Event Notification Report for May 19, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/18/2003 - 05/19/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39857398583985939860
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39857
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN MANPENFEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN MANPENFEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 05:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 04:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 05:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 04:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 3 | Startup | 0 | Startup |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM RESULTING IN PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATIONS
At 0424 EDT, during startup operations, the Main Turbine Bypass valves unexpectedly opened and depressurized the reactor vessel. After depressurization, the reactor level increased due to swell and caused an automatic reactor scram. Additionally, there was a Reactor Building Isolation Signal and Group I, II, and VI Primary Containment Isolation Signal generated. Immediately after the automatic scram, five control rods failed to insert into the core. Plant operations personnel performed actions in accordance with their Emergency Operating Procedures to drive the control rods into the core. According to the licensee, adequate shutdown margin was always maintained.
The plant electrical system is stable with plant equipment being powered from offsite and the startup transformer. Reactor pressure and level are being maintained via steam line drains to the main condenser.
Troubleshooting of the Main Turbine Bypass valves/control system is in progress.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/19/03 @ 0934 EDT FROM ERIC OLSON TO CROUCH * * *
The following clarification of the above information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 04:24 EDT, during startup operations, the Main Turbine Bypass Valves failed open. At the beginning of the event reactor pressure was approximately 880 psig. When the Main Turbine Bypass Valves opened, reactor pressure lowered to approximately 820 psi and reactor water level swelled (due to voiding) from 28 inches to approximately 55 inches. This resulted in a Group I PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Signal] being generated as designed and automatically closing the MSIV's [Main Steam Isolation Valves]. MSIV closure terminated the depressurization, however initiated an automatic RPS [Reactor Protection System] signal as designed. Termination of depressurization resulted in reactor level lowering to approximately 7 inches which in turn initiated a Group II (Containment Isolation) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation) PCIS signals. All rods inserted during the scram, however five control rods went beyond full in. Actions were taken in accordance with EOP's [Emergency Operating Procedures] and plant operating procedures to verify the five control rods were beyond full in. This is an indication issue with control rods that can occur when a scram signal is present and the Control Rod Drive System charging water flow drives the control rods beyond the [zero] and full in reed switches.
"The plant electrical system is stable with plant equipment being powered from offsite power via the startup transformer. Reactor pressure is being maintained by steam line drains to the main condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained with normal feed and condensate system.
"Troubleshooting of the Main Turbine Bypass Valve/Control system is in progress.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."
At 0424 EDT, during startup operations, the Main Turbine Bypass valves unexpectedly opened and depressurized the reactor vessel. After depressurization, the reactor level increased due to swell and caused an automatic reactor scram. Additionally, there was a Reactor Building Isolation Signal and Group I, II, and VI Primary Containment Isolation Signal generated. Immediately after the automatic scram, five control rods failed to insert into the core. Plant operations personnel performed actions in accordance with their Emergency Operating Procedures to drive the control rods into the core. According to the licensee, adequate shutdown margin was always maintained.
The plant electrical system is stable with plant equipment being powered from offsite and the startup transformer. Reactor pressure and level are being maintained via steam line drains to the main condenser.
Troubleshooting of the Main Turbine Bypass valves/control system is in progress.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/19/03 @ 0934 EDT FROM ERIC OLSON TO CROUCH * * *
The following clarification of the above information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 04:24 EDT, during startup operations, the Main Turbine Bypass Valves failed open. At the beginning of the event reactor pressure was approximately 880 psig. When the Main Turbine Bypass Valves opened, reactor pressure lowered to approximately 820 psi and reactor water level swelled (due to voiding) from 28 inches to approximately 55 inches. This resulted in a Group I PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Signal] being generated as designed and automatically closing the MSIV's [Main Steam Isolation Valves]. MSIV closure terminated the depressurization, however initiated an automatic RPS [Reactor Protection System] signal as designed. Termination of depressurization resulted in reactor level lowering to approximately 7 inches which in turn initiated a Group II (Containment Isolation) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation) PCIS signals. All rods inserted during the scram, however five control rods went beyond full in. Actions were taken in accordance with EOP's [Emergency Operating Procedures] and plant operating procedures to verify the five control rods were beyond full in. This is an indication issue with control rods that can occur when a scram signal is present and the Control Rod Drive System charging water flow drives the control rods beyond the [zero] and full in reed switches.
"The plant electrical system is stable with plant equipment being powered from offsite power via the startup transformer. Reactor pressure is being maintained by steam line drains to the main condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained with normal feed and condensate system.
