricane Response Plan - Nuclear, Section 5.6). The poll was conducted from the back-up status logger at Innsbrook due to the unavailability of the primary status logger in the Surry LEOF (see Plant Issue - S-2003-4152).
"45 of the 67 sirens expected to respond to the siren polling are considered inoperable at this time due to power failure as a result of Hurricane Isabel (the status of 2 of these was indeterminate). 22 of the 67 sirens responded satisfactorily and are considered operational.
"This is a reportable event per VPAP - 2802 Attachment 3 d. Early Warning System second bullet "More than 25 percent of all sirens are unavailable" and the third bullet "The capability to alert a large segment of the population does not exist."
This discrepancy was discovered at 1130 EDT on 9/19/03.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as state and local government officials.
**** Update on 09/29/03 at 1524 EDT by Larry Wheeler taken by MacKinnon ****
Currently Surry Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown.
"Surry EWS sirens have been returned to operable status on September 29, 2003 following repairs due to weather related effects of a Hurricane Isabel. Presently 63 of 67 sirens have been returned to service (94%). All sirens located within the 5 miles portion of the EPZ are operable. The current availability of the EWS no longer constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communication capability pursuant to 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Information related to the return to service of these sirens is being transmitted to the State of Virginia and FEMA. This is the final report that will be issued relative to siren system restoration efforts following Hurricane Isabel. Normal siren system status monitoring practices will remain in effect going forward." R2DO (Mark Lesser) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40182
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART FITCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART FITCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO STORM
"At approximately 1535 [ET] on 9/19/03 the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that the 7.2 Kv supply line to the Tank Mountain repeater for activation of all emergency sirens was unavailable [approximately 121 sirens in Lucerne and Columbia Counties]. The backup batteries for the repeater were reported to be supplying power for repeater activation. Following further discussion with Emergency Planning personnel, Susquehanna LLC could not determine how long the battery supply would be available. At 1600 the ability to activate the emergency sirens was declared inoperable due to the inability to determine the status of the power source. Loss of ability to activate the emergency sirens is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, as an eight hour notification. The Susquehanna LLC Emergency Plan incorporates alternate means, i.e. Route Alert Teams, to notify the public during an emergency situation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying State and local agencies.
* * * * UPDATE FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 2105 ET 09/19/03 * * * *
"As of 2010 hours [ET] on 9/19/2003, power was restored to the repeater that is used for emergency siren activation and the emergency sirens are considered operable. The NRC resident inspector has been updated."
The licensee will be notifying State and local agencies. Informed R1DO (H. Gray)
"At approximately 1535 [ET] on 9/19/03 the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that the 7.2 Kv supply line to the Tank Mountain repeater for activation of all emergency sirens was unavailable [approximately 121 sirens in Lucerne and Columbia Counties]. The backup batteries for the repeater were reported to be supplying power for repeater activation. Following further discussion with Emergency Planning personnel, Susquehanna LLC could not determine how long the battery supply would be available. At 1600 the ability to activate the emergency sirens was declared inoperable due to the inability to determine the status of the power source. Loss of ability to activate the emergency sirens is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, as an eight hour notification. The Susquehanna LLC Emergency Plan incorporates alternate means, i.e. Route Alert Teams, to notify the public during an emergency situation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying State and local agencies.
* * * * UPDATE FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 2105 ET 09/19/03 * * * *
"As of 2010 hours [ET] on 9/19/2003, power was restored to the repeater that is used for emergency siren activation and the emergency sirens are considered operable. The NRC resident inspector has been updated."
The licensee will be notifying State and local agencies. Informed R1DO (H. Gray)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40183
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MANKIN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MANKIN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 20:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 20:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The licensee notified the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Linn County Sheriff, and the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center of a reportable spill of fuel oil into the Cedar River per applicable reporting procedures. Dredging operations were underway, and while refueling dredging equipment located on a barge in the Cedar River, approximately one gallon of fuel oil was spilled into the Cedar river.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will notify the state and local authorities.
