Event Notification Report for July 08, 2003

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY

"At approximately 10:58 hours (EDT) on July 8, 2003, a fiber optic cable that provides service to H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, was removed from service due to highway bridge repairs on State Road 23, Old Camden Road, approximately 1.5 miles west of the plant site. This resulted in the loss of circuits supported by Bellsouth, which includes the selective signaling system for communication with the state and counties, an additional phone system for internal and external communication called ESSX, the NRC T1 link, and dial 9 service from the internal plant telephone system. Communications capability remained available via the on-site PBX telephone service, cellular phone service, satellite phone, and the Progress Energy Voicenet system.

"At approximately 09:00 hours [EDT], Bellsouth personnel informed HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, personnel of the plan to temporarily remove the cable from service at approximately 11:00 hours [EDT] in support of the bridge repair work. HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, Emergency Preparedness personnel notified the control room Superintendent of Shift Operations pertaining to the impending communications outage and verified that a cellular phone and satellite phone were available in the control room. The state and county emergency operation centers, warning points, and back-up warning points were notified of the planned communications link outage prior to its removal from service. The fiber optic cable was placed back in service at approximately 14:51 hours [EDT] and the systems were subsequently tested satisfactorily.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability. The capability to provide notification as required was maintained by use of alternate systems, specifically cellular phone, satellite phone, and the Progress Energy Voicenet system. The resident inspector has been notified."

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING [RCIC] RENDERED INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

The following is a portion of a fax submitted by the licensee:

"This ENS notification is made to report that on July 8, 2003 at 10:08 PDT Reactor Core Isolation Cooling was rendered inoperable when its inboard containment isolation valve inadvertently closed during the performance of a routine surveillance procedure. The surveillance test was discontinued and plant operators entered the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statements. The RCIC system was restored to its normal standby lineup and declared operable within one hour.

"Initially the event was not considered reportable to the NRC based on guidance contained in NUREG 1022, 'Event Reporting Guidelines,' and NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001-14, 'Position on Reportability Requirements for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Failure.' RIS 2001-14 indicates that RCIC failures are not reportable unless the RCIC system is specifically credited in the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report for mitigating the consequences of a control rod drop accident (CRDA). The initial conclusion was that RCIC at Columbia Generating Station was mentioned but not credited in the FSAR Chapter 15 Control Rod Drop Analysis. After further review, it has been decided that the current licensing basis and docketed correspondence is not clear regarding RCIC credit for CRDA mitigation. Therefore, Columbia Generating Station has decided to conservatively report this event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). A follow-up LER will be issued under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)."

The licensee's corrective action is under review.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.