Event Notification Report for June 10, 2003

ARIZONA LICENSEE, QUALITY TESTING, REPORTED A MISSING TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"At approximately 8:00 AM MST June 10, 2003, Arizona was informed by the Licensee Radiation Safety Officer that they believe a Troxler Model 3411 B SN 4647 moisture-density gauge was missing and had been since 5:00 AM. At approximately 8:30 MST the Agency was informed that gauge fell off of the truck and had been recovered by JSW Concrete Contractor. The gauge was recovered from Price Road under the Fry Road Overpass. The Department of Public Safety and the Chandler Police were notified prior to recovery. The Licensee took possession of the gauge at approximately 9:00AM. There were no indications the gauge had been opened. Inspection by the State Agency revealed several possible violations."

LOST EXIT SIGN

The US air Force reported that one tritium exit sign was determined missing after an inventory check on 06/10/03 at Cannon AFB, NM. Prior to January - February contractor work the sign was accounted for.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - REFINERY FIRE INVOLVING POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR GAUGE

The following agreement state report was received at the Operations Center via fax:

"Radiation source involved in fire [at 500 West St Bernard Hwy, Chalmette, LA]. The gauge was closed and had normal readings of 0.25 mR/hr. Area barricaded and restricted. A leak test was being performed. The gauge was being overnighted to Ohmart for analysis. The gauge contained 1600 mCi [millicuries] of Cs-137."

INADEQUATE I & C CABLE SEPARATION DISCOVERED DURING APPENDIX "R" REVIEW

"McGuire has identified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 electrical cables associated with redundant safe shutdown trains do not meet the separation criteria of Appendix R. Specifically, cables for all four channels of a Unit's Reactor Protection System (RPS) are routed together through the respective Unit's ETA Switchgear Room. This room has no fire detection or suppression capabilities in the area containing the cables. Consequently, in the event of a postulated Appendix R fire in the ETA Switchgear Room, all four channels of the respective Unit's RPS could be susceptible to fire damage. Upon discovery of this condition, a fire watch was established in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ETA Switchgear Rooms.

"McGuire has not yet determined whether this condition would result in the loss of a safety function significantly degrading plant safety. However, since this condition is similar to an example provided in NUREG 1022 Section 3.2.4, McGuire is conservatively reporting this as an unanalyzed condition significantly degrading plant safety."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.

* * *Retraction on 08/01/03 at 1034 EDT by Tom Arlow taken by MacKinnon * * *

"Subsequent evaluation has concluded that the condition identified in the event report 39915 does not significantly degrade plant safety since the affected Unit would remain capable of proceeding to a safe shutdown condition should the subject RPS trains experience fire damage. In addition, probabilistic risk assessment of this condition determined it has low safety significance. Therefore, McGuire is retracting Event Report 39915." R2DO (Jim Moorman).

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

LOSS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY DUE TO DAMAGED POWER LINE

Power to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was unavailable for approximately two and a half hours due to a severe thunderstorm and a downed power line feeding the facility. An Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is running, supplying power to the EOF.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** UPDATE AT 2311 EDT ON 6/10/03 FROM J.R. WEEKLEY TO A. COSTA ***

The downed power line to the EOF has been repaired and electricity to the facility has been restored. The licensee terminated use of the EDG.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.

INABILITY TO ACTIVATE EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE

"On June 10, 2003 at 0930 hours, the control room was notified that all 112 Prompt Alert and Notification System (PANS) sirens were inoperable by maintenance personnel. All necessary notifications to local towns and MEMA (Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency) have been made. A backup plan (route altering) is in place in the event of an emergency at Pilgrim station. It was determined that one of the 112 sirens was transmitting a continuous radio signal to the remaining sirens, preventing actuation. The faulty siren was isolated from the system at 1040 [hours], and the remaining 111 sirens are now operational."

The licensee informed both state and local agencies and the NRC resident inspector.