The licensee notified the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Linn County Sheriff, and the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center of a reportable spill of fuel oil into the Cedar River per applicable reporting procedures. Dredging operations were underway, and while refueling dredging equipment located on a barge in the Cedar River, approximately one gallon of fuel oil was spilled into the Cedar river.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will notify the state and local authorities.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40184
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MICKLOW
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MICKLOW
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 20:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
Notification Time: 20:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNANALYZED CONDITION
While shutdown in Mode 5, containment recirculation sump 'B' was inspected for sump screen bypass flow paths in accordance with the requirements of NRC Bulletin 2003-01. Inspection results showed that approximately 25 square inches of space is available for recirculation flow to bypass the sump screens. This condition has the possibility of affecting the containment spray, safety injection and residual heat removal systems. The plant is stable in a refueling outage at approximately 95 degrees F, with normal residual heat removal in service and loop levels at 72 inches.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/03 @ 1356 BY RICHARD KAPP TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The licensee is retracting this event after performing an extensive evaluation had determined that equipment required to mitigate the event, though found to be in a degraded condition, would have performed their functions. This event has been discussed with the NRC Resident Inspector and he was informed of the event retraction.
Notified Reg 1 RDO(Rogge)
While shutdown in Mode 5, containment recirculation sump 'B' was inspected for sump screen bypass flow paths in accordance with the requirements of NRC Bulletin 2003-01. Inspection results showed that approximately 25 square inches of space is available for recirculation flow to bypass the sump screens. This condition has the possibility of affecting the containment spray, safety injection and residual heat removal systems. The plant is stable in a refueling outage at approximately 95 degrees F, with normal residual heat removal in service and loop levels at 72 inches.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/03 @ 1356 BY RICHARD KAPP TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The licensee is retracting this event after performing an extensive evaluation had determined that equipment required to mitigate the event, though found to be in a degraded condition, would have performed their functions. This event has been discussed with the NRC Resident Inspector and he was informed of the event retraction.
Notified Reg 1 RDO(Rogge)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40185
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/20/2003
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 20:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2003
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 20:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSE CALVO (NRR)
AL AUSTIN (FEMA)
BOB TURNER (DOE)
LEN POPE (DHS)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSE CALVO (NRR)
AL AUSTIN (FEMA)
BOB TURNER (DOE)
LEN POPE (DHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
PLANT HAD AUTO REACTOR SCRAM FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL AS RESULT OF A PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"At 2041 hrs on 09/19/03, an electrical fault on 500 KV Bus Section 2 caused a Group A Transformer lockout. The Alpha and Charlie 4.16 KV vital busses did not transfer to their respective alternate infeeds from Group B Transformers, the associated Emergency Diesel Generators auto-started to supply their respective busses, and the associated Loss of Power sequencers initiated. This automatic electrical transfer caused a loss of the Alpha and Charlie Reactor Feedpumps due to a low hydraulic oil pressure signal, and Reactor level decreased to the low level RPS scram setpoint of 12.5 inches. All rods fully inserted in response to the RPS scram signal. Reactor water level dropped to approx. minus 25 inches and was subsequently returned to a normal level of 34 inches post-scram by the Bravo Reactor Feedpump. In addition, 7.2 KV Bus 10A110 failed to transfer to its alternate infeed breaker, and de-energized causing a loss of the Alpha and Delta Turbine Building Chillers, 00K107 Station Air Compressor, Alpha Primary Condensate Pump, Alpha Secondary Condensate Pump, and the Alpha Reactor Recirc Pump. The Alpha Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Pump tripped during the electrical transient, and was subsequently restarted. The Alpha and Bravo Reactor Water Cleanup Pumps tripped during the electrical transient, and preparations are being made to restart the system. Core circulation is being supplied by the Bravo Reactor Recirc Pump. Reactor Pressure is being controlled by Turbine Bypass valves to the Main Condenser, and Reactor Pressure is 762 PSIG. Electrical Distribution personnel are inspecting Switchyard electrical components and relaying to determine the exact location and nature of the fault. Hope Creek-Salem 500 KV 5037 500 KV line has been isolated as a result of visual reports of arcing/tracking, and is considered a potential cause of the electrical transient. Forced outage team personnel have been assembled to review the event and develop a recovery plan. This event is being reported IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the actuation of RPS on a low reactor water level signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the Emergency Diesel Generators start and sequencer initiation,"
Two (A&C) of four Emergency Diesels started and loaded to their busses. The B&D Emergency Diesels are available. The plant has two offsite power sources available, but only one is feeding the B&D vital busses.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/20/03 AT 1948 FROM A. BREADY TO E. THOMAS * * *
"Salem Unit 1, Unit 2, and Hope Creek Shut Down.
