Event Notification Report for September 05, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/04/2003 - 09/05/2003
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40134
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON E. ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON E. ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/05/2003
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2003
Event Time: 09:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2003
Event Time: 09:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE.
"At 09:30 EDT, Unit 1 was performing the HPCI Quarterly Flow verification surveillance. Shortly after the initiation of the system an abnormally loud bang was heard. System flow of approximately 5200 gpm and discharge pressure of approximately 1300 psi was achieved at approximately 09:33. Approximately 4 seconds after reaching rated system flow HPCI discharge pressure increased to approximately 1675 psi and system flow dropped to approximately 2700 gpm. HPCI had been declared inoperable at 08:35 EDT to perform the surveillance and will remain inoperable until the cause of the loss of system flow is corrected. Because HPCI is a single train ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] safety system, this event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2.
"There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service."
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is fully operable and HPCI entered Tech Spec 3.5.1 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other ECCS systems are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WALSH TO CROUCH ON 10/02/03 @ 1548 EDT* * *
"On 09/05/2003, PPL Susquehanna LLC made an ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to an apparent loss of the HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] safety function. In the event, results of HPCI Quarterly Flow Surveillance testing did not meet acceptance criteria established for the system.
"Investigation into the cause of the failed HPCI surveillance revealed a 360-degree weld crack on the HPCI Test Line to Condensate Storage Tank [CST] Valve, HV155F008. HV155F008 is not in the reactor vessel injection flowpath. The impact of this crack, which was located between the valve seat cage assembly and the valve body, was that the HPCI Test Line to CST valve was not capable of throttling over the full range of HPCI system flows. Valve performance became erratic at higher flows because the valve seat cage was lifted out of the valve body into the flow path, increasing system resistance, and preventing attainment of design flow in the HPCI test loop.
"While the ability to effectively test the HPCI system using the test return path to the CST was compromised, the HPCI injection flowpath to the reactor vessel was not adversely affected by the damaged valve. Accordingly, the HPCI system maintained full capability for providing sufficient coolant to the reactor vessel in the event of a small break loss-of-coolant accident. Because the HPCI safety function was not compromised by the identified test path obstruction, this ENS notification is being retracted."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cobey).
"At 09:30 EDT, Unit 1 was performing the HPCI Quarterly Flow verification surveillance. Shortly after the initiation of the system an abnormally loud bang was heard. System flow of approximately 5200 gpm and discharge pressure of approximately 1300 psi was achieved at approximately 09:33. Approximately 4 seconds after reaching rated system flow HPCI discharge pressure increased to approximately 1675 psi and system flow dropped to approximately 2700 gpm. HPCI had been declared inoperable at 08:35 EDT to perform the surveillance and will remain inoperable until the cause of the loss of system flow is corrected. Because HPCI is a single train ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] safety system, this event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2.
"There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service."
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is fully operable and HPCI entered Tech Spec 3.5.1 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other ECCS systems are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WALSH TO CROUCH ON 10/02/03 @ 1548 EDT* * *
"On 09/05/2003, PPL Susquehanna LLC made an ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to an apparent loss of the HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] safety function. In the event, results of HPCI Quarterly Flow Surveillance testing did not meet acceptance criteria established for the system.
"Investigation into the cause of the failed HPCI surveillance revealed a 360-degree weld crack on the HPCI Test Line to Condensate Storage Tank [CST] Valve, HV155F008. HV155F008 is not in the reactor vessel injection flowpath. The impact of this crack, which was located between the valve seat cage assembly and the valve body, was that the HPCI Test Line to CST valve was not capable of throttling over the full range of HPCI system flows. Valve performance became erratic at higher flows because the valve seat cage was lifted out of the valve body into the flow path, increasing system resistance, and preventing attainment of design flow in the HPCI test loop.
"While the ability to effectively test the HPCI system using the test return path to the CST was compromised, the HPCI injection flowpath to the reactor vessel was not adversely affected by the damaged valve. Accordingly, the HPCI system maintained full capability for providing sufficient coolant to the reactor vessel in the event of a small break loss-of-coolant accident. Because the HPCI safety function was not compromised by the identified test path obstruction, this ENS notification is being retracted."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cobey).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40135
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THAD REAMES
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THAD REAMES
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 09/05/2003
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2003
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2003
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2003
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE MEDICAL EVENT AT McGUIRE
"Transport of a potentially radioactively contaminated person to Carolinas Medical Center due to head and neck injury. This is a conservative classification. Initial frisks of the injured individual did not reveal any contamination. His back could not be frisked because he was on a stretcher with potential head and neck injuries."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*****UPDATE ON 9/5/03 AT 13:00 FROM REAMER TO LAURA*****
Further radiological surveys determined the individual was not contaminated.
"Transport of a potentially radioactively contaminated person to Carolinas Medical Center due to head and neck injury. This is a conservative classification. Initial frisks of the injured individual did not reveal any contamination. His back could not be frisked because he was on a stretcher with potential head and neck injuries."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*****UPDATE ON 9/5/03 AT 13:00 FROM REAMER TO LAURA*****
Further radiological surveys determined the individual was not contaminated.