Event Notification Report for April 24, 2003

FITNESS FOR DUTY

A contract employee was determined to be under the influence of marijuana during a monitor result drug test. The employee's access to the plant has been permanently terminated. Contact the HOO for additional details.

CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR REPORT (RESPONSE BULLETIN 91-01)

The following information was obtained from the regulatee via facsimile:

"At 1320 [CDT] on 4/23/03, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the trap media replacement activities for C-337 #4 Seal Exhaust (SX) trap were performed on 4/6/03 through 4/8/03 and the trap media and the bottom screen were replaced. Contrary to the requirements of NCSA CAS-007, 'independent verification of no trap media below the bottom screen' was not performed prior to the bottom flange being removed. This requirement ensures that an unanalyzed volume of media does not spill from the trap.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event.

"PDGP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 03-1199 PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2003-008 NRC Event Worksheet [39791].

"Responsible Division: Maintenance

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

"Although the trap was not independently verified to be essentially empty of accumulated trap mix, prior to in-place maintenance, no media was found when the bottom flange was removed.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(s) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):

"In order for a criticality to be possible, a critical volume of trap mix would have to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION. ETC):

"Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on volume.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):

"There was no media found when the bottom flange was removed.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL (S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

"The first leg of double contingency relies on controlling the volume of trap mix available to be spilled from the, trap after removal of media above the bottom screen. NCSA CAS-007 requires the trap to be verified emptied of trap media prior to in-place maintenance, thus ensuring that the trap does not contain any accumulated trap mix in excess of a 5.5-gal drum. Verification of the trap mix accumulated in the trap was not done, thus, this control was violated.

"The second leg of double contingency relies on controlling the volume of trap mix available to be spilled from the trap after removal of media above the bottom screen. NCSA CAS-007 requires the trap to be independently verified emptied of trap media prior to in-place maintenance. Independent verification of the trap mix accumulated in the trap was not performed, therefore, this control was violated. Neither of the controls (verification and independent verification) of the single parameter (volume) were performed and double contingency was not maintained.

"No trap media was spilled from the trap, thus maintaining the volume parameter.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

"None."

Operations notified the NRC resident inspector.

ALERT AT PERRY DUE TO EVENT IN FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

"At 11:00 the control room received a High alarm on the FHB Gas and Alert on FHB Iodine. ONI ZZZ-7 was entered along with ONI J11-2 and ONI D17. Fuel movement was stopped after all fuel was placed in a safe condition. The FHB, Drywell, and Containment were evacuated and the Containment and FHB closure plans were carried out. At 11:30 the control room received a report that the fuel bundle being inspected in the FHB had a bubble float to the top of the pool. At 11:27 the alarms in the FHB reset. The entry into an Alert was recognized at 11:50 and initial notifications were completed. The Technical Support center has been staffed to develop a recovery plan."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

GRAND GULF AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND ECCS INJECTION DUE TO PARTIAL LOOP

"At 09:47 (CDT), Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) auto scrammed due to complications following a partial loss of offsite power. At the time of the scram there was a severe thunderstorm in the vicinity of GGNS. It is believed that high winds caused damage in the GGNS switchyard which in turn led to the partial LOOP. The following items actuated/initiated during this event:

"1. RPS automatic actuation, exact cause unknown.
"2. HPCS and RCIC initiated on reactor water level 2 and injected into the vessel to restore water level.
"3. Division 2 and 3 EDGs started on a loss of power to the 16 and 17 buses. Division 2 and 3 EDG energized the 16 and 17 buses respectively.
"4. Some time after the initial event the 15 bus lost power and was re-energized by the Division 1 EDG.
"5. All MSIVs isolated on loss of power.
"6. Containment isolation occurred on power loss and on reactor water level 2.

"At present reactor water level is being maintained with RCIC and reactor pressure is being maintained with SRVs. A review of plant data is underway to confirm proper response of plant equipment."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.

*****UPDATE ON 4/24/03 AT 19:20 FROM BRINMAN TO LAURA*****

"It should be noted that offsite power was always available to the GGNS from the ESF transformer #12 during/following the scram at 09:47 hours (CDT) on 4/24/03. Also, there was no structural damage to the GGNS switchyard. There was only minor damage to a locking collar on a disconnect in the GGNS switchyard. The wind blew the disconnect closed breaking it's locking collar and grounding the switchyard through a grounding strap. The grounding strap disintegrated and a lockout occurred on service transformer #21 and the west bus of the GGNS switchyard. Power has been restored to all busses and all diesel generators have been secured."

Notified R4DO (C. Cain)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO HYDRAULIC OIL SPILL

The licensee notified the state that they had approximately one tablespoon of hydraulic oil spill from a manlift to the soil in the south RCA yard near the rad waste reduction facility.

The NRC RDO(Gray) was notified.

ALERT DECLARED

At 0348 EDT on 4/24/03, the plant experienced an influx of fish on the intake screens for the circwater and essential service water (ESW) systems. This resulted in a loss of vacuum to Units 1 and 2 main turbines, which led operators to manually trip both reactors. Following the trip, operators noted that ESW flow to all 4 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) was severely degraded. This resulted in the licensee declaring all 4 EDG's inoperable. An alert was declared at 0348 EDT, and the NRC entered Monitoring Mode at 0506 EDT.

* * * UPDATE AT 0600 ON 4/24/03 FROM LICENSEE TO H. CROUCH * * *

All EDG's have adequate flow to be used in an emergency, but remain inoperable.

The licensee is assessing damage to intake screens and strainers in the ESW system, and manually backwashing ESW screens.

* * * UPDATE AT 0718 ON 4/24/03 FROM DEAN BRUCK TO E. THOMAS * * *

The licensee made a 4-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to inform the NRC of the manual reactor trips inserted on Units 1 and 2 at 0328 and 0329 on 4/24/03 for the reasons listed above. Post-trip response of the plant was normal. Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed on both units due to lowering Reactor Coolant System temperature and lowering vacuum. Both units remain in Mode 3.

* * * UPDATE AT 1020 ON 4/24/03 FROM TODD CASPER TO E. THOMAS * * *

The licensee made an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) to inform the NRC of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) actuations in Units 1 and 2 following the reactor trips. The heat removal path for both units is via AFW to the steam generator pressure operated relief valves.

* * * UPDATE AT 0532 ON 4/25/03 FROM R3 IRC TO E. THOMAS * * *

The licensee terminated the Alert at 0521 EDT. The Alert was terminated based on having one train of ESW and one EDG declared OPERABLE for each Unit. The NRC exited the Monitoring Mode of normal operations at 0532 EDT.