Event Notification Report for August 19, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/18/2003 - 08/19/2003
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40089
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL GINZEL
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL GINZEL
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 08/20/2003
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2003
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
PARTIAL LOSS OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DUE TO PIPE LEAK AT HONEYWELL METROPOLIS
The fire protection system became inoperable to the Feeds Material and Fluorine Plant when an underground water leak on the fire suppression system was discovered and isolated. This caused the fire protection system water supply to be isolated to the Feeds Material and Fluorine Plant and thereby disabling a safety system. The fire system (water suppression system) to the Feeds Material and Fluorine Plant remains out of service pending repair of the failed pipe. No estimate of the time required to repair and return to service of the fire suppression system water supply is available at this time.
Licensee compensatory measures include the establishment of a fire watch and staging of fire hose to stations normally supplied by the fire suppression water system
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region 3 (Ken O'Brien) of this event.
The licensee has reported similar events under EN #39899 and EN #40015
The fire protection system became inoperable to the Feeds Material and Fluorine Plant when an underground water leak on the fire suppression system was discovered and isolated. This caused the fire protection system water supply to be isolated to the Feeds Material and Fluorine Plant and thereby disabling a safety system. The fire system (water suppression system) to the Feeds Material and Fluorine Plant remains out of service pending repair of the failed pipe. No estimate of the time required to repair and return to service of the fire suppression system water supply is available at this time.
Licensee compensatory measures include the establishment of a fire watch and staging of fire hose to stations normally supplied by the fire suppression water system
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region 3 (Ken O'Brien) of this event.
The licensee has reported similar events under EN #39899 and EN #40015
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40206
Rep Org: FRAMATOME ANP
Licensee: EATON CUTLER HAMMER
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAN STARR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Licensee: EATON CUTLER HAMMER
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAN STARR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 09/30/2003
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2003
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
JACK FOSTER (NRR)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
JACK FOSTER (NRR)
PART 21 REPORT
A potential safety concern was reported regarding failure of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Freedom Series Heater Pack due to a possible defect in the weld which joins the screw terminal to the heater coil. The following conditions could potentially occur:
- Open circuit resulting in loss of current to a pole in the overload relay. If the load was not running at the time of failure, it would draw excessive current during its next attempted start, and either trip the overload or damage the load. If the load was running at the time of failure, it would slow to a stop while drawing excessive current, which would either trip the overload or damage the load.
- If two heaters failed in the same load, a shock hazard could develop due to voltage to ground on the remaining phase.
The affected Heater Packs are H2009B-3 through H2011B-3, and H2012B-3 through H2017B-3. The following NRC Licensees are affected: DC Cook, Vogtle, and Beaver Valley, Framatome-ANP Inc. in Lynchburg, VA.
Corrective actions by the supplier include daily inspection/replacement of weld electrodes, and destructive sample testing. Corrective actions by Framatome include dedication activities that address weld integrity acceptance.
Framatome recommends licensees replace all affected Heater Packs.
A potential safety concern was reported regarding failure of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Freedom Series Heater Pack due to a possible defect in the weld which joins the screw terminal to the heater coil. The following conditions could potentially occur:
- Open circuit resulting in loss of current to a pole in the overload relay. If the load was not running at the time of failure, it would draw excessive current during its next attempted start, and either trip the overload or damage the load. If the load was running at the time of failure, it would slow to a stop while drawing excessive current, which would either trip the overload or damage the load.
- If two heaters failed in the same load, a shock hazard could develop due to voltage to ground on the remaining phase.
The affected Heater Packs are H2009B-3 through H2011B-3, and H2012B-3 through H2017B-3. The following NRC Licensees are affected: DC Cook, Vogtle, and Beaver Valley, Framatome-ANP Inc. in Lynchburg, VA.
Corrective actions by the supplier include daily inspection/replacement of weld electrodes, and destructive sample testing. Corrective actions by Framatome include dedication activities that address weld integrity acceptance.
Framatome recommends licensees replace all affected Heater Packs.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 40105
Rep Org: PUBLIC HEALTH LAB, SAN JUAN
Licensee: PUBLIC HEALTH LAB, SAN JUAN
Region: 2
City: SAN JUAN State: PR
County:
License #: 52-719560-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dr. MOLINARIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: PUBLIC HEALTH LAB, SAN JUAN
Region: 2
City: SAN JUAN State: PR
County:
License #: 52-719560-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dr. MOLINARIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/26/2003
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2003
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
TWO GAS CHROMATOGRAPHS ACCIDENTALLY DISPOSED OF TO A LANDFILL
On 08/19/03 The Public Health Lab in San Juan, Puerto Rico accidentally disposed of 2 Gas Chromatographs, Model 8500 manufactured by Perkin-Elmer. The Gas Chromatographs ended up in a San Juan landfill. The trash company said that it would nearly be impossible to find the 2 Gas Chromatographs because they were now under tons of dirt. This incident was reported to Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan Radiation Safety Officer on 08/25/03. The caller did not know what type of radioisotope or the strength of the radioisotope in each Gas Chromatographs.
Search of former events revealed that Perkin-Elmer Gas Chromatographs normally contain a 15 millicurie Ni-63 source.
On 08/19/03 The Public Health Lab in San Juan, Puerto Rico accidentally disposed of 2 Gas Chromatographs, Model 8500 manufactured by Perkin-Elmer. The Gas Chromatographs ended up in a San Juan landfill. The trash company said that it would nearly be impossible to find the 2 Gas Chromatographs because they were now under tons of dirt. This incident was reported to Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan Radiation Safety Officer on 08/25/03. The caller did not know what type of radioisotope or the strength of the radioisotope in each Gas Chromatographs.
Search of former events revealed that Perkin-Elmer Gas Chromatographs normally contain a 15 millicurie Ni-63 source.