Event Notification Report for July 07, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/06/2003 - 07/07/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39980
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DONALD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DONALD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 07/07/2003
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2003
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION
"At 1500 on 07/07/2003, Operations received a revised Functional Evaluation concerning a Unit 1 Appendix R Analysis which affected both Units 2 & 3. It was identified that a Reactor Building fire could fault a Recirc Pump Motor Generator (MG) Set supply cable/control power cable and cause a loss of the control power required to trip the breaker. Upon further review, it was determined that the 250v dc control power associated circuit for the Recirc Pump Board breaker trip circuit does not have adequate separation from the 4KV feeder cable to the Recirc Pump MG Set (Unit 3) or the Variable Frequency Drive (Unit 2). A fire propagating to the Cable Spreading Room from the Reactor Building may affect safe shutdown circuits and remains unanalyzed. Roving Fire watches were established in the affected areas on both Units 2 & 3.
"This event is reportable as an 8-hour Notification and a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) & 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) as 'Any event or condition that results in the Nuclear Power Plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
"At 1500 on 07/07/2003, Operations received a revised Functional Evaluation concerning a Unit 1 Appendix R Analysis which affected both Units 2 & 3. It was identified that a Reactor Building fire could fault a Recirc Pump Motor Generator (MG) Set supply cable/control power cable and cause a loss of the control power required to trip the breaker. Upon further review, it was determined that the 250v dc control power associated circuit for the Recirc Pump Board breaker trip circuit does not have adequate separation from the 4KV feeder cable to the Recirc Pump MG Set (Unit 3) or the Variable Frequency Drive (Unit 2). A fire propagating to the Cable Spreading Room from the Reactor Building may affect safe shutdown circuits and remains unanalyzed. Roving Fire watches were established in the affected areas on both Units 2 & 3.
"This event is reportable as an 8-hour Notification and a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) & 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) as 'Any event or condition that results in the Nuclear Power Plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39981
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/07/2003
Notification Time: 23:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2003
Notification Time: 23:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
MANUAL ACTUATION OF A SAFETY SYSTEM DUE TO UF6 CYLINDER LEAKAGE
"On 07/07/03 at 1100 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was notified by operations personnel at the X344 facility, that during the initiation of UF6 transfer from Autoclave #3 to the daughter cylinder, smoke was observed emitting from between the cylinder valve stem and packing gland. The operator attempted to shut the cylinder valve, but discovered that the stem would continue to turn in the closing direction well beyond its normal expected shut position. Out gassing continued to be observed emitting from between the cylinder valve stem and packing gland. The First Line Manager, observing the evolution, directed the Operator to press the Emergency Closure Button placing autoclave #3 into containment. This was manual actuation of Safety Equipment used to mitigate (prevent) a release of UF6. Emergency Response was initiated and the Gas Release Alarm was activated to evacuate the building, which placed the other in service autoclave into containment. All Air monitoring was less than detectable for HF and below Plant Allowable Limits for Beta and Gamma."
Operations notified both the DOE site representative and the NRC resident inspector.
"On 07/07/03 at 1100 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was notified by operations personnel at the X344 facility, that during the initiation of UF6 transfer from Autoclave #3 to the daughter cylinder, smoke was observed emitting from between the cylinder valve stem and packing gland. The operator attempted to shut the cylinder valve, but discovered that the stem would continue to turn in the closing direction well beyond its normal expected shut position. Out gassing continued to be observed emitting from between the cylinder valve stem and packing gland. The First Line Manager, observing the evolution, directed the Operator to press the Emergency Closure Button placing autoclave #3 into containment. This was manual actuation of Safety Equipment used to mitigate (prevent) a release of UF6. Emergency Response was initiated and the Gas Release Alarm was activated to evacuate the building, which placed the other in service autoclave into containment. All Air monitoring was less than detectable for HF and below Plant Allowable Limits for Beta and Gamma."
