Event Notification Report for May 29, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/28/2003 - 05/29/2003
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39888
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/29/2003
Notification Time: 05:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2003
Event Time: 02:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2003
Notification Time: 05:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2003
Event Time: 02:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED ACCIDENT MITIGATION FEATURE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 05/29/2003 at 0239 [CDT], during performance of 3-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Main and Booster Pump Developed Head and Flowrate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, following release of the HPCI Trip Push button, the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve, 3-FCV-73-18, did not return to the OPEN position as required by the surveillance. The SR [Surveillance Requirement] was stopped.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)[(D) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"This is also reportable as a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii) as 'Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in a single system designed to: (D) Mitigate the consequence of an accident.'"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 07/25/03 @ 1456 BY NACOSTE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
This report is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, it was determined that failure of the HPCI stop valve to re-open, (after successful performance of the HPCI flow test) did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. The HPCI stop valve did not re-open due to failure of the overspeed trip device to reset. This overspeed trip device only actuates during a HPCI turbine overspeed condition or it can be manually actuated to test the stop valve trip and reset function. In this case, since no overspeed condition occurred, the actuation was most likely the result of testing activities. HPCI reset following an overspeed trip is not a safety function of HPCI, and is not credited in the accident analysis for HPCI. Therefore, the failure of the HPCI stop valve to reset and reopen is not a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of HPCI, and this event is not reportable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified Reg 2 RDO (Anne Boland)
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 05/29/2003 at 0239 [CDT], during performance of 3-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Main and Booster Pump Developed Head and Flowrate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, following release of the HPCI Trip Push button, the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve, 3-FCV-73-18, did not return to the OPEN position as required by the surveillance. The SR [Surveillance Requirement] was stopped.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)[(D) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"This is also reportable as a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii) as 'Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in a single system designed to: (D) Mitigate the consequence of an accident.'"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 07/25/03 @ 1456 BY NACOSTE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
This report is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, it was determined that failure of the HPCI stop valve to re-open, (after successful performance of the HPCI flow test) did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. The HPCI stop valve did not re-open due to failure of the overspeed trip device to reset. This overspeed trip device only actuates during a HPCI turbine overspeed condition or it can be manually actuated to test the stop valve trip and reset function. In this case, since no overspeed condition occurred, the actuation was most likely the result of testing activities. HPCI reset following an overspeed trip is not a safety function of HPCI, and is not credited in the accident analysis for HPCI. Therefore, the failure of the HPCI stop valve to reset and reopen is not a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of HPCI, and this event is not reportable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified Reg 2 RDO (Anne Boland)
Hospital
Event Number: 39889
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Region: 1
City: PHILADELPHIA State: PA
County:
License #: 37-0018-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROB FORREST
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Region: 1
City: PHILADELPHIA State: PA
County:
License #: 37-0018-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROB FORREST
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/29/2003
Notification Time: 08:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2003
Notification Time: 08:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
DOUGLAS BROADDUS (NMSS)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
DOUGLAS BROADDUS (NMSS)
LOSS OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCE
"On Tuesday April 29, 2003, a laboratory supervisor at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (HUP) notified Environmental Health and Radiation Safety that a package of 250 [microcurie] of P-32 was not received by her lab as expected on April 25, 2003. The package was shipped as an excepted package not subject to external labeling.
"The package was delivered by materials management staff and left in the hallway near the laboratory with other supplies instead of being delivered directly to the lab as required.
"The radiation safety investigation determined that housekeeping staff removed the package unopened from the hallway and disposed of it in the regular trash. Based on the activity and exposure rate, this package did not present an exposure to any employee or member of the general public.
"Corrective actions have been initiated with laboratory, materials management and housekeeping staff to prevent reoccurrence."
"On Tuesday April 29, 2003, a laboratory supervisor at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (HUP) notified Environmental Health and Radiation Safety that a package of 250 [microcurie] of P-32 was not received by her lab as expected on April 25, 2003. The package was shipped as an excepted package not subject to external labeling.
"The package was delivered by materials management staff and left in the hallway near the laboratory with other supplies instead of being delivered directly to the lab as required.
"The radiation safety investigation determined that housekeeping staff removed the package unopened from the hallway and disposed of it in the regular trash. Based on the activity and exposure rate, this package did not present an exposure to any employee or member of the general public.
"Corrective actions have been initiated with laboratory, materials management and housekeeping staff to prevent reoccurrence."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39891
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DON KURTTI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DON KURTTI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/30/2003
Notification Time: 00:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2003
Event Time: 21:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2003
Notification Time: 00:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2003
Event Time: 21:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
161 KV WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO THE PREDICTED POST TRIP VOLTAGE BELOW SETPOINT
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
" [Abnormal Operating Procedure] AOP-31 '161KV GRID MALFUNCTIONS' was entered due to the predicted post trip 161 KV voltage dropping to 160.6 KV on the PCMMINT [Personal Computer Monitoring of Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Transmission] computer monitoring program. 161 KV was declared inoperable due to the predicted post trip voltage being below the 160.7 KV setpoint. Tech Spec 2.7(2)C, 72 hour LCO was entered. Both emergency diesel generators are operable.
"Main generator VARS [Volt-Amperes Reactive] were raised from 100 to 150 MVARS lagging in an attempt to raise predicted post trip voltage. Predicted voltage rose above 161 KV for approx. 5 minutes and then lowered below 161 KV again to 160.8 KV and is now fluctuating. System Operations was notified and stated that 161 KV actual voltage remained at approx. 164 KV and that the electrical grid was stable.
"Design Engineering was notified and hypothesizes that MAPP [Mid-America Power Pool] values into PCMMINT program may not be valid and that they will attempt to validate the inputs."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
" [Abnormal Operating Procedure] AOP-31 '161KV GRID MALFUNCTIONS' was entered due to the predicted post trip 161 KV voltage dropping to 160.6 KV on the PCMMINT [Personal Computer Monitoring of Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Transmission] computer monitoring program. 161 KV was declared inoperable due to the predicted post trip voltage being below the 160.7 KV setpoint. Tech Spec 2.7(2)C, 72 hour LCO was entered. Both emergency diesel generators are operable.
"Main generator VARS [Volt-Amperes Reactive] were raised from 100 to 150 MVARS lagging in an attempt to raise predicted post trip voltage. Predicted voltage rose above 161 KV for approx. 5 minutes and then lowered below 161 KV again to 160.8 KV and is now fluctuating. System Operations was notified and stated that 161 KV actual voltage remained at approx. 164 KV and that the electrical grid was stable.
"Design Engineering was notified and hypothesizes that MAPP [Mid-America Power Pool] values into PCMMINT program may not be valid and that they will attempt to validate the inputs."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.