Event Notification Report for May 20, 2003

SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The following information was obtained from the regulatee via facsimile:

"05/20/03 at 0930 hrs. following the investigation into circumstances surrounding NRC Event #39853 (PTS-2003-011 update #1), the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was notified that the air supply line to the parent cylinder safety valves had been disconnected during applicable TSR mode III (Cylinder/Pigtail Operations) on multiple occasions in both the X-343 and X-344 facilities. Discussions with facility management and operating personnel indicate the air supply line was disconnected in preparation for sampling operations. This condition is reportable under 76.120 (c)(2)(ii) and 76.120 (d)(2). The equipment is required by Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) to be available and operable and either should have been operating or have operated on demand.

"The PSS directed an extent of condition be performed for cylinder operations in X-342, X-343, X-344 and X-326 withdrawal station. The result of the extent of condition placed the X-343 sample autoclaves in mode VII (shutdown) and removed from service until affected procedures can be changed, the X-344 autoclaves remain operable, the X-342 autoclaves remains inoperable, and the X-326 withdrawal station remains operable."

The regulatee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR REPORT (BULLETIN 91-01)

The following information was received from the regulatee via facsimile :

"At 1915 on 5/20/03, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that some removed process gas equipment item groups in C-720 have not received proper independent mass verification in violation of NCSA GEN-010. The group mass is required to be independently verified to be within always safe mass limits. This is done by independently verifying the equipment item mass is correctly copied onto the grouping sheet. An entry was discovered on the grouping sheet in which the mass on the equipment was 0 [zero] pounds, however the GEN-010 tag on the equipment item indicated a mass of 284 pounds of uranium at 1.38% enrichment. Additionally, several equipment items were tagged with GEN-010 tags that had information lined out and corrected, appearing to violate the independent verification of the equipment item mass, on the tag. This information was then subsequently used for grouping purposes on the equipment grouping sheet. This is a legacy issue, as the dates on the tags are from the 97-98 timeframe.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

"Double contingency was not maintained because the independent verification of mass has not been performed. However, the policy for the shop is to only allow items which have been fully decontaminated into the shop, which gives high confidence that less than a safe mass is present.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):

"In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a critical mass of uranium must be accumulated [and] then become moderated.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

"Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):

"Less than an always safe mass of uranium.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

"The first leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of grouped items be verified less than the UH [Uncomplicated Handling] mass limit and documented. The mass of an equipment item was incorrectly copied onto the grouping sheet. However, the listed mass for the item is UH at the listed enrichment. In addition, other items in the group have tags, which indicate no visible contamination but have been updated and only have one signature. This mass was then used in the grouping. The control was violated, however the parameter has been maintained.

"The second leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of grouped items be independently verified less than the UH mass limit and documented in accordance with CP2-PO-FO1031 [a facility procedure]. The independent verification was incorrectly performed; therefore, this control was violated. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.

"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, and a control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

"Ensure each item in the group is properly tagged according to CP2-CO-CN2030 [a facility procedure]. Properly group and document each equipment item according to CP2-CO-CN2030. Upon completion of the above corrective actions, the exclusion zone and postings may be removed."

The regulatee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

The plant experienced a trip of the "C" 4160 V electrical bus. This condition required entry into multiple technical specifications the most limiting being 3.3.D.5.B due to the loss of the capability to determine the rate of identified containment leakage. This required the reactor to be placed in a shutdown condition within the next 12 hours.

The licensee believes that the cause of the "C" bus trip is a fault on the bus that is indicated as a lockout, however, the specific fault is unknown at this time and is under investigation. Due to the faulted bus, the station's emergency diesel generator did not start and will not be able to power any equipment on the "C" bus until the fault is repaired. Significant safety equipment lost due to loss of the bus is as follows:

Emergency Service Water pump and Containment spray system #1
Service Water pump #1
Reactor Building Closed Cooling pump #1
Standby Gas Treatment system #1
Core spray and Core spray booster pumps "A" & "D" (4 pumps total)
Standby Liquid Control pump #1
Control Rod Drive pump #1

The plant is commencing the required shutdown and expect to be at 60% reactor power by 0430 EDT.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1040 EDT ON 5/20/03 FROM PEZZELLA TO CROUCH * * *

As a result of the loss of 4160 VAC, the safeguards system became degraded. Immediate compensatory measures were taken upon discovery. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.

* * * UPDATE AT 1245 EDT ON 5/20/03 FROM PIETRUSKI TO THOMAS * * *

The plant initiated an unplanned reactor manual scram from 60 percent power at 0945 ET. This event was reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B): 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

The licensee had planned to scram the plant from 30 percent power, but because of the loss of "C" 4160V electrical bus, they were unable to remove the second stage reheaters and feedwater heaters from service, and were thus limited by procedure from lowering power to the desired level prior to inserting a scram.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR EO (T. Reis, R. Dennig), DIRO (M. Evans), R1DO (A. Dimitriadis)

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:

"At 0325 hours CDT on 5/20/2003, the Unit One Reactor Coolant System was determined to have Pressure Boundary Leakage. The Unit was in the process of shutting down for a maintenance outage, and subcritical at the time. The leakage was found during a Drywell inspection as part of the shutdown. The leak was located upstream of the isolation valves on the reactor head vent line. The Technical Specification Required Action for this Condition (Technical Specification 3.4.4, Condition C) is for the Unit to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and be in Mode 4 in 36 hours.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i)."

The licensee is unable to quantify the leak at this time and is unable to determine if the this was a long-term leak. Unit 1 entered Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) at 0607 CDT.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OPERATING MAIN FEED PUMP

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"At 0453 on 05/20/03 with the reactor at approximately 20 percent power in MODE 1, the reactor was manually tripped in response to an automatic trip of the operating Main Feed Pump (MFP). Both motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps started due to the trip of the MFP. Safety systems functioned as required. The operations crew responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant was stabilized at normal operating no-load Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure following the reactor trip. The cause of the MFP trip is still under investigation.
This condition is being reported as actuations of the reactor protection system and AFW in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

According to the licensee, the MFP tripped after loss of the "A" condensate booster pump.

After the manual trip, all control rods inserted into the core. There were no primary relief valves actuated during the resulting transient. Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed during the trip therefore decay heat is being removed via AFW and the steam generator power operated relief valves.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

At 0650 EDT on 5/20/03, the licensee notified the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection due to an impending planned scram. Additionally, they notified the same agency that Oyster Creek will have a potential non-compliance based on the plant canal temperature recorder losing power (see event #39862). This is a potential violation of the plant's New Jersey Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1100 EDT ON 5/20/03 FROM DOSTAL TO CROUCH * * *

The licensee will be issuing a press release based on loss of 4160 VAC bus and resulting plant shutdown.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO ROD CONTROL SYSTEM ERROR

"Shutdown Bank 'B' group step counter for group (1) did not indicate outward rod motion during rod exercising surveillance. Shutdown Bank 'B' group (2) step counter indicated normal outward rod motion. Urgent failure for rod control system annunciator received. Tech Specs required initiation of Nuclear Plant Shutdown."

At the time of this notification, the plant is in Mode 1 at 80% power with a controlled plant shutdown in progress. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (R. Haag)

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM UNABLE TO SUPPLY DATA TO NRC OPERATIONS CENTER

"The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was discovered at 1022 [Et] to be unable to supply ERDS data to the NRCOC. At 1052, a loss of the ability to supply ERDS for greater than 30 minutes occurred. This constitutes a reportable event based upon 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At the time the failure was discovered, the Turkey Point Unit 3 was in the process of responding to a Technical Specifications required shutdown due to a failure in the rod control system (reported separately). The anticipated unit condition will be Mode 3 until the rod control system is repaired."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (R. Haag)

OVEREXPOSURE

Event occurred on May 20, 2003 between the hours of 0200 and 0230 hours CDT at the Amoco Refinery in Texas City, TX. Overexposure was reported to the Texas Dept. of Health on July 3, 2003.

"A radiography source was not cranked into the fully shielded position resulting in a 6.403 R whole body exposure to a radiographer. The radiographer was making wall thickness exposures using a 100 curie cobalt 60 source with a directional collimator. The radiographer made the last exposure for the night, then proceeded to retrieve the film and take it for development in the darkroom. The radiographer believed the pigtail had been fully retracted, however, his initial survey was not conclusive because his survey meter was not turned on. Although the ratemeter was alarming, because of the noise level and the ear plugs, he did not initially hear ratemeter alarming. When he did hear the faint ringing he checked the meter and it was off. When the radiographer turned the meter on and resurveyed the guide tubes, the needle went off-scale. He checked his pocket dosimeter and it was off scale. The radiographer then retracted the pigtail into the fully shielded position. The radiographers reported the event to their management by telephone, then returned to the company shop.

"The following day the personnel monitoring badge was sent for emergency processing. The radiographer believes he was exposed for about one minute.

"We will provide additional information as it is collected"

Source Production & Equipment Company.
Source Information:
Model G-70 sn# C60-02
101 Curies cobalt-60 on May 29, 2002 (3737GBq)

Texas Incident No: I-8033