Event Notification Report for June 30, 2003

VALID REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"This event notification is being made to report the valid actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor was critical, and subsequent reactor scram. On June 30, 2003, [at 0918 PDT], the plant was in Mode 1 at 79% power, when a turbine trip occurred, followed by a reactor scram. The cause of the turbine trip is unknown at this time. All plant systems functioned properly in response to the scram. Operators are proceeding to bring the plant to Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, while investigation into the cause of the transient is completed."

During the scram, all rods inserted into the core. There were no lifts of power-operated or manual relief valves during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and powering all safety equipment. There were no other specified system actuations. Decay heat is being removed via the bypass valves to the main condenser.

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO SEISMIC EVENT IN THE AREA

At 1541 EDT on 6/30/03, Perry Nuclear Plant declared an Unusual Event due to a seismic event. No immediate issues were noticed. The operating-basis earthquake/safe-shutdown annunciator did not alarm, however the plant did receive a seismic panel alarm. The set point for the alarm is 0.005g. There were no unplanned radioactive releases. No protective action recommendations are advised by the licensee. State and local counties (Lake, Geauga and Ashtabula) have been informed.

The National Earthquake Information Center has preliminary indications that the earthquake measured 3.4 on the Richter scale at 41.7 N latitude and 81.2 W longitude near Painesville, OH.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector

* * * UPDATE AT 2242 ON 06/30/03 CARMAN TO GOTT * * *

Licensee terminated from unusual event. Action needed to terminate from the unusual event was a plant walk down. The licensee completed same with no plant damage identified, no unplanned radiological release, and no planned corrective actions.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident and Senior Resident Inspectors.

Notified NRR EO (Ruland), DIRO Manager (McGinty), DHS (Murray), FEMA (Stiendurf), and R3DO (Clayton)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FIRE

"At 1459 EDT 06/30/03 a fire was reported on Unit II containment. The fire was on wooden staging, and was about the size of a normal campfire. The fire was a result of the disassembly of the Unit II containment dome. Per procedure, the Seabrook Fire Department was called and responded. The fire was extinguished by the Unit II disassembly crew (the onsite fire brigade did not respond because the fire was outside of the Unit I protected area). The Seabrook Fire Department was not used to extinguish the fire. Corporate Communications Group have been in contact with Channel 9 and with the Associated Press. The fire was extinguished at 1535 using prestaged hoses. The fire water was provided by Hydrant #15 of Seabrook Station's Fire Protection System."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

On June 30, 2003, at 1710 EDT, Unit 1 reactor power was decreased, initiating a reactor shutdown required by
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.4 due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
operational leakage exceeding a TS LCO limit. At 0615 hours, TS LCO 3.4.4 was entered due to an increase in
unidentified leakage of greater than 2 gpm (gallons per minute) within the previous 24 hour period. Leakage increased from 0.63 gpm on June 29, 2003 at 2000 EDT, to 2.69 gpm on June 30, 2003 at 0615 EDT. Required Actions from LCO 3.4.4 are to reduce leakage to within TS limits within 8 hours or be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours and Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. As of 1700 EDT, leakage could not be reduced to exit the TS LCO Condition.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OPERATOR ASLEEP AT REACTOR CONTROLS

The following was emailed from the licensee to the NRC Project Manager:

"The licensee Facility Director called the NRC project manager to report that on 6/29/03 between 0605 EDT and 0645, the operator at the control console fell asleep for approximately 25 minutes. The operator had logged console operations at 0605 and 0645. Other licensee personnel had tried to contact the console operator during this time period without success. The licensee is investigating the event and will review this situation with all reactor operators."

This is in violation of 10 CFR 50.54 (k).

HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB) DOOR NOT LATCHED

"On June 30, 2003 at approximately 1545 [CDT] it was identified that a High Energy Line Break (HELB) door separating Divisional Motor Control Centers was not latched as required. It was determined that this condition existed for a maximum of 15 minutes. This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State Emergency Management Agency.

* * *RETRACTION on 08/27/03 at 1215 EDT from R. Sand to John MacKinnon * * *

Because plant safety was not significantly degraded, this event is not reportable under the unanalyzed condition criteria based on: (1) the door in either event was in an uncontrolled condition for less than one minute, (2) the door was not materially affected, only operated improperly, (3) the PRA significance of the event was low, and (4) the HELB Barrier door was not open for a period than is allowed by station procedural guidance. R3DO (C. Miller) notified.

