Event Notification Report for June 05, 2003

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE AGENCIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED RELEASE

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

"Notified Maine Emergency Management Agency of unscheduled release that occurred on Monday June 2, 2003. Notified Department of Human Services of same.

"Maine Yankee released 3E-8 curies of liquid. 3E-8 curies of this release exceeded the value projected for this period and is, therefore, classified as unscheduled. The total liquid release resulted in an exposure value of 1E-8 millirem.

"This unscheduled release resulted from low levels of Cs-137 exiting the restricted area via a storm drain, and occurred throughout the 24-hr time period from 6-2-3."

FAILURE IN RADIOACTIVE GAS RELEASE MONITORING EQUIPMENT DEGRADES ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM

The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:

"At approximately 19:49 hours [EDT] on June 5, 2003, during a source check of containment radiation monitor R-11 with containment pressure relief in progress, the containment pressure relief isolation valves, V12-10 and V12-11, would not close automatically. The valves were closed by use of the control switch in the control room to stop the pressure relief of the containment at the time of the source check failure. The source check should have caused the valves to close automatically by the initiation of a containment ventilation isolation signal. The penetration was isolated at 20:47 hours by the use of closed and de-activated automatic isolation valve; specifically valve V12-10 was closed and de-activated, in accordance with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Required Action B.1. Subsequent evaluation, during review of the condition report for this failure, has determined that the failure, which was caused by a faulty control switch, would have prevented the automatic closure of these valves as required for a containment isolation or a containment high radiation signal. Therefore, this event is being reported as a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a structure, system, or component that is needed to control the release of radioactivity or mitigate the consequences of accident, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). The control switch was repaired at approximately 14:13 hours on June 6, 2003, and the system was restored to operable status at that time. A planned and monitored gaseous release from the containment was in progress at the time of this event using the containment pressure relief system. No release limits were exceeded. If plant conditions had required isolation of the penetration, alarms and indications in the Control Room would have alerted the operators to the condition and the applicable operating procedures direct the operators to manually isolate the penetration.

"(The following information is system description information for the Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief System copied from the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report):

"Normal power operation is conducted with the closed containment building at essentially atmospheric pressure. The Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief System is provided to control variations in containment pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure. These variations are due to changes in atmospheric pressure and leakage from the Instrument Air and Penetration Pressurization Systems. The containment pressure and vacuum relief system includes separate 6 inch lines penetrating the containment, each equipped with two quick-closing, tight-seating, 125 psi air operated butterfly valves, one inside and one outside containment. These valves are designed to fail closed on loss of control signal or control air, and are closed during normal plant operation, except as required for pressure control.

"The butterfly valves are protected by debris screens, located inside containment and attached to the inboard pressure and vacuum relief valves, which will ensure that airborne debris will not interfere with their tight closure. The pressure relief line discharges to the plant vent through a HEPA filter and charcoal filters. These filters are provided for removal of particulate and halogen radioactivity from the vented air. Operation of the pressure and vacuum relief lines is manually controlled by the plant operator. A narrow range pressure transmitter continuously indicates containment pressure in the Control Room. Separate high and low pressure alarms are actuated by this transmitter to alert the operator to overpressure and vacuum conditions. These alarms are tentatively set for actuation at plus and minus 0.3 psig. Vacuum relief can be accomplished without regard to atmospheric conditions. In the event of pressure buildup, the operator will be guided by atmospheric conditions, and by the containment particulate and radiogas monitor in relieving the overpressure. Manual operation of both these lines is overridden by automatic containment isolation and containment high radioactivity signals."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MISSING WELL LOGGING SOURCE SHIPMENT

On 6/5/03, the NM Rad Control Program Office was notified by SpectraTek that one of four boxes in a shipment of well logging sources sent from SpectraTek in Albuquerque via FEDEX on 6/2/03, airbill #791397943907, to Elite Air Freight in Houston, TX was missing. The missing box contains a 40 millicurie Scandium-46 source. The shipment which is enroute to Nigeria is currently being held in Houston pending resolution of the missing source issue. Elite Air Freight contacted FEDEX who believes that the package has been located in the Houston area. NM State Report #NM-03-04.

* * * UPDATE 1342EDT 6/6/03 FROM MIKE BREWER (SPECTRATEK) TO S. SANDIN

The missing box containing the 40 millicurie Scandium-46 source was located and delivered to Elite Air Freight in Houston, TX the morning of 6/6/03. Notified R4DO(Loveless), NMSS(Broaddus), DOE(Bailey), and EPA RegionVI(Hammack).

* * * UPDATE 1540EDT 6/6/03 FROM PAUL PATRICK (FEDEX) TO S. SANDIN

Due to an administrative oversight, the wrong airbill was updated showing delivery. FEDEX is still investigating and attempting to locate this shipment. Notified R4DO(Loveless), NMSS(Broaddus), DOE(Bailey), and EPA RegionVI(Hammack).

* * * UPDATE 1730EDT 6/7/03 FROM MARVIN SUDDUTH TO GERRY WAIG * * *

The missing package was located at approximately 1645EDT at the Houston-Hobby Satellite facility in the Dangerous Goods area with no indication of damage or tampering. A FEDEX security specialist is currently escorting the package to the main FEDEX facility for safe storage over the weekend. FEDEX will make arrangements to have a management representive deliver the package to the receipt on Monday morning and will inform SpectraTek. Notified R4(Loveless, Maier ), R2(Landis), NMSS(Holahan, Broaddus, Miller), EDO(Kane), OSTP(Lothaus), DOE(Turner), EPA RegionVI(Hammack), and DHS(Svenningsen).

LOSS OF 2 OFFSITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS AT INDIAN POINT

On 06/05/03 at 1644 EDT the licensee reported that 2 of 16 emergency notification sirens located in Orange County failed on 06/05/03 at 1545 EDT due to a loss of power. An investigation is underway to determine the cause and restore power to the affected sirens.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.