Event Notification Report for July 22, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/21/2003 - 07/22/2003
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40008
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GERRY STOCKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GERRY STOCKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/22/2003
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 09:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 09:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HELB DOOR NOT LATCHED AS REQUIRED DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR
"A High Energy Line Break (HELB) door was not latched as required. This condition is being reported as an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The door is currently closed."
The HELB door which separates two critical Motor Control Center [MCC] areas was unlatched for less than two (2) minutes. The licensee will inform the state representative and has informed the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION on 08/27/03 at 1216 EDT by R. Sand to John MacKinnon * * *
Because plant safety was not significantly degraded, this event is not reportable under the unanalyzed condition criteria based on: (1) the door in either event was in an uncontrolled condition for less than one minute, (2) the door was not materially affected, only operated improperly, (3) the PRA significance of the event was low, and (4) the HELB Barrier door was not open for a period longer than is allowed by station procedural guidance. R3DO (C. Miller) notified.
The station continues to review the event in the station's corrective action program.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
"A High Energy Line Break (HELB) door was not latched as required. This condition is being reported as an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The door is currently closed."
The HELB door which separates two critical Motor Control Center [MCC] areas was unlatched for less than two (2) minutes. The licensee will inform the state representative and has informed the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION on 08/27/03 at 1216 EDT by R. Sand to John MacKinnon * * *
Because plant safety was not significantly degraded, this event is not reportable under the unanalyzed condition criteria based on: (1) the door in either event was in an uncontrolled condition for less than one minute, (2) the door was not materially affected, only operated improperly, (3) the PRA significance of the event was low, and (4) the HELB Barrier door was not open for a period longer than is allowed by station procedural guidance. R3DO (C. Miller) notified.
The station continues to review the event in the station's corrective action program.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40009
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/22/2003
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 14:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2003
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 14:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONCERNING MINOR OIL SPILL
"On 7-22-03 at 1100, approximately 1 gallon of fuel oil was spilled during a diesel generator fuel oil transfer surveillance test due to a leak at a hose connection. It is estimated that 1 quart of fuel oil went into a nearby floor drain. As a result, a visible sheen of oil was observed on a swamp area on plant site. This is a reportable spill to government agencies since there is a visible sheen on "waters of the United States". The US Coast Guard National Response Center was notified at 1456 on 7/22/03 and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management was notified at 1510 on 7/22/03."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 7-22-03 at 1100, approximately 1 gallon of fuel oil was spilled during a diesel generator fuel oil transfer surveillance test due to a leak at a hose connection. It is estimated that 1 quart of fuel oil went into a nearby floor drain. As a result, a visible sheen of oil was observed on a swamp area on plant site. This is a reportable spill to government agencies since there is a visible sheen on "waters of the United States". The US Coast Guard National Response Center was notified at 1456 on 7/22/03 and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management was notified at 1510 on 7/22/03."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40010
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/22/2003
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 13:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2003
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 13:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTIVE RELAY ACTUATION
"With Unit 2 operating at 100% power, a Main Generator protective relay actuation occurred causing a Main Turbine trip and automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The RPS signal received was Main Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. RPS functioned as designed and all control rods fully inserted. Group II and III primary containment isolations went to completion and Standby Gas Treatment automatically started when reactor level reached the setpoint of 1" reactor level.
"At 1358, with Standby Gas Treatment System in operation, Main Steam Tunnel temperatures rose to the Group I isolation setpoint and a Group I isolation occurred. There was not a steam leak that caused the Group I isolation. Following the Group I isolation, reactor level again lowered to the 1" RPS actuation and Group II/III isolation setpoint. All control rods were fully inserted when this RPS actuation occurred. With containment isolated, HPCI and RCIC were used to control reactor level.
"At 1615 hours, while transitioning reactor level control to condensate, a RPS actuation, Group II, and Group III isolation occurred when reactor level reached the setpoint of 1". All control rods were fully inserted at the time. All containment isolation valves that were opened following the initial actuation, isolated as expected.
"All primary containment parameters are currently normal. The crew has stabilized the plant and plant recovery actions have commenced. The cause of the Main Generator protective relay actuation is not known at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"With Unit 2 operating at 100% power, a Main Generator protective relay actuation occurred causing a Main Turbine trip and automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The RPS signal received was Main Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. RPS functioned as designed and all control rods fully inserted. Group II and III primary containment isolations went to completion and Standby Gas Treatment automatically started when reactor level reached the setpoint of 1" reactor level.
"At 1358, with Standby Gas Treatment System in operation, Main Steam Tunnel temperatures rose to the Group I isolation setpoint and a Group I isolation occurred. There was not a steam leak that caused the Group I isolation. Following the Group I isolation, reactor level again lowered to the 1" RPS actuation and Group II/III isolation setpoint. All control rods were fully inserted when this RPS actuation occurred. With containment isolated, HPCI and RCIC were used to control reactor level.
"At 1615 hours, while transitioning reactor level control to condensate, a RPS actuation, Group II, and Group III isolation occurred when reactor level reached the setpoint of 1". All control rods were fully inserted at the time. All containment isolation valves that were opened following the initial actuation, isolated as expected.
"All primary containment parameters are currently normal. The crew has stabilized the plant and plant recovery actions have commenced. The cause of the Main Generator protective relay actuation is not known at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.