Event Notification Report for May 10, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/09/2003 - 05/10/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39840398353983639837
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39840
Rep Org: STATE OF MISSOURI
Licensee: MISSOURI DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 3
City: JEFFERSON CITY State: MO
County: COLE
License #: 24-20415-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: MISSOURI DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 3
City: JEFFERSON CITY State: MO
County: COLE
License #: 24-20415-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 18:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 18:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
LOST AND THEN RECOVERED TROXLER ASPHALT CONTENT GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On Saturday evening, May 10, 2003, at approximately 6:00 pm [CDT], a tornado wiped out a trailer at an asphalt plant that contained an asphalt nuclear gauge 3241 [Troxler]. The gauge was in its gray shipping container that was locked inside a metal case, which was bolted to the floor. The gauge was found about 100 feet from the trailer site out of the metal box, but the gray shipping case was still intact. It did not appear to be damaged. The contractor, Chester Bross Construction Company, found the gauge and stored it in their plant shack with their gauge. Their Safety Director, [DELETED], also came up on Sunday morning and took readings. Neither gauge appeared to be leaking."
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On Saturday evening, May 10, 2003, at approximately 6:00 pm [CDT], a tornado wiped out a trailer at an asphalt plant that contained an asphalt nuclear gauge 3241 [Troxler]. The gauge was in its gray shipping container that was locked inside a metal case, which was bolted to the floor. The gauge was found about 100 feet from the trailer site out of the metal box, but the gray shipping case was still intact. It did not appear to be damaged. The contractor, Chester Bross Construction Company, found the gauge and stored it in their plant shack with their gauge. Their Safety Director, [DELETED], also came up on Sunday morning and took readings. Neither gauge appeared to be leaking."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39835
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY MAYEUX
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY MAYEUX
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/10/2003
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 10:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2003
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 10:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
PLANT MAY HAVE EXCEEDED RATED THERMAL POWER DURING PREVIOUS OPERATING CYCLE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On May 10, 2003, plant personnel determined that River Bend Station [RBS] may have operated above the licensed thermal power limit of 3039 MWt [megawatts thermal] during the last operating cycle due to a non-conservative error in feedwater flow measurement. RBS installed a new feedwater ultrasonic flow meter during the last refueling outage. Data analyzed following initial testing of the new flow meter resulted in the identification of discrepancies between feedwater flow measurements from the new ultrasonic flow meter, the previously installed external ultrasonic flow meter and the venturi nozzle flow meter. Feedwater flow measurement directly impacts the calculation of thermal power during plant operation. The plant normally operates at 100% thermal power. Thus, any non conservative error in feedwater measurement results in thermal power greater than 100%.
"Initial review of feedwater flow data indicates that the licensed thermal power limit may have been exceeded. Further analysis is ongoing to determine the magnitude of the condition. This condition was primarily caused by error in the flow measurement using the previously installed external ultrasonic flow meter. As this device is no longer installed in the plant, the reported condition has no impact on current plant operation. This report is being made as required by RBS Operating License [OL] Condition 2.E as a violation of OL Condition 2.C(1)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On May 10, 2003, plant personnel determined that River Bend Station [RBS] may have operated above the licensed thermal power limit of 3039 MWt [megawatts thermal] during the last operating cycle due to a non-conservative error in feedwater flow measurement. RBS installed a new feedwater ultrasonic flow meter during the last refueling outage. Data analyzed following initial testing of the new flow meter resulted in the identification of discrepancies between feedwater flow measurements from the new ultrasonic flow meter, the previously installed external ultrasonic flow meter and the venturi nozzle flow meter. Feedwater flow measurement directly impacts the calculation of thermal power during plant operation. The plant normally operates at 100% thermal power. Thus, any non conservative error in feedwater measurement results in thermal power greater than 100%.
"Initial review of feedwater flow data indicates that the licensed thermal power limit may have been exceeded. Further analysis is ongoing to determine the magnitude of the condition. This condition was primarily caused by error in the flow measurement using the previously installed external ultrasonic flow meter. As this device is no longer installed in the plant, the reported condition has no impact on current plant operation. This report is being made as required by RBS Operating License [OL] Condition 2.E as a violation of OL Condition 2.C(1)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39836
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/10/2003
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 15:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2003
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 15:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE OF WISCONSIN
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 5/10/03, while performing a reactor plant startup, the 'B' AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] pump Safeguards Alley trench overflowed. Recent procedural changes have been made to N-FW-05B which do[es] not allow throttling of the lube oil coolers discharge valves to prevent flooding. To address the condition, a sump pump was used to pump water from the trench directly to the turbine building standpipe because the normal flowpath ( Turbine Building Sump ) capacity had been exceeded. This water is believed to be free from radiological, chemical, or petroleum products as it is processed as pure DI [de-ionized] water. This has effectively created a previously unrecognized and consequently unauthorized discharge flowpath. This notification is being made due to the expected report to the Wisconsin DNR [Department of Natural Resources] on the same incident."
To mitigate this condition, the licensee has temporarily changed the revised procedure to allow throttling of lube oil coolers discharge valves (original procedural guidance) until the revised procedure can be re-evaluated. The discharge did not exceed any reportable quantities.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 5/10/03, while performing a reactor plant startup, the 'B' AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] pump Safeguards Alley trench overflowed. Recent procedural changes have been made to N-FW-05B which do[es] not allow throttling of the lube oil coolers discharge valves to prevent flooding. To address the condition, a sump pump was used to pump water from the trench directly to the turbine building standpipe because the normal flowpath ( Turbine Building Sump ) capacity had been exceeded. This water is believed to be free from radiological, chemical, or petroleum products as it is processed as pure DI [de-ionized] water. This has effectively created a previously unrecognized and consequently unauthorized discharge flowpath. This notification is being made due to the expected report to the Wisconsin DNR [Department of Natural Resources] on the same incident."
To mitigate this condition, the licensee has temporarily changed the revised procedure to allow throttling of lube oil coolers discharge valves (original procedural guidance) until the revised procedure can be re-evaluated. The discharge did not exceed any reportable quantities.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39837
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ALAN RABENOLD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ALAN RABENOLD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/10/2003
Notification Time: 20:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 15:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2003
Notification Time: 20:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2003
Event Time: 15:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
MANUAL RPS ACTUATION DUE TO FAILED OVERRIDE FEATURE
"At 1509 [CDT], during the performance of the Division One (1) LOOP / LOCA Test, the instrument air to Control Rods was lost due to a failure of the supply isolation valve to re-open during the test. It was planned that the Scram Air Header isolation valve would close during the test but the LOCA Override feature failed to work and prevented the valve from being re-opened. A manual Rx Scram was inserted before Scram Air Header pressure dropped to the point that it would have caused a Rx Scram.
"The Control Rods were already inserted into the Core and no Rod motion occurred. The valve was manually re-opened and air was restored to the Scram Air Header. The Scram was reset at 1546 [hrs.]. The Plant is currently in a Refueling Outage. Troubleshooting will be occurring to determine the failure of the override feature to function:"
Normal Scram Air Header pressure is 120 psig. At a pressure of 38 psig, the Scram Air Header valves will start to fail close due to low air pressure and result in a Scram. The licensee initiated the manual Rx Scram when pressure reached 60 psig decreasing. The air header depressurized completely until the air supply valve was manually re-opened after operators were unable to open the valve from the control room. During this outage, there was some work performed on the Scram Air Supply Isolation valve but none that would have affected the LOCA Override feature. The Isolation valve override will be repaired during this refueling outage.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1509 [CDT], during the performance of the Division One (1) LOOP / LOCA Test, the instrument air to Control Rods was lost due to a failure of the supply isolation valve to re-open during the test. It was planned that the Scram Air Header isolation valve would close during the test but the LOCA Override feature failed to work and prevented the valve from being re-opened. A manual Rx Scram was inserted before Scram Air Header pressure dropped to the point that it would have caused a Rx Scram.
"The Control Rods were already inserted into the Core and no Rod motion occurred. The valve was manually re-opened and air was restored to the Scram Air Header. The Scram was reset at 1546 [hrs.]. The Plant is currently in a Refueling Outage. Troubleshooting will be occurring to determine the failure of the override feature to function:"
Normal Scram Air Header pressure is 120 psig. At a pressure of 38 psig, the Scram Air Header valves will start to fail close due to low air pressure and result in a Scram. The licensee initiated the manual Rx Scram when pressure reached 60 psig decreasing. The air header depressurized completely until the air supply valve was manually re-opened after operators were unable to open the valve from the control room. During this outage, there was some work performed on the Scram Air Supply Isolation valve but none that would have affected the LOCA Override feature. The Isolation valve override will be repaired during this refueling outage.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.