"Troubleshooting of the Main Turbine Bypass Valve/Control system is in progress.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39858
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JONATHAN ROBB
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JONATHAN ROBB
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 05:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 05:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
PLANT COMMENCED TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 0323 [CDT] on May 19th an Individual Rod Position Indication (IRPI) of control bank D exceeded 12 steps from its bank demand position. At 0418 an additional IRPI of control bank D exceeded 12 steps from its bank demand position, at which time the two IRPI indications were declared inoperable. At 0518 the plant initiated a Standard Shutdown Sequence as required by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS 3.10.f.2) since two IRPI's in a group were out of service. At 0530 the two IRPI were within 12 steps of the bank demand position and therefore the shutdown sequence was exited. Power is being held at 97% to investigate.
"This is a 4-hour. Notification made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)."
Initially, rod G-3 indication was greater than 12 steps from the bank demand position. Then rod G-11 indication drifted greater than 12 steps from the bank demand position. Currently, power in stable at 97% with G-3 indicating 198 steps and G-11 indicating 204 steps and bank demand position at 202 steps.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1540 EDT ON 5/19/03 FROM JONATHAN ROBB TO E.THOMAS * * *
Mr. Robb called back to clarify that IRPI indication deviated gradually from bank rod position as the bank was withdrawn, and as power and Tavg were increased.
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 0323 [CDT] on May 19th an Individual Rod Position Indication (IRPI) of control bank D exceeded 12 steps from its bank demand position. At 0418 an additional IRPI of control bank D exceeded 12 steps from its bank demand position, at which time the two IRPI indications were declared inoperable. At 0518 the plant initiated a Standard Shutdown Sequence as required by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS 3.10.f.2) since two IRPI's in a group were out of service. At 0530 the two IRPI were within 12 steps of the bank demand position and therefore the shutdown sequence was exited. Power is being held at 97% to investigate.
"This is a 4-hour. Notification made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)."
Initially, rod G-3 indication was greater than 12 steps from the bank demand position. Then rod G-11 indication drifted greater than 12 steps from the bank demand position. Currently, power in stable at 97% with G-3 indicating 198 steps and G-11 indicating 204 steps and bank demand position at 202 steps.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1540 EDT ON 5/19/03 FROM JONATHAN ROBB TO E.THOMAS * * *
Mr. Robb called back to clarify that IRPI indication deviated gradually from bank rod position as the bank was withdrawn, and as power and Tavg were increased.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39859
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: GEORGE TULLIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: GEORGE TULLIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
MANATEE TRAPPED IN THE INTAKE CANAL
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"Notification being made due to a State Notification (Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission - Bureau of Protected Species) at 0905 [EDT]. (10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)).
"State notification made due to a Manatee trapped in the Intake Canal. The animal appears to be in good condition and State personnel are [en route] to assist in removal and release.
"This notification includes requirements per St. Lucie Environmental Protection Plan Technical Specifications, Appendix B, section 4.1. This is a 72-hr notification for unusual occurrence of any species protected by the Endangered Species Act of 1973."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"Notification being made due to a State Notification (Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission - Bureau of Protected Species) at 0905 [EDT]. (10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)).
"State notification made due to a Manatee trapped in the Intake Canal. The animal appears to be in good condition and State personnel are [en route] to assist in removal and release.
"This notification includes requirements per St. Lucie Environmental Protection Plan Technical Specifications, Appendix B, section 4.1. This is a 72-hr notification for unusual occurrence of any species protected by the Endangered Species Act of 1973."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39860
Rep Org: GIBRALTAR PLASTIC CORPORATION
Licensee: GIBRALTAR PLASTIC CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: LODI State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-18454-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY WIZA
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: GIBRALTAR PLASTIC CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: LODI State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-18454-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY WIZA
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2003
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
SURFACE CONTAMINATION LEVELS ON SOURCE IS GREATER THAN LIMITS
The licensee was packaging eleven cesium sources for shipment to Adco Services Incorporated. Upon surveying the sources, the contractor found that one Cs-137 source, Model No.S-4, Serial No.485 indicated field testing contaminations above 0.005 microcuries (exposure rate greater than 0.5 mR/h). The source activity is believed to be approximately 10.2 millicuries. This contaminated source will be packaged as dry waste in certified type A containers and will be shipped for disposal . The cabinet where the source was stored was contaminated and will also be packed and shipped for disposal.
The licensee contacted Region 1 (D. White).
The licensee was packaging eleven cesium sources for shipment to Adco Services Incorporated. Upon surveying the sources, the contractor found that one Cs-137 source, Model No.S-4, Serial No.485 indicated field testing contaminations above 0.005 microcuries (exposure rate greater than 0.5 mR/h). The source activity is believed to be approximately 10.2 millicuries. This contaminated source will be packaged as dry waste in certified type A containers and will be shipped for disposal . The cabinet where the source was stored was contaminated and will also be packed and shipped for disposal.
The licensee contacted Region 1 (D. White).