Event Notification Report for August 01, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/31/2003 - 08/01/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40043
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS COTE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS COTE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/01/2003
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2003
Event Time: 11:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2003
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2003
Event Time: 11:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOE STAMBAUGH (DOE)
PO SLACH (EPA)
RICHARD DAVIDSON (HHS)
MIKE EACHES (FEMA)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOE STAMBAUGH (DOE)
PO SLACH (EPA)
RICHARD DAVIDSON (HHS)
MIKE EACHES (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO MINOR OIL SPILL
The following information was received by the licensee via facsimile:
"During the restoration of the 0A River Screen House air compressor, lubricating oil leaked internal to the compressor and was blown down to a drain trench which discharged to the Rock River. A film or sheen of approximately 2 square feet was observed on the Rock River water surface. An estimated three cups of lubricating oil was discharged [through] the drain trench to the Rock River. Based on this information, a notification to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) was performed within 15 minutes, and notification to the National Response Center within 1 hour was performed. Actions taken to stop the discharge include isolation of the air compressor blowdown flowpath and placement of oil absorbent rags at the discharge location to the Rock River. The discharge of oil has been terminated."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received by the licensee via facsimile:
"During the restoration of the 0A River Screen House air compressor, lubricating oil leaked internal to the compressor and was blown down to a drain trench which discharged to the Rock River. A film or sheen of approximately 2 square feet was observed on the Rock River water surface. An estimated three cups of lubricating oil was discharged [through] the drain trench to the Rock River. Based on this information, a notification to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) was performed within 15 minutes, and notification to the National Response Center within 1 hour was performed. Actions taken to stop the discharge include isolation of the air compressor blowdown flowpath and placement of oil absorbent rags at the discharge location to the Rock River. The discharge of oil has been terminated."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40126
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: KEN RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: KEN RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/02/2003
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2003
Event Time: 21:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2003
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2003
Event Time: 21:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF DIVISION 2 BALANCE-OF-POWER INBOARD ISOLATION VALVES
"On August 1, 2003, at 2118 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced an actuation of several Division 2 Balance-of-Plant (BOP) inboard isolation valves. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 (Power Operation). The isolation closed one or more valves in each of the following Division 2 subsystems: Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled Water, Reactor Water Sampling, Drywell and Containment Radiation Monitoring, and Control Room Ventilation.
"The event is considered an invalid system actuation, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. It meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Therefore, notification is being provided via 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). All systems functioned as expected for a partial BOP (inboard) isolation.
"Repositioning of the valves did not present operational concerns; they were re-opened per restoration procedures.
The BOP isolation was attributed to an electrical transient on 120 volt AC electrical bus EK-1-B1 as a result of a failed capacitor. The capacitor had been previously replaced during Refuel Outage 9.
"This event was documented in the Corrective Action Program. Remedial actions include replacement of the defective capacitor. The capacitor will be sent out for failure analysis."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On August 1, 2003, at 2118 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced an actuation of several Division 2 Balance-of-Plant (BOP) inboard isolation valves. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 (Power Operation). The isolation closed one or more valves in each of the following Division 2 subsystems: Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled Water, Reactor Water Sampling, Drywell and Containment Radiation Monitoring, and Control Room Ventilation.
"The event is considered an invalid system actuation, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. It meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Therefore, notification is being provided via 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). All systems functioned as expected for a partial BOP (inboard) isolation.
"Repositioning of the valves did not present operational concerns; they were re-opened per restoration procedures.
The BOP isolation was attributed to an electrical transient on 120 volt AC electrical bus EK-1-B1 as a result of a failed capacitor. The capacitor had been previously replaced during Refuel Outage 9.
"This event was documented in the Corrective Action Program. Remedial actions include replacement of the defective capacitor. The capacitor will be sent out for failure analysis."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.