Event Notification Report for April 23, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/22/2003 - 04/23/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39788
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK OKOPNY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK OKOPNY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/23/2003
Notification Time: 23:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2003
Event Time: 19:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2003
Notification Time: 23:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2003
Event Time: 19:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 67 | Power Operation | 67 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 10 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOST OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major loss of emergency assessment capability. During the performance of routine surveillance LOS-VG-M1 Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test and Inservice Test of 1VG001 and 1VG003, it was reported that the installed preplanned monitoring system sample pump tripped. At 19:55 CDST on April 23rd it was confirmed that the sample pump had tripped for the Preplanned Alternate sampling system. This Preplanned Alternate sampling system had been connected to comply with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) from the inoperability of the installed Standby Gas Treatment Stack monitoring system (Standby Gas Treatment system Wide Range Gas Monitoring system -SBGT WRGM). Troubleshooting is in progress to restore the Preplanned Alternate sample pump. The Standby Gas Treatment Train has been secured and placed in standby configuration. The plant is stable and no abnormal or elevated release occurred during this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major loss of emergency assessment capability. During the performance of routine surveillance LOS-VG-M1 Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test and Inservice Test of 1VG001 and 1VG003, it was reported that the installed preplanned monitoring system sample pump tripped. At 19:55 CDST on April 23rd it was confirmed that the sample pump had tripped for the Preplanned Alternate sampling system. This Preplanned Alternate sampling system had been connected to comply with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) from the inoperability of the installed Standby Gas Treatment Stack monitoring system (Standby Gas Treatment system Wide Range Gas Monitoring system -SBGT WRGM). Troubleshooting is in progress to restore the Preplanned Alternate sample pump. The Standby Gas Treatment Train has been secured and placed in standby configuration. The plant is stable and no abnormal or elevated release occurred during this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39789
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK OKOPNY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK OKOPNY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/24/2003
Notification Time: 01:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2003
Event Time: 19:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2003
Notification Time: 01:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2003
Event Time: 19:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 67 | Power Operation | 67 | Power Operation |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. On 04/23/03, at 18:15 CDST, the 1A Diesel Generator was made inoperable for a scheduled surveillance. Concurrent with this inoperability, the 0 Diesel Generator received a spurious CO2 actuation signal. This spurious CO2 partial logic actuation did not result in an actual CO2 injection into the 0 Diesel Generator Room. The CO2 system partial actuation however resulted in several ventilation dampers failing closed as designed. With these dampers closed, the ventilation support system for the 0 Diesel Generator became inoperable, the 0 Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1923 hours 04/23/03. This condition resulted in both the 1A and 0 Diesel Generators concurrently being inoperable. Actions were taken to terminate the 1A Diesel surveillance and restore the 1A Diesel Generator to an operable status. This was accomplished at 1952 hours 04/23/03. The 1A and 0 Diesel Generators were simultaneously inoperable for 29 minutes. Due to the concurrent Diesel Generator inoperabilities which affect redundant trains required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, it has been determined that this event is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification.
"Corrective actions have been initiated to address the 0 Diesel Generator CO2 system and restore the ventilation dampers to an operable status. The spurious actuation of the 0 Diesel Generator CO2 system was determined to be due to a Non-Licensed Operator opening the fire detection panel for inspection."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. On 04/23/03, at 18:15 CDST, the 1A Diesel Generator was made inoperable for a scheduled surveillance. Concurrent with this inoperability, the 0 Diesel Generator received a spurious CO2 actuation signal. This spurious CO2 partial logic actuation did not result in an actual CO2 injection into the 0 Diesel Generator Room. The CO2 system partial actuation however resulted in several ventilation dampers failing closed as designed. With these dampers closed, the ventilation support system for the 0 Diesel Generator became inoperable, the 0 Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1923 hours 04/23/03. This condition resulted in both the 1A and 0 Diesel Generators concurrently being inoperable. Actions were taken to terminate the 1A Diesel surveillance and restore the 1A Diesel Generator to an operable status. This was accomplished at 1952 hours 04/23/03. The 1A and 0 Diesel Generators were simultaneously inoperable for 29 minutes. Due to the concurrent Diesel Generator inoperabilities which affect redundant trains required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, it has been determined that this event is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification.
"Corrective actions have been initiated to address the 0 Diesel Generator CO2 system and restore the ventilation dampers to an operable status. The spurious actuation of the 0 Diesel Generator CO2 system was determined to be due to a Non-Licensed Operator opening the fire detection panel for inspection."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39784
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DOUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DOUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/23/2003
Notification Time: 05:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2003
Event Time: 02:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2003
Notification Time: 05:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2003
Event Time: 02:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
RPS ACTUATION WHILE CRITICAL
"At 0207 EDT on April 23, 2003, a loss of feedwater occurred on Unit 1. Operators initiated a manual reactor scram at 15 [inches] RPV level (auto scram signal = 12.5 [inches]). The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) systems initiated as designed at -38 [inches], and injected into the RPV. RPV level was restored to the normal band, HPCI and RCIