Event Notification Report for May 15, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/14/2003 - 05/15/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39852398533984939879
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39852
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JIM FISHER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JIM FISHER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 05/15/2003
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 13:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2003
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 13:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SAFEGUARDS EVENT
The licensee reported a vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area and vital area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee reported a vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area and vital area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39853
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/16/2003
Notification Time: 10:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2003
Notification Time: 10:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.75(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIP DISABLED/FAIL
10 CFR Section:
72.75(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIP DISABLED/FAIL
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION
On 5/15/03 @1400 during pigtail disconnect, a small amount of particulate fell from the pigtail. This particulate began to smoke resulting in a see and flee. During the see and flee the gas release alarm was activated. The alarm resulted in the actuation of a "Q" Safety system while in applicable mode (mode III). The PSS Responded to the see and flee. The affected cylinder was made inoperable. No spread of contamination outside already posted area. Air sampling results are less than MDA.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 23:46 EDT ON 5/20/03 FROM McCLEERY TO CROUCH * * *
The following update was received from the regulatee via facsimile:
"5/20/05: As requested, this is additional information to clarify some questions in the initial report of PTS-2003-011. Mode III (Cylinder/Pigtail Operations) includes but is not limited to pigtail connection/disconnections, roll/tilt and valve clarity checks; steam valves closed, cylinder valve or safety valve may or may not be closed. MDA is minimum detectable activity. The initial report should have been marked as Other Non-CFR Requirements in place of (c)(2) safety equipment failure.
Additionally, during the investigation of the event it was determined the cylinder safety valve air supply was removed prior to the see and flee. This condition is reportable under 76.120 (c)(2)(ii) [and] 76.120 (d)(2). The equipment is required by Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) to be available and operable to perform the required safety function, while the autoclave is operating in mode III (cylinder/ pigtail operations).
On 5/15/03 @1400 during pigtail disconnect, a small amount of particulate fell from the pigtail. This particulate began to smoke resulting in a see and flee. During the see and flee the gas release alarm was activated. The alarm resulted in the actuation of a "Q" Safety system while in applicable mode (mode III). The PSS Responded to the see and flee. The affected cylinder was made inoperable. No spread of contamination outside already posted area. Air sampling results are less than MDA.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 23:46 EDT ON 5/20/03 FROM McCLEERY TO CROUCH * * *
The following update was received from the regulatee via facsimile:
"5/20/05: As requested, this is additional information to clarify some questions in the initial report of PTS-2003-011. Mode III (Cylinder/Pigtail Operations) includes but is not limited to pigtail connection/disconnections, roll/tilt and valve clarity checks; steam valves closed, cylinder valve or safety valve may or may not be closed. MDA is minimum detectable activity. The initial report should have been marked as Other Non-CFR Requirements in place of (c)(2) safety equipment failure.
Additionally, during the investigation of the event it was determined the cylinder safety valve air supply was removed prior to the see and flee. This condition is reportable under 76.120 (c)(2)(ii) [and] 76.120 (d)(2). The equipment is required by Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) to be available and operable to perform the required safety function, while the autoclave is operating in mode III (cylinder/ pigtail operations).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39849
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HALL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HALL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/15/2003
Notification Time: 05:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 02:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2003
Notification Time: 05:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 02:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER ON BOTH UNITS DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON BOTH UNITS
The licensee reported that a loss of power on the 345KV grid caused a turbine trip on both units which resulted in a reactor trip from 100% on both units. All rods fully inserted and no ECCS was actuated. Both units are currently at Mode 3 in natural circulation and stable. The auxiliary feed water systems started on both units to maintain steam generator levels. The reactor coolant temperature is being controlled by using the steam generator atmospheric relief valves. Since the safety systems were powered by an alternate offsite power supply, the 4 emergency diesels did not auto start, but they are operable. The licensee is investigating why they lost the 345KV grid.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
*****UPDATE ON 5/16/03 AT 1500 EST FROM D. BUTLER TO R. LAURA*****
"Status as of 10:30, 05/16/03 - Sequence of Events
1. Parker line experiences a `B' phase to ground fault at 02:52.
2. CPSES [Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station] Parker feeder breaker 8040 fails to trip as required.
Primary and backup ground relaying do not actuate. No trip signal is sent to the Parker breaker.
Should normal tripping have occurred, fault would likely have cleared and event ended.
East Bus backup timers are not initiated due to lack of Parker Breaker 8040 trip signal. Operation of the
backup timers would have isolated the East bus. CPSES impact would likely have been lowering one unit to
50% power while operating the other unit at 100% power.
3. Parker line remains faulted with fault current being supplied from the East bus, West bus and CPSES generation.
4. Approximately 30 cycles into the fault, 345 Kv offsite feeds began to trip via their own protective schemes.
5. At approximately 1.3 seconds, Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator breakers trip on generator backup Main transformer
neutral ground relaying.
6. Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator lockout relays actuate on Load Rejection protection.
7. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal 6.9KV busses trip on Generator lockout signals.
8. Unit 1 Normal busses slow transfer to Station Transformer 1 ST at approximately 5 seconds.
Unit 2 two normal bus alternate feed 2ST has been de-energized from the 8080 breaker blocking slow
transfer operation.
9. Station Transformer 1 ST `C' phase time over current relaying operates generating a 1 ST lockout signal.
10. Unit 1 normal 6.9Kv bus alternate feeder breakers are tripped via the 1 ST lockout signal.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 normal 6.9Kv busses are now de-energized.