"After riding out Hurricane Isabel and supplying power to the PJM grid, Salem Units 1 and 2, and Hope Creek were shut down over the weekend due to salting in the switchyard.
"High winds and rough surf in the Delaware River resulted in salt deposits in the 500 KV switchyards at Salem and Hope Creek. These deposits caused electrical faults and arcing in both switchyards. Hope Creek automatically shut down on Friday at 8:41 p.m. due to problems initiated by the switchyard. Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 were manually taken off line Saturday morning at 3:44 a.m. and 4:37 a.m. respectively.
"A team has been assembled to investigate the cause of the events. All three units will remain shutdown while the switchyards are cleaned and any necessary repairs are made. The cleaning of the salt from the switchyards has already begun."
Notified R1DO (H. Gray), NRR EO (J. Calvo), and DIRO (T. McGinty)
"At 2041 hrs on 09/19/03, an electrical fault on 500 KV Bus Section 2 caused a Group A Transformer lockout. The Alpha and Charlie 4.16 KV vital busses did not transfer to their respective alternate infeeds from Group B Transformers, the associated Emergency Diesel Generators auto-started to supply their respective busses, and the associated Loss of Power sequencers initiated. This automatic electrical transfer caused a loss of the Alpha and Charlie Reactor Feedpumps due to a low hydraulic oil pressure signal, and Reactor level decreased to the low level RPS scram setpoint of 12.5 inches. All rods fully inserted in response to the RPS scram signal. Reactor water level dropped to approx. minus 25 inches and was subsequently returned to a normal level of 34 inches post-scram by the Bravo Reactor Feedpump. In addition, 7.2 KV Bus 10A110 failed to transfer to its alternate infeed breaker, and de-energized causing a loss of the Alpha and Delta Turbine Building Chillers, 00K107 Station Air Compressor, Alpha Primary Condensate Pump, Alpha Secondary Condensate Pump, and the Alpha Reactor Recirc Pump. The Alpha Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Pump tripped during the electrical transient, and was subsequently restarted. The Alpha and Bravo Reactor Water Cleanup Pumps tripped during the electrical transient, and preparations are being made to restart the system. Core circulation is being supplied by the Bravo Reactor Recirc Pump. Reactor Pressure is being controlled by Turbine Bypass valves to the Main Condenser, and Reactor Pressure is 762 PSIG. Electrical Distribution personnel are inspecting Switchyard electrical components and relaying to determine the exact location and nature of the fault. Hope Creek-Salem 500 KV 5037 500 KV line has been isolated as a result of visual reports of arcing/tracking, and is considered a potential cause of the electrical transient. Forced outage team personnel have been assembled to review the event and develop a recovery plan. This event is being reported IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the actuation of RPS on a low reactor water level signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the Emergency Diesel Generators start and sequencer initiation,"
Two (A&C) of four Emergency Diesels started and loaded to their busses. The B&D Emergency Diesels are available. The plant has two offsite power sources available, but only one is feeding the B&D vital busses.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/20/03 AT 1948 FROM A. BREADY TO E. THOMAS * * *
"Salem Unit 1, Unit 2, and Hope Creek Shut Down.
"After riding out Hurricane Isabel and supplying power to the PJM grid, Salem Units 1 and 2, and Hope Creek were shut down over the weekend due to salting in the switchyard.
"High winds and rough surf in the Delaware River resulted in salt deposits in the 500 KV switchyards at Salem and Hope Creek. These deposits caused electrical faults and arcing in both switchyards. Hope Creek automatically shut down on Friday at 8:41 p.m. due to problems initiated by the switchyard. Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 were manually taken off line Saturday morning at 3:44 a.m. and 4:37 a.m. respectively.
"A team has been assembled to investigate the cause of the events. All three units will remain shutdown while the switchyards are cleaned and any necessary repairs are made. The cleaning of the salt from the switchyards has already begun."
Notified R1DO (H. Gray), NRR EO (J. Calvo), and DIRO (T. McGinty)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40176
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY SCHIENDELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY SCHIENDELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 04:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 04:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
"32 of 165 offsite sirens not functioning due to loss of power/equipment failure because of ongoing storm."
The licensee will inform the affected counties/PEMA and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"32 of 165 offsite sirens not functioning due to loss of power/equipment failure because of ongoing storm."