The station continues to review the events in the station's corrective action program.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE RUN OVER

"Licensee: WA State Dept. of Transportation (WA DOT), South Central Region
"City and state: Yakima, Washington
"License number: WN-L065-1
"Type of license: Portable Gauge

"Date of event: 30 June 2003
"Location of Event: near Walla Walla, Washington

"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention) On 30 June 2003, at about 9:45 AM, an errant motorist entered a coned-off lane and ran over a Troxler, Model 3430, moisture/density gauge, Serial Number 24671. The gauge contained two sealed sources, one of about 8 millicuries of Cesium 137 and the second of about 40 millicuries of Americium 241/Beryllium. The accident happened just north of Myra Road on State Route 125 near Walla Walla, Washington.

"An errant motorist drove past a WA DOT road flagger holding a stop sign. The motorist entered a lane that had been coned-off. The motorist proceeded to drive down the restricted lane and ran over the gauge while it was being used to test for compaction. The gauge operator saw the approaching vehicle and attempted to stop it by waving his hands and yelling as the vehicle approached. The motorist, a senior, was apparently oblivious to the lane restriction. After the gauge was hit, it wedged under the vehicle and was dragged for approximately 90 feet down the road until the motorist finally became aware of the problem and stopped. The cause was inattention or inability to understand that the road conditions had changed. It appears that age of the driver contributed to the cause of the event.

"The need to make any corrective action was deemed to be unnecessary. The gauge operator was operating per procedure and was only feet away from the gauge as it performed the test. The lane was restricted from travel by flagger and cone.

"The incident destroyed the gauge. Impact with the vehicle caused the Cesium 137 source to be drawn back into its shielded position. Although pieces of the gauge housing, electronics and mechanisms were scattered along the 90-foot section of road that the vehicle traveled after impact the gauge, the sources were still attached to their respective parts of the gauge. Subsequent leak tests were negative.

"DOH was not able to do an on site investigation due to the excessive distance to the event site and excessive time it would have taken to get staff to the site and clear the incident. The licensed RSO, a person trained to respond to events of this nature and having experience with similar events, went to the scene to give direction. The RSO performed surveys and an evaluation that allowed trained WA DOT personnel to release the area. The gauge parts were placed into the Troxler transportation box, a gravel/dirt mix was used to lower dose-rate readings to below a usual reading for an intact gauge, and the box was transported by trained WA DOT personnel to the WA DOT Headquarters facility for further evaluation, leak testing and disposition.

"WA DOH personnel performed an investigation of events and the gauge at WA DOT Headquarters after the gauge arrived. WA DOH staff inspected the gauge parts including the sources, evaluated the circumstances of the event, reviewed the report information, and consulted with WA DOT staff regarding procedure, equipment and their plan to return the gauge to Troxler. Once WA DOH staff determined that sources were not leaking and the material was safe to be returned to Troxler, it was sent to Troxler via normal method.

"There was no media attention.

"What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? 10 CFR 30.50(B)(2) and 20.2201 - After reviewing the incident file and the Handbook on Nuclear Material Event Reporting in the Agreement States , we determined that a 24 hour notification should have been sent to NRC. This did not occur; consequently we are now submitting this completed report, although late.

"Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 8 millicuries of Cesium 137 and 40 millicuries of Americium 241/Beryllium

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence) No members of the public received exposure in any amount. Calculation, survey readings and previous experience with similar gauge events indicate that WA DOT radiation worker staff only received exposure that is associated with usual gauge operations. Dosimetry reports will be evaluated upon receipt from the dosimetry processor.

"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number) Troxler, Model 3430, Serial Number 24671 was destroyed (damaged).

"Disposition/recovery: The gauge was returned to Troxler for disposal.

"Leak test? A leak test was performed on each source. They were found to be negative.

"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) The gauge transportation vehicle was not involved in the event.

"Release of activity? There was no release of activity.

"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: N/A
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: N/A
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided? The licensee provided a written report, dated 7 July 2003.
"Was referring physician notified? N/A

"Consultant used? No"