11. East and West busses are inspected by ONCOR and CPSES Maintenance. Switchyard West bus is re-
energized from the Wolf Hollow Line.
12. Station transformers 1ST and 2ST are re-energized and power restored to Unit 1 and 2 Normal 6.9KV busses.
"Troubleshooting
"Primary Fault detection relay is tested and is found failed. The Fault detector serves as a Supervisory relay during line faults. It serves as a trip permissive, placing the trip circuits of the ground detection relaying in service. Failure of the Fault Detector is the obvious cause of the Primary relay protection scheme failure to operate. Backup Fault detection relay is tested and is found to operate correctly. Failure of the backup protection scheme is likely caused by the inconsistent operation of the backup ground relay and failure of the CA unit of the Zone 1 relay."
Notified R4DO (Johnson)
The licensee reported that a loss of power on the 345KV grid caused a turbine trip on both units which resulted in a reactor trip from 100% on both units. All rods fully inserted and no ECCS was actuated. Both units are currently at Mode 3 in natural circulation and stable. The auxiliary feed water systems started on both units to maintain steam generator levels. The reactor coolant temperature is being controlled by using the steam generator atmospheric relief valves. Since the safety systems were powered by an alternate offsite power supply, the 4 emergency diesels did not auto start, but they are operable. The licensee is investigating why they lost the 345KV grid.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
*****UPDATE ON 5/16/03 AT 1500 EST FROM D. BUTLER TO R. LAURA*****
"Status as of 10:30, 05/16/03 - Sequence of Events
1. Parker line experiences a `B' phase to ground fault at 02:52.
2. CPSES [Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station] Parker feeder breaker 8040 fails to trip as required.
Primary and backup ground relaying do not actuate. No trip signal is sent to the Parker breaker.
Should normal tripping have occurred, fault would likely have cleared and event ended.
East Bus backup timers are not initiated due to lack of Parker Breaker 8040 trip signal. Operation of the
backup timers would have isolated the East bus. CPSES impact would likely have been lowering one unit to
50% power while operating the other unit at 100% power.
3. Parker line remains faulted with fault current being supplied from the East bus, West bus and CPSES generation.
4. Approximately 30 cycles into the fault, 345 Kv offsite feeds began to trip via their own protective schemes.
5. At approximately 1.3 seconds, Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator breakers trip on generator backup Main transformer
neutral ground relaying.
6. Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator lockout relays actuate on Load Rejection protection.
7. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal 6.9KV busses trip on Generator lockout signals.
8. Unit 1 Normal busses slow transfer to Station Transformer 1 ST at approximately 5 seconds.
Unit 2 two normal bus alternate feed 2ST has been de-energized from the 8080 breaker blocking slow
transfer operation.
9. Station Transformer 1 ST `C' phase time over current relaying operates generating a 1 ST lockout signal.
10. Unit 1 normal 6.9Kv bus alternate feeder breakers are tripped via the 1 ST lockout signal.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 normal 6.9Kv busses are now de-energized.
11. East and West busses are inspected by ONCOR and CPSES Maintenance. Switchyard West bus is re-
energized from the Wolf Hollow Line.
12. Station transformers 1ST and 2ST are re-energized and power restored to Unit 1 and 2 Normal 6.9KV busses.
"Troubleshooting
"Primary Fault detection relay is tested and is found failed. The Fault detector serves as a Supervisory relay during line faults. It serves as a trip permissive, placing the trip circuits of the ground detection relaying in service. Failure of the Fault Detector is the obvious cause of the Primary relay protection scheme failure to operate. Backup Fault detection relay is tested and is found to operate correctly. Failure of the backup protection scheme is likely caused by the inconsistent operation of the backup ground relay and failure of the CA unit of the Zone 1 relay."
Notified R4DO (Johnson)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39879
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: SIPEX CORP.
Region: 1
City: Billerica State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: SIPEX CORP.
Region: 1
City: Billerica State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/23/2003
Notification Time: 14:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2003
Notification Time: 14:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
MISSING/LOST STATIC ELIMINATOR POLONIUM-210 SOURCE.
On May 22, 2003, the MA Radiation Control Program received a letter, dated May 16, 2003, from Sipex, Corporation, a general license holder, notifying them that Sipex Corp. was missing one Static Eliminator source. The Static Eliminator was manufactured by NRD and it contained four Po-210 sources. The Po-210 sources are located in the fitting of an air line. On May 15, 2003 the air line was relocated to a different location. After the air line had been relocated it was discovered that one of its four Po-210 sources was missing. Sipex Corp. believes that the source is still in the facility or it ended up in the trash. The calculated Po-210 source strength as of May 23, 2003 is 1.6 millicuries. The State of MA tracking number for this event is 05 4172.
On May 22, 2003, the MA Radiation Control Program received a letter, dated May 16, 2003, from Sipex, Corporation, a general license holder, notifying them that Sipex Corp. was missing one Static Eliminator source. The Static Eliminator was manufactured by NRD and it contained four Po-210 sources. The Po-210 sources are located in the fitting of an air line. On May 15, 2003 the air line was relocated to a different location. After the air line had been relocated it was discovered that one of its four Po-210 sources was missing. Sipex Corp. believes that the source is still in the facility or it ended up in the trash. The calculated Po-210 source strength as of May 23, 2003 is 1.6 millicuries. The State of MA tracking number for this event is 05 4172.