Event Notification Report for July 17, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/16/2003 - 07/17/2003
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40002
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: HASTINGS STATE BANK
Region: 4
City: LINCOLN State: NE
County:
License #: GL0377
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: HASTINGS STATE BANK
Region: 4
City: LINCOLN State: NE
County:
License #: GL0377
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/17/2003
Notification Time: 10:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2003
Notification Time: 10:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
MATT HAHN (IAT)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
MATT HAHN (IAT)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO LOST EXIT SIGNS THAT CONTAIN TRITIUM
At 1042 EDT on 7/17/03, a Nebraska Radiation Program Radiation Health Specialist reported that a licensee, Hastings State Bank, could not account for two tritium-based exit signs. The bank is buying a building that previously housed a bank. Nebraska State Radiation Program billed the new bank for the materials license associated with the exit signs. The new branch manager of the Hastings Bank was unable to locate the exit signs in question. In April of 1989, each sign contained 4.7 curies of tritium. The State of Nebraska will be visiting the site when the new bank opens in August.
At 1042 EDT on 7/17/03, a Nebraska Radiation Program Radiation Health Specialist reported that a licensee, Hastings State Bank, could not account for two tritium-based exit signs. The bank is buying a building that previously housed a bank. Nebraska State Radiation Program billed the new bank for the materials license associated with the exit signs. The new branch manager of the Hastings Bank was unable to locate the exit signs in question. In April of 1989, each sign contained 4.7 curies of tritium. The State of Nebraska will be visiting the site when the new bank opens in August.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40004
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SYNDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SYNDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/17/2003
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2003
Event Time: 03:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2003
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2003
Event Time: 03:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN NOTIFICATION INVOLVING LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL
The following is a portion of text from a fax submitted by the licensee:
"Pump-Out to UNBSS Without Sample Results.
"Reason for Notification: An operator pumped out a batch from the clean dissolver to the uranyl nitrate bulk storage tank prior to receiving the required sample results for grams U-235 per liter, percent free acid, and pH.
"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the bulk storage tank is based on concentration control. Concentration control is based upon maintaining uranyl nitrate that is pumped to the tanks at less than 5 grams U-235/liter. The pH is maintained at a value of less than 2 to ensure that the uranyl nitrate stays in solution. The percent free acid is maintained at greater than 4 percent to ensure that the uranyl nitrate stays in solution and depresses the freezing temperature of the solution to prevent concentration by freezing.
"It has been determined that less than previously documented double contingency protection remained for the system and that greater than a safe mass was involved., but a sufficient number of controls that were lost were restored within 4 hours. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
"As Found Condition: See 'Reason for Notification' above.
"Summary of Activity: (1) Pump outs to the bulk storage tanks were stopped, (2) Samples for grams U-235/liter, pH, and %free acid were taken to ensure the tanks were in specification, (3) Before the end of the shift, sample results for grants U-235/liter, pH, and %free acid were determined to be acceptable.
"Conclusions: (1) Loss of double contingency protection occurred, (2) Greater than a safe mass was involved, (3) At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved, (4) The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures, (5) Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis, (6) A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee attributes the cause of this incident to personnel error. The licensee will inform both NRC Region 2 and the NRC Headquarters PM.
The following is a portion of text from a fax submitted by the licensee:
"Pump-Out to UNBSS Without Sample Results.
"Reason for Notification: An operator pumped out a batch from the clean dissolver to the uranyl nitrate bulk storage tank prior to receiving the required sample results for grams U-235 per liter, percent free acid, and pH.
"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the bulk storage tank is based on concentration control. Concentration control is based upon maintaining uranyl nitrate that is pumped to the tanks at less than 5 grams U-235/liter. The pH is maintained at a value of less than 2 to ensure that the uranyl nitrate stays in solution. The percent free acid is maintained at greater than 4 percent to ensure that the uranyl nitrate stays in solution and depresses the freezing temperature of the solution to prevent concentration by freezing.
"It has been determined that less than previously documented double contingency protection remained for the system and that greater than a safe mass was involved., but a sufficient number of controls that were lost were restored within 4 hours. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
"As Found Condition: See 'Reason for Notification' above.
"Summary of Activity: (1) Pump outs to the bulk storage tanks were stopped, (2) Samples for grams U-235/liter, pH, and %free acid were taken to ensure the tanks were in specification, (3) Before the end of the shift, sample results for grants U-235/liter, pH, and %free acid were determined to be acceptable.
"Conclusions: (1) Loss of double contingency protection occurred, (2) Greater than a safe mass was involved, (3) At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved, (4) The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures, (5) Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis, (6) A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee attributes the cause of this incident to personnel error. The licensee will inform both NRC Region 2 and the NRC Headquarters PM.