Event Notification Report for June 15, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/14/2003 - 06/15/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39939
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/15/2003
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2003
Event Time: 09:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2003
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2003
Event Time: 09:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM WHILE IN HOT STANDBY
"At 0928, on 6/15/03, with the reactor shut down in Mode 3, a feedwater isolation signal and an automatic start of both Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFW) occurred due to the trip of the last running Main Feedwater Pump. The event occurred as the plant operators closed the reactor trip breakers per plant procedure OP-104 in preparation for a reactor startup. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) were in automatic and the MFRV block valves were open. With reactor coolant system average temperature at less than 564°F and the reactor trip breakers open, a MFRV close signal is established via the P-4 permissive. Closing the reactor trip breakers removed the permissive P-4 block signal that was maintaining the MFRVs closed. This allowed the MFRVs to open to the full open demand position. With the MFRVs feeding the steam generators and no load conditions on the secondary plant, steam generator level exceeded the HI-HI level setpoint of 78%. This generated a turbine trip signal, a Main Feedwater isolation signal, and a trip of the Main Feedwater Pumps. The trip of the last running Main Feedwater Pump generated the automatic AFW actuation. This condition is being reported as actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in accordance with 1O CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"A reactor trip signal was not generated during this event and no control Rods had been withdrawn from the reactor core at the time of the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
The plant is stable in mode 3 and the AFW system is running to maintain steam generator levels. All systems functioned as required.
"At 0928, on 6/15/03, with the reactor shut down in Mode 3, a feedwater isolation signal and an automatic start of both Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFW) occurred due to the trip of the last running Main Feedwater Pump. The event occurred as the plant operators closed the reactor trip breakers per plant procedure OP-104 in preparation for a reactor startup. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) were in automatic and the MFRV block valves were open. With reactor coolant system average temperature at less than 564°F and the reactor trip breakers open, a MFRV close signal is established via the P-4 permissive. Closing the reactor trip breakers removed the permissive P-4 block signal that was maintaining the MFRVs closed. This allowed the MFRVs to open to the full open demand position. With the MFRVs feeding the steam generators and no load conditions on the secondary plant, steam generator level exceeded the HI-HI level setpoint of 78%. This generated a turbine trip signal, a Main Feedwater isolation signal, and a trip of the Main Feedwater Pumps. The trip of the last running Main Feedwater Pump generated the automatic AFW actuation. This condition is being reported as actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in accordance with 1O CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"A reactor trip signal was not generated during this event and no control Rods had been withdrawn from the reactor core at the time of the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
The plant is stable in mode 3 and the AFW system is running to maintain steam generator levels. All systems functioned as required.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39974
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: C. REEVES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: C. REEVES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/03/2003
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2003
Event Time: 14:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2003
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2003
Event Time: 14:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 1 | Startup |
INVALID START OF THE AUXILARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
"On 06/15/2003 at 1453 an invalid start of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred. The actuation was caused by a maintenance activity on a common high pressure turbine impulse pressure transmitter.
"Both the Train A and B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were running and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump started.
"Complete train actuation occurred.
"The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump start was successful."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
"On 06/15/2003 at 1453 an invalid start of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred. The actuation was caused by a maintenance activity on a common high pressure turbine impulse pressure transmitter.
"Both the Train A and B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were running and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump started.
"Complete train actuation occurred.
"The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump start was successful."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40057
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 08/12/2003
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2003
Event Time: 14:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2003
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2003
Event Time: 14:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
10 CFR 50.73 REPORT
"The report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.
"During performance of a Surveillance Order, a Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation was initiated at 14:47 on 6/15/03. The apparent cause of the isolation was human error due to the incorrect de-energizing and placement of test leads on the 'B' train component instead of the 'A' train component as required by procedure. After the 'B' Train Sorrento RM-80 (1SP-RY4856B) was de-energized, the 'A' train detector (1SP-RE-4857A) was disconnected in accordance with the procedure. When the opposite train detector was disconnected, the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation was initiated.
"Upon receipt of the Reactor Building Equipment (RBE) isolation, the following systems isolated:
"Torus water cleanup, Drywell (DW) floor and equipment sumps, Drywell Leak Detection (DLD) sampling skid, Reactor Building Ventilation System (RBVS) isolated, Radwaste (RW) ventilation isolated, Filtration Recirculation Ventilation System (FRVS) auto started, B Station Service Water (SSW) pump and B Station Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) pump auto started, Primary Containment Instrument (PCI) gas valves and compressors isolated.
"The operating crew entered the procedure for Primary Containment abnormal condition B. When instrument technicians restored the 'B' RBE radiation monitor, the operating crew reset PCI Signal in accordance with the Operating Procedure and restored the systems to normal.
"All safety systems responded to the isolation signal according to design."
"The report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.
"During performance of a Surveillance Order, a Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation was initiated at 14:47 on 6/15/03. The apparent cause of the isolation was human error due to the incorrect de-energizing and placement of test leads on the 'B' train component instead of the 'A' train component as required by procedure. After the 'B' Train Sorrento RM-80 (1SP-RY4856B) was de-energized, the 'A' train detector (1SP-RE-4857A) was disconnected in accordance with the procedure. When the opposite train detector was disconnected, the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation was initiated.
"Upon receipt of the Reactor Building Equipment (RBE) isolation, the following systems isolated:
"Torus water cleanup, Drywell (DW) floor and equipment sumps, Drywell Leak Detection (DLD) sampling skid, Reactor Building Ventilation System (RBVS) isolated, Radwaste (RW) ventilation isolated, Filtration Recirculation Ventilation System (FRVS) auto started, B Station Service Water (SSW) pump and B Station Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) pump auto started, Primary Containment Instrument (PCI) gas valves and compressors isolated.
"The operating crew entered the procedure for Primary Containment abnormal condition B. When instrument technicians restored the 'B' RBE radiation monitor, the operating crew reset PCI Signal in accordance with the Operating Procedure and restored the systems to normal.
"All safety systems responded to the isolation signal according to design."