Event Notification Report for September 11, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/10/2003 - 09/11/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40147
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON ROLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON ROLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/11/2003
Notification Time: 02:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2003
Event Time: 00:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2003
Notification Time: 02:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2003
Event Time: 00:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 63 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (PEMA)
"At 2314 EDT on 9/10/03 a fire was reported at the Unit 1B Reactor Feed Pump. The Fire Brigade was activated and the fire was extinguished at 2322 (8 minutes after identification). To support removal of the feed pump from service reactor power was reduced to 63%. Due to notifying the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and other outside agencies, this event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the Licensee.
"At 2314 EDT on 9/10/03 a fire was reported at the Unit 1B Reactor Feed Pump. The Fire Brigade was activated and the fire was extinguished at 2322 (8 minutes after identification). To support removal of the feed pump from service reactor power was reduced to 63%. Due to notifying the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and other outside agencies, this event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the Licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40151
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: S. SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: S. SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/12/2003
Notification Time: 02:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2003
Event Time: 08:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2003
Notification Time: 02:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2003
Event Time: 08:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY WAS NOT MAINTAINED FOR NON-FISSILE NAMs.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 0845 on 9/11/03, it was discovered that non-fissile negative air machines (NAMs) were not verified by two individuals to contain approved and properly installed filters, as specified in NCSA GEN-09, "Operation and Maintenance of Negative Air Machines". Procedure CP4-GP-BG2108, "Negative Air Machine and in-place HEPA System Internal Inspection and Filter Replacement", did not adequately flowdown requirements specified in NCSA GEN-09 was revised to make non-fissile portable negative air machines (NAMs) readily available for fissile use in emergency situations. Contrary to requirements specific in NCSA GEN-09, procedure CP4-GP-BG2108 did not include requirements for two individuals to perform independent verification that approved filters are selected and properly installed. This control prevents mass loadings of fissile material that are outside the scope of that analyzed in NCSE KY/S-249.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency was not maintained for non-fissile NAMs because the second verification was not performed. However, the non-fissile NAMs were not used for fissile material releases. The non-fissile NAMs have been subsequently verified to contain approved and properly installed filters.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to be possible, a non-fissile NAM would have to be used in a fissile material release and greater than a safe mass of uranium would have to accumulate within the NAM in a configuration favorable for criticality.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency for the accumulation of an unsafe fissile mass is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
This system has a process limit of (xx) wt% U235.
NUCLEAR CRITICLITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency is based on one individual verifying and documenting that approved filters are selected and properly installed. This control prevents loadings of fissile material that are outside the scope of that analyzed in NCSE KY/S-249. This verification was performed, therefore, this control was maintained.
The second leg of double contingency is based on a different individual verifying and documenting that approved filters are selected and properly installed. This control prevents loadings of fissile material that are outside the scope of the analyzed in NCSE KY/S-249. Because this verification was not performed, this control was lost. No events have occurred to introduce fissile material into any non-fissile NAMs. Therefore, though the control was violated, the parameter was maintained.
Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, and one control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Non-fissile Nams verified to contain the correct filters and installed in the correct orientation. Completed 9/11/2003.
2. Procedure CP4-GP-BG2108 placed on hold pending revision to include independent verification requirements specific in NCSA GEN-09. Completed 9/11/2003.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
At 0845 on 9/11/03, it was discovered that non-fissile negative air machines (NAMs) were not verified by two individuals to contain approved and properly installed filters, as specified in NCSA GEN-09, "Operation and Maintenance of Negative Air Machines". Procedure CP4-GP-BG2108, "Negative Air Machine and in-place HEPA System Internal Inspection and Filter Replacement", did not adequately flowdown requirements specified in NCSA GEN-09 was revised to make non-fissile portable negative air machines (NAMs) readily available for fissile use in emergency situations. Contrary to requirements specific in NCSA GEN-09, procedure CP4-GP-BG2108 did not include requirements for two individuals to perform independent verification that approved filters are selected and properly installed. This control prevents mass loadings of fissile material that are outside the scope of that analyzed in NCSE KY/S-249.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency was not maintained for non-fissile NAMs because the second verification was not performed. However, the non-fissile NAMs were not used for fissile material releases. The non-fissile NAMs have been subsequently verified to contain approved and properly installed filters.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to be possible, a non-fissile NAM would have to be used in a fissile material release and greater than a safe mass of uranium would have to accumulate within the NAM in a configuration favorable for criticality.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency for the accumulation of an unsafe fissile mass is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
This system has a process limit of (xx) wt% U235.
NUCLEAR CRITICLITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency is based on one individual verifying and documenting that approved filters are selected and properly installed. This control prevents loadings of fissile material that are outside the scope of that analyzed in NCSE KY/S-249. This verification was performed, therefore, this control was maintained.
The second leg of double contingency is based on a different individual verifying and documenting that approved filters are selected and properly installed. This control prevents loadings of fissile material that are outside the scope of the analyzed in NCSE KY/S-249. Because this verification was not performed, this control was lost. No events have occurred to introduce fissile material into any non-fissile NAMs. Therefore, though the control was violated, the parameter was maintained.
Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, and one control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Non-fissile Nams verified to contain the correct filters and installed in the correct orientation. Completed 9/11/2003.
2. Procedure CP4-GP-BG2108 placed on hold pending revision to include independent verification requirements specific in NCSA GEN-09. Completed 9/11/2003.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40149
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: ATL INC.
Region: 4
City: MESA State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-116
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: ATL INC.
Region: 4
City: MESA State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-116
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 09/11/2003
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2003
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
VICTOR GONZALES (MEXI)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
VICTOR GONZALES (MEXI)
STOLEN SOIL DENSITY MOISTURE GAUGE
The following information was provided via facsimile:
"On September 11, 2003, and prior to 6:00 AM, a soil density moisture gauge was stolen from the back of a pickup truck located at (Deleted), Mesa, AZ. The gauge is a Troxler Model 4640, Serial Number 2443 and was contained in a yellow shipping container. It was reported that the gauge was originally chained and locked in the rear of the pickup bed and the chain and lock were missing. This Agency was notified and the Mesa Police are investigating. The company is offering a $500.00 for information leading to the recovery and return of the gauge.
"The initial investigation indicates that several violations may have occurred.
"The Agency and licensee's will continue to investigate this occurrence and report further. The U.S. NRC, FBI, Mexico, and the states of Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico and California are being informed of the incident."
The following information was provided via facsimile:
"On September 11, 2003, and prior to 6:00 AM, a soil density moisture gauge was stolen from the back of a pickup truck located at (Deleted), Mesa, AZ. The gauge is a Troxler Model 4640, Serial Number 2443 and was contained in a yellow shipping container. It was reported that the gauge was originally chained and locked in the rear of the pickup bed and the chain and lock were missing. This Agency was notified and the Mesa Police are investigating. The company is offering a $500.00 for information leading to the recovery and return of the gauge.
"The initial investigation indicates that several violations may have occurred.
"The Agency and licensee's will continue to investigate this occurrence and report further. The U.S. NRC, FBI, Mexico, and the states of Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico and California are being informed of the incident."