Event Notification Report for September 12, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/11/2003 - 09/12/2003
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40152
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: ED STECK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: ED STECK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/12/2003
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2003
Event Time: 10:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2003
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2003
Event Time: 10:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
IMPROPER SCANNING OF LEAD RODS FOR THE PRODUCT ENGINEERING LABORATORY
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
FACILITY:
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched (<5.0 wt,% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
TIME AND DATE OF EVENT:
April 4, 2001 - -- September 5, 2003
REASON FOR NOTIFICATION:
Lead-filled rods in a small number of replica fuel assemblies were scanned using an improper instrument. The rods were to be verified as free of uranium prior to delivery to the Product Engineering Lab. The verification is accomplished by either scanning each individual rod with a hand-held instrument or scanning an assembly with a combination of a thimble tube probe and an external hand-held instrument. A few of the hand-held scans were performed with a marginal instrument.
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTION:
Double contingency protection for the VIPER test loop vessel is assured by preventing uranium with greater than 1.0 weight percent uranium-235 from entering the Product Engineering (PE) Lab and preventing that uranium from entering the VIPER test loop vessel. Although lead-filled rods are not tested in the VIPER test loop, the improper scans left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
AS FOUND CONDITION:
See "Reason for Notification" above.
NCS detected the absence of a procedure number listing during a normal special routing review. Inquiries led to the discovery that the incorrect instrument was being used to scan lead-filled rods. It was subsequently determined that the response of the instrument used was inadequate to reliably detect a single uranium rod mixed with lead-tilled rods.
The initial investigation revealed a weakness in the procedure structure for scanning lead-filled rods. The procedure steps for scanning lead-filled rods are contained in a procedure for transfer and release of potentially contaminated equipment or materials and not addressed in the instrument procedures.
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY:
1). An improved procedure is now in place requiring that all lead-filled rods be individually scanned with the appropriate instrument.
2). All health physics personnel have been trained on the new procedure and proper instrument.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). Loss of double contingency protection occurred.
2). At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
3). The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
4). Notification was the result of a weakness in the procedure structure, not a deficient NCS analysis.
5). A causal analysis will be performed.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
FACILITY:
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched (<5.0 wt,% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
TIME AND DATE OF EVENT:
April 4, 2001 - -- September 5, 2003
REASON FOR NOTIFICATION:
Lead-filled rods in a small number of replica fuel assemblies were scanned using an improper instrument. The rods were to be verified as free of uranium prior to delivery to the Product Engineering Lab. The verification is accomplished by either scanning each individual rod with a hand-held instrument or scanning an assembly with a combination of a thimble tube probe and an external hand-held instrument. A few of the hand-held scans were performed with a marginal instrument.
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTION:
Double contingency protection for the VIPER test loop vessel is assured by preventing uranium with greater than 1.0 weight percent uranium-235 from entering the Product Engineering (PE) Lab and preventing that uranium from entering the VIPER test loop vessel. Although lead-filled rods are not tested in the VIPER test loop, the improper scans left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
AS FOUND CONDITION:
See "Reason for Notification" above.
NCS detected the absence of a procedure number listing during a normal special routing review. Inquiries led to the discovery that the incorrect instrument was being used to scan lead-filled rods. It was subsequently determined that the response of the instrument used was inadequate to reliably detect a single uranium rod mixed with lead-tilled rods.
The initial investigation revealed a weakness in the procedure structure for scanning lead-filled rods. The procedure steps for scanning lead-filled rods are contained in a procedure for transfer and release of potentially contaminated equipment or materials and not addressed in the instrument procedures.
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY:
1). An improved procedure is now in place requiring that all lead-filled rods be individually scanned with the appropriate instrument.
2). All health physics personnel have been trained on the new procedure and proper instrument.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). Loss of double contingency protection occurred.
2). At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
3). The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
4). Notification was the result of a weakness in the procedure structure, not a deficient NCS analysis.
5). A causal analysis will be performed.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40153
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: KEN O'BRIEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: KEN O'BRIEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/12/2003
Notification Time: 07:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2003
Event Time: 05:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2003
Notification Time: 07:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2003
Event Time: 05:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2003
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
40.35(f) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
40.35(f) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
DOUG WEAVER (IRO)
JIM DYER (R3RA)
BILL THOMAS (DHS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
DOUG WEAVER (IRO)
JIM DYER (R3RA)
BILL THOMAS (DHS)
ALERT DECLARED DUE TO RELEASE OF ANTIMONY PENTAFLOURIDE
Ken O'Brien, NRC R3 Chief of the Fuels Cycle Branch, called at 0704 EDT to inform us that Honeywell had a chemical release and they had declared an Alert at 0531 CDT. There was no radiological release associated with this event.
The event occurred when a plant employee attempted to obtain a sample from a tank of antimony pentaflouride. During the sampling process, the tank was inadvertently over pressurized and was vented outside of the building to atmosphere. The winds in the area during the release directed the chemical away from town. The building was isolated and the tank reduced to sub-atmospheric pressure by the plant response personnel. Their were no injuries as a result of the incident.
An all-clear was given at 0655 CDT and the Alert was terminated at 1114 CDT.
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Resident Inspector was notified by Honeywell.
Notified the following federal agencies: FEMA(Caldwell), HHS-CDC(Davidson), DHS-DOE Desk(Yates), DOE(Turner), USDA(Thomas), NRC-EPA(Baumgarner).
Ken O'Brien, NRC R3 Chief of the Fuels Cycle Branch, called at 0704 EDT to inform us that Honeywell had a chemical release and they had declared an Alert at 0531 CDT. There was no radiological release associated with this event.
The event occurred when a plant employee attempted to obtain a sample from a tank of antimony pentaflouride. During the sampling process, the tank was inadvertently over pressurized and was vented outside of the building to atmosphere. The winds in the area during the release directed the chemical away from town. The building was isolated and the tank reduced to sub-atmospheric pressure by the plant response personnel. Their were no injuries as a result of the incident.
An all-clear was given at 0655 CDT and the Alert was terminated at 1114 CDT.
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Resident Inspector was notified by Honeywell.
Notified the following federal agencies: FEMA(Caldwell), HHS-CDC(Davidson), DHS-DOE Desk(Yates), DOE(Turner), USDA(Thomas), NRC-EPA(Baumgarner).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40156
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: CHRIS VERDONI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: CHRIS VERDONI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/13/2003
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2003
Event Time: 20:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2003
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2003
Event Time: 20:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 16 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO UNANTICIPATED NEGATIVE AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI).
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual initiation of the RPS, although briefed, was not part of any written pre-planned sequence. The unanticipated negative ASI response that began to approach RPS APD trip settings drove the decision to manually initiate an RPS trip.
"Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 was being shutdown for a planned refueling outage. During scheduled power shutdown at 3% per hour, ASI was trending more negative (power shifting to top of core) than expected. Reactor Engineering was contacted about the trend at 67% reactor power on September 11, 2003. New guidance was issued, however negative ASI trend continued. RPS Axial Power Distribution (APD) pretrip/trip setpoints were -0.55/-0.58 ASI Units. Below 15% power APD trips are bypassed. Operations briefed the continued power descension with manual trip criteria being the receipt of any 1 of 4 APD pretrip setpoints.
"At 15.8% delta T power it became apparent that with ASI approaching APD pretrips (-0.5305 ASIU recorded), an Automatic Trip could be initiated if the downpower continued. At 2055 on September 12, 2003, with power at 15.8% delta T, a briefing was conducted and an manual reactor trip was initiated by tripping the Primary RPS Trip pushbutton on Control Board-4.
"Operations entered EOP-00, "Standard Post Trip Actions" and transitioned to EOP-01, "Reactor Trip Recovery" with all safety functions verified. EOP-01 was exited at 2200 hours and the plant entered OP-3A, "Plant Trip". The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 with RCS Tave at 535 degrees F.
"The only abnormal plant response noted was a feedwater side relief valve lifted and failed to fully reseat on FW-16A, High Pressure Feedwater Heater. The relief valve was cycled by maintenance and was reseated approximately 10 minutes after opening."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual initiation of the RPS, although briefed, was not part of any written pre-planned sequence. The unanticipated negative ASI response that began to approach RPS APD trip settings drove the decision to manually initiate an RPS trip.
"Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 was being shutdown for a planned refueling outage. During scheduled power shutdown at 3% per hour, ASI was trending more negative (power shifting to top of core) than expected. Reactor Engineering was contacted about the trend at 67% reactor power on September 11, 2003. New guidance was issued, however negative ASI trend continued. RPS Axial Power Distribution (APD) pretrip/trip setpoints were -0.55/-0.58 ASI Units. Below 15% power APD trips are bypassed. Operations briefed the continued power descension with manual trip criteria being the receipt of any 1 of 4 APD pretrip setpoints.
"At 15.8% delta T power it became apparent that with ASI approaching APD pretrips (-0.5305 ASIU recorded), an Automatic Trip could be initiated if the downpower continued. At 2055 on September 12, 2003, with power at 15.8% delta T, a briefing was conducted and an manual reactor trip was initiated by tripping the Primary RPS Trip pushbutton on Control Board-4.
"Operations entered EOP-00, "Standard Post Trip Actions" and transitioned to EOP-01, "Reactor Trip Recovery" with all safety functions verified. EOP-01 was exited at 2200 hours and the plant entered OP-3A, "Plant Trip". The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 with RCS Tave at 535 degrees F.
"The only abnormal plant response noted was a feedwater side relief valve lifted and failed to fully reseat on FW-16A, High Pressure Feedwater Heater. The relief valve was cycled by maintenance and was reseated approximately 10 minutes after opening."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.