Operations notified both the DOE site representative and the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39982
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: LARRY BLUNK
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: LARRY BLUNK
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 07/08/2003
Notification Time: 02:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2003
Event Time: 23:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2003
Notification Time: 02:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2003
Event Time: 23:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AT LaSALLE UNIT 2 DUE TO TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE
"At 2319 CDT on July 7, 2003 LaSalle Unit 2 Automatically scrammed due to a trip of the main turbine. The main turbine trip was caused by a main generator lockout due to a fault on the "B" phase of the main power disconnect. All rods inserted on the scram. Three safety relief valves actuated in the relief mode on the turbine trip. Both reactor recirc pumps tripped off and all three circulation water pumps tripped off. The main steam line isolation valves and main steam line drains were closed due to the loss of the circulating water pumps. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was entered due to simultaneous inoperability of A, B, and C residual heat removal pumps. "A" residual heat removal pump was declared inoperable due to use in suppression pool cooling. "B" and "C" residual heat removal pumps were inoperable at the beginning of the event for planned [preventive] maintenance on the essential core cooling system ventilation. There were no automatic actuations of ECCS systems and no primary or secondary containment isolation system actuations. There [were] no ECCS injections into the reactor vessel. There were 3 subsequent auto scram signals on low reactor level due to level shrink on SRV closure in pressure control."
Unit 2 is currently stable with reactor feedwater being provided by the condensate system and reactor heat removal using SRV steam discharge to the suppression pool. Residual heat removal pumps "A" and "B" are operating to provide suppression pool cooling. "C" residual heat removal pump has been returned to operable status. All emergency diesel generators are available.
The licensee also reported that the electrical system transient resulted in the need to reduce power on LaSalle Unit 1 from 100% to ~92% to stabilize condensate booster pump suction pressure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * UPDATE ON 7/8/03 AT 1108 EDT FROM DANIEL COVEYOU TO GERRY WAIG * * *
"At 0306 [CDT] on 7/8/03 there was an automatic RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuation due to reactor water level 3. At the time of the scram all control rods were already fully inserted. There was no rod movement as a result of the 0306 [CDT] auto reactor scram. The low level condition was a momentary response due to level shrink upon safety relief valve closure. The safety relief valves were being manually operated to control reactor pressure."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO ( Chris Miller)
"At 2319 CDT on July 7, 2003 LaSalle Unit 2 Automatically scrammed due to a trip of the main turbine. The main turbine trip was caused by a main generator lockout due to a fault on the "B" phase of the main power disconnect. All rods inserted on the scram. Three safety relief valves actuated in the relief mode on the turbine trip. Both reactor recirc pumps tripped off and all three circulation water pumps tripped off. The main steam line isolation valves and main steam line drains were closed due to the loss of the circulating water pumps. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was entered due to simultaneous inoperability of A, B, and C residual heat removal pumps. "A" residual heat removal pump was declared inoperable due to use in suppression pool cooling. "B" and "C" residual heat removal pumps were inoperable at the beginning of the event for planned [preventive] maintenance on the essential core cooling system ventilation. There were no automatic actuations of ECCS systems and no primary or secondary containment isolation system actuations. There [were] no ECCS injections into the reactor vessel. There were 3 subsequent auto scram signals on low reactor level due to level shrink on SRV closure in pressure control."
Unit 2 is currently stable with reactor feedwater being provided by the condensate system and reactor heat removal using SRV steam discharge to the suppression pool. Residual heat removal pumps "A" and "B" are operating to provide suppression pool cooling. "C" residual heat removal pump has been returned to operable status. All emergency diesel generators are available.
The licensee also reported that the electrical system transient resulted in the need to reduce power on LaSalle Unit 1 from 100% to ~92% to stabilize condensate booster pump suction pressure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * UPDATE ON 7/8/03 AT 1108 EDT FROM DANIEL COVEYOU TO GERRY WAIG * * *
"At 0306 [CDT] on 7/8/03 there was an automatic RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuation due to reactor water level 3. At the time of the scram all control rods were already fully inserted. There was no rod movement as a result of the 0306 [CDT] auto reactor scram. The low level condition was a momentary response due to level shrink upon safety relief valve closure. The safety relief valves were being manually operated to control reactor pressure."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO ( Chris Miller)