Event Notification Report for May 16, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/15/2003 - 05/16/2003
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39854
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN YADUSKY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN YADUSKY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 05/16/2003
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2003
Event Time: 04:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2003
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2003
Event Time: 04:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On 5/16/03 with the reactor shutdown in MODE 3, an unplanned actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system occurred during testing of the 'B' Main Feed Pump (MFP). A trip of an uncoupled MFP generated a signal to start both motor-driven AFW pumps during testing following maintenance. The 'A' motor-driven AFW pump was already in service, so the 'B' AFW pump started on receipt of the signal. Feed to the steam generators was always available, even without the additional actuation of the AFW system. The purpose of the actuation of AFW following a trip of the main feed system is to ensure adequate flow to the steam generator. In this case, the main feed pump was being tested and was not being used to provide flow to the steam generator. Therefore the actuation was not required to provide any safety function. The 'B' motor-driven AFW pump was secured within approximately two minutes because the additional flow was not required. This condition is being reported as an unplanned system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"10 CFR 50.72 requires an 8-hour report for, 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' In this case, the AFW pump start signal due to trip of the last running MFP is only applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and is not required in the current MODE of plant operation (MODE 3).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 7/15/03 @ 1044 BY YADUSKY TO LAURA * * * RETRACTION
Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the reported event did not meet the definition of a valid signal. Therefore, the reporting criterion contained in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was not applicable. Per NUREG 1022, Revision 2 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73), "Valid actuations are those actuations that result from `valid signals' . . . That are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system."
Because the AFW actuation signal was not initiated in response to an actual loss of the last running MFP (the motor was disconnected from the pump and no MFP was in operation), the actuation was not valid; therefore, the event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv). In addition, because the invalid signal was received after the safety function had already been completed (the alternate train of AFW was operating at the time of the uncoupled motor trip), the event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(2)(ii).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
NRC notified REG 2 RDO.
"On 5/16/03 with the reactor shutdown in MODE 3, an unplanned actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system occurred during testing of the 'B' Main Feed Pump (MFP). A trip of an uncoupled MFP generated a signal to start both motor-driven AFW pumps during testing following maintenance. The 'A' motor-driven AFW pump was already in service, so the 'B' AFW pump started on receipt of the signal. Feed to the steam generators was always available, even without the additional actuation of the AFW system. The purpose of the actuation of AFW following a trip of the main feed system is to ensure adequate flow to the steam generator. In this case, the main feed pump was being tested and was not being used to provide flow to the steam generator. Therefore the actuation was not required to provide any safety function. The 'B' motor-driven AFW pump was secured within approximately two minutes because the additional flow was not required. This condition is being reported as an unplanned system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"10 CFR 50.72 requires an 8-hour report for, 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' In this case, the AFW pump start signal due to trip of the last running MFP is only applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and is not required in the current MODE of plant operation (MODE 3).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 7/15/03 @ 1044 BY YADUSKY TO LAURA * * * RETRACTION
Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the reported event did not meet the definition of a valid signal. Therefore, the reporting criterion contained in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was not applicable. Per NUREG 1022, Revision 2 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73), "Valid actuations are those actuations that result from `valid signals' . . . That are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system."
Because the AFW actuation signal was not initiated in response to an actual loss of the last running MFP (the motor was disconnected from the pump and no MFP was in operation), the actuation was not valid; therefore, the event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv). In addition, because the invalid signal was received after the safety function had already been completed (the alternate train of AFW was operating at the time of the uncoupled motor trip), the event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(2)(ii).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
NRC notified REG 2 RDO.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39990
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRY GARBER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRY GARBER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/11/2003
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2003
Event Time: 07:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2003
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2003
Event Time: 07:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown |
INVALID EMERGENCY DIESEL START SIGNAL
"The report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.
"With the unit in refueling shutdown and defueled, a loss of the 1B DC Electrical Bus occurred during maintenance activities associated with the 1B Battery performance test. The current leads from a load bank to the positive (+) terminal of the 1B Battery were being disconnected.
"The Unit 1J Emergency AC Bus degraded and undervoltage protection relays, powered from the 1B DC Bus, deenergized and provided a start signal for the #3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The #3 EDG started, however, the diesel did not load on the Unit 1J AC Bus due to the loss of control power to Unit 1J AC Bus circuit breakers. The signal to start the #3 EDG on the emergency AC electrical power system was considered invalid because the Unit 1 Emergency AC Bus did not experience an actual degraded/undervoltage condition.
"Maintenance, Operations, and Engineering conducted a walkthrough of the restoration actions and step sequence and at 1252 hours, re-energized the 1B DC Bus. At 1550 hours, all loads were restored on 1B DC Bus.
"The direct cause of the loss of the 1B DC Bus was the disconnection of the wrong battery discharge cables. A root cause evaluation is being performed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.
"With the unit in refueling shutdown and defueled, a loss of the 1B DC Electrical Bus occurred during maintenance activities associated with the 1B Battery performance test. The current leads from a load bank to the positive (+) terminal of the 1B Battery were being disconnected.
"The Unit 1J Emergency AC Bus degraded and undervoltage protection relays, powered from the 1B DC Bus, deenergized and provided a start signal for the #3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The #3 EDG started, however, the diesel did not load on the Unit 1J AC Bus due to the loss of control power to Unit 1J AC Bus circuit breakers. The signal to start the #3 EDG on the emergency AC electrical power system was considered invalid because the Unit 1 Emergency AC Bus did not experience an actual degraded/undervoltage condition.
"Maintenance, Operations, and Engineering conducted a walkthrough of the restoration actions and step sequence and at 1252 hours, re-energized the 1B DC Bus. At 1550 hours, all loads were restored on 1B DC Bus.
"The direct cause of the loss of the 1B DC Bus was the disconnection of the wrong battery discharge cables. A root cause evaluation is being performed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.