Event Notification Report for July 15, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/14/2003 - 07/15/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39996
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/15/2003
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2003
Event Time: 13:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2003
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2003
Event Time: 13:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
"On 07/15/03 at 1340hrs [CDT], the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power upon loss of G-06 rod drive motor-generator (MG) set. Automatic transfer of the G-06 MG set to G-07 MG set did not occur. Automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater occurred. The cause of the failure of the G-06 rod drive MG set is being investigated. All systems operated as expected."
G-06 rod drive MG set was carrying the load and running in parallel with rod drive MG set G-07 when it started to smoke. Rod drive MG set G-06 did not automatically transfer its load to rod drive MG set G-07. No fire was seen and rod drive MG set G-06 was electrically secured. All rods fully inserted into the core. The first out annunciator for the reactor trip was overtemperature delta temperature trip. The Turbine Driven and both Motor Driven Auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected. Currently the licensee is using one train of main feedwater to maintain proper steam generator water level. All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"On 07/15/03 at 1340hrs [CDT], the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power upon loss of G-06 rod drive motor-generator (MG) set. Automatic transfer of the G-06 MG set to G-07 MG set did not occur. Automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater occurred. The cause of the failure of the G-06 rod drive MG set is being investigated. All systems operated as expected."
G-06 rod drive MG set was carrying the load and running in parallel with rod drive MG set G-07 when it started to smoke. Rod drive MG set G-06 did not automatically transfer its load to rod drive MG set G-07. No fire was seen and rod drive MG set G-06 was electrically secured. All rods fully inserted into the core. The first out annunciator for the reactor trip was overtemperature delta temperature trip. The Turbine Driven and both Motor Driven Auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected. Currently the licensee is using one train of main feedwater to maintain proper steam generator water level. All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39997
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SCHAEFER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SCHAEFER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/15/2003
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2003
Event Time: 15:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2003
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2003
Event Time: 15:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
22 OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"South Texas Project is making this eight hour notification IAW 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) for "Loss of Offsite Response Capability". Currently, due to local power outages, 10 sirens are available and 22 sirens are not available. Compensatory actions are in place to alert the public if necessary. There are three compensatory actions: local law enforcement officials are prepared to respond to areas where the sirens are not available to alert the public, a community alert network is in place to activate a phone tree to local residents and tone alert radios with residents. Power restoration and recovery actions are in progress." State and local officials will be notified of this event by the licensee.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/25/03 AT 1112 EDT FROM SCOTT HEAD TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The licensee reported that all 22 of the sirens previously reported as "not available" have been returned to service as of 0900 CDT on 7/24/03. All Offsite Notification Sirens are operable and available at this time. Notified NRC Region 4 DO (Troy Pruett).
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"South Texas Project is making this eight hour notification IAW 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) for "Loss of Offsite Response Capability". Currently, due to local power outages, 10 sirens are available and 22 sirens are not available. Compensatory actions are in place to alert the public if necessary. There are three compensatory actions: local law enforcement officials are prepared to respond to areas where the sirens are not available to alert the public, a community alert network is in place to activate a phone tree to local residents and tone alert radios with residents. Power restoration and recovery actions are in progress." State and local officials will be notified of this event by the licensee.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/25/03 AT 1112 EDT FROM SCOTT HEAD TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The licensee reported that all 22 of the sirens previously reported as "not available" have been returned to service as of 0900 CDT on 7/24/03. All Offsite Notification Sirens are operable and available at this time. Notified NRC Region 4 DO (Troy Pruett).
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39998
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: DAVID WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: DAVID WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/15/2003
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2003
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2003
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2003
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
TEMPORARY PROCEDURE TO COMPACT AIR FILTER PAPER NCS FUNCTION WAS NOT REVIEWED OR APPROVED
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
"Time and Date of Event
23 Jan 2003 - 19 Mar 2003
"Reason for Notification
"On January 23rd 2003, the process engineer generated a temporary procedure to compact air filter paper, and did not place the NCS function on review or approval. The temporary procedure was approved and the process was performed, in violation of the bounding assumptions of the LLRW ISA (compact filter paper was the end product). The process engineer later placed the same process in a formal operating procedure that was reviewed by NCS. On February 20th, the NCS reviewer withheld approval of the formal operating procedure since the "proposed" process would violate the bounding assumptions of the ISA and, therefore, require further analysis and an ISA license annex revision before approval could be given. The NCS engineer informed the process engineer that such analysis was necessary and it was placed in the NCS work queue. The process engineer did not inform the NCS engineer that the process had already been performed. When starting the safety analysis on June 30th 2003, the NCS engineer found records of completed filter paper and subsequent investigation revealed the temporary procedure on July 1, 2003. The temporary procedure had been retired on March 19th, although drums of compacted filter media continued to be created in the item control system into at least April 2003.
"Double Contingency Protection
"The compaction unit is authorized to be used for volume reduction of noncombustible material that was previously determined to be free of gross contamination in the originating area, and verified to be free of gross contamination by the URRS operator before being placed into the compactor. A criticality would be possible only if an excessive accumulation of uranium occurred with sufficient moderating materials.
"The compactor system was operated outside there documented safety basis stated in the ISA. A 24- hour notification, therefore, is being issued.
"As Found Condition
"Drums contained a range of grams U-235 values from near zero to approximately 50 grams U-235. These low gram U-235 values reflect the low Uranium loading in the filter media. The filter paper media is removed from the filters and "tapped" to remove "loose" material, but is not considered to be "free of gross contamination" due to ability to retain imbedded material.
"Summary of Activity
"1. The process had already been stopped when discovered.
"2. The content of each drum was reviewed and found to contain less than 50g U-235.
"3. Selected drums were opened and visually inspected. All were in a safe condition.
"Conclusions
"1. Much less than a safe mass was involved.
"2. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy.
"No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
"3. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
"4. Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis.
"5. A causal analysis will be performed."
The certificate holder informed NRC Region 2 (M. Crespo) of this event.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
"Time and Date of Event
23 Jan 2003 - 19 Mar 2003
"Reason for Notification
"On January 23rd 2003, the process engineer generated a temporary procedure to compact air filter paper, and did not place the NCS function on review or approval. The temporary procedure was approved and the process was performed, in violation of the bounding assumptions of the LLRW ISA (compact filter paper was the end product). The process engineer later placed the same process in a formal operating procedure that was reviewed by NCS. On February 20th, the NCS reviewer withheld approval of the formal operating procedure since the "proposed" process would violate the bounding assumptions of the ISA and, therefore, require further analysis and an ISA license annex revision before approval could be given. The NCS engineer informed the process engineer that such analysis was necessary and it was placed in the NCS work queue. The process engineer did not inform the NCS engineer that the process had already been performed. When starting the safety analysis on June 30th 2003, the NCS engineer found records of completed filter paper and subsequent investigation revealed the temporary procedure on July 1, 2003. The temporary procedure had been retired on March 19th, although drums of compacted filter media continued to be created in the item control system into at least April 2003.
"Double Contingency Protection
"The compaction unit is authorized to be used for volume reduction of noncombustible material that was previously determined to be free of gross contamination in the originating area, and verified to be free of gross contamination by the URRS operator before being placed into the compactor. A criticality would be possible only if an excessive accumulation of uranium occurred with sufficient moderating materials.
"The compactor system was operated outside there documented safety basis stated in the ISA. A 24- hour notification, therefore, is being issued.
"As Found Condition
"Drums contained a range of grams U-235 values from near zero to approximately 50 grams U-235. These low gram U-235 values reflect the low Uranium loading in the filter media. The filter paper media is removed from the filters and "tapped" to remove "loose" material, but is not considered to be "free of gross contamination" due to ability to retain imbedded material.
"Summary of Activity
"1. The process had already been stopped when discovered.
"2. The content of each drum was reviewed and found to contain less than 50g U-235.
"3. Selected drums were opened and visually inspected. All were in a safe condition.
"Conclusions
"1. Much less than a safe mass was involved.
"2. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy.
"No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
"3. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
"4. Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis.
"5. A causal analysis will be performed."
The certificate holder informed NRC Region 2 (M. Crespo) of this event.