The licensee will inform the affected counties/PEMA and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40177
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB FRANSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB FRANSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 04:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 01:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 04:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 01:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF POWER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
"Peach Bottom lost power to the TSC from 0145 to 0255 this morning due to a temporary loss of the Station Blackout Line (SBO). The SBO line, and subsequently power to the TSC, has been restored. The station meteorological data was lost due to the initial power loss with the SBO at 0145. The meteorological data remains out of service at this time.
"Contingency plans exist for the use of an alternate TSC, if required. Use of data from local and national weather services is available in place of the station meteorological data.
"Additionally, Peach Bottom has notified the FAA that power has been lost to the flashing lights at the top of high voltage towers in the river."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Peach Bottom lost power to the TSC from 0145 to 0255 this morning due to a temporary loss of the Station Blackout Line (SBO). The SBO line, and subsequently power to the TSC, has been restored. The station meteorological data was lost due to the initial power loss with the SBO at 0145. The meteorological data remains out of service at this time.
"Contingency plans exist for the use of an alternate TSC, if required. Use of data from local and national weather services is available in place of the station meteorological data.
"Additionally, Peach Bottom has notified the FAA that power has been lost to the flashing lights at the top of high voltage towers in the river."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40178
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 05:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 02:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 05:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 02:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 10 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
"TMI is notifying the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi), Notification of Other Government Agency and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. At 0224 AM on Friday, September 19 it was determined that 25 of 79 of the public emergency sirens for Three Mile Island Unit 1 were inoperable due to loss of power due to Tropical Storm Isabel. Subsequently, it has been determined that 32 of 79 of the sirens are inoperable. The inoperable sirens are located throughout the five risk counties around TMI. The inoperability of the sirens around TMI impacts a large segment of the population.
"Contingency actions have been established for the deficient sirens. Automatic route alerting, that is the coordinated use of vehicles that will make loudspeaker announcements throughout affected areas will be utilized if the need should arise prior to restoration of power to the inoperable sirens. Local power company line crews have been notified of the loss of power to the sirens and are working to restore power on a priority basis to the sirens."
The licensee informed the affected counties/PEMA and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"TMI is notifying the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi), Notification of Other Government Agency and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. At 0224 AM on Friday, September 19 it was determined that 25 of 79 of the public emergency sirens for Three Mile Island Unit 1 were inoperable due to loss of power due to Tropical Storm Isabel. Subsequently, it has been determined that 32 of 79 of the sirens are inoperable. The inoperable sirens are located throughout the five risk counties around TMI. The inoperability of the sirens around TMI impacts a large segment of the population.
"Contingency actions have been established for the deficient sirens. Automatic route alerting, that is the coordinated use of vehicles that will make loudspeaker announcements throughout affected areas will be utilized if the need should arise prior to restoration of power to the inoperable sirens. Local power company line crews have been notified of the loss of power to the sirens and are working to restore power on a priority basis to the sirens."
The licensee informed the affected counties/PEMA and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40179
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: T. L. SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: T. L. SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2003
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2003
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 62 | Power Operation | 62 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY TO THE ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
"At 0930 on September 19, 2003 it was identified that there was a major loss of offsite response capability. 43 out of 63 early warning sirens were determined inoperable due to loss of power as a result of Hurricane Isabel.
"The State and NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event."
*****UPDATE ON 9/24/03 AT 0715 FROM JOHNSTONE TO LAURA*****
"On September 24, 2003, at 0715 hours, a siren poll test was conducted to verify availability of the early warning sirens (EWS). The test identified that 57 of 63 (90%) sirens were available. The current availability of the EWS no longer constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communication capability pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)"
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
Notified R2DO (C. Julian)
"At 0930 on September 19, 2003 it was identified that there was a major loss of offsite response capability. 43 out of 63 early warning sirens were determined inoperable due to loss of power as a result of Hurricane Isabel.
"The State and NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event."
*****UPDATE ON 9/24/03 AT 0715 FROM JOHNSTONE TO LAURA*****
"On September 24, 2003, at 0715 hours, a siren poll test was conducted to verify availability of the early warning sirens (EWS). The test identified that 57 of 63 (90%) sirens were available. The current availability of the EWS no longer constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communication capability pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)"
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
Notified R2DO (C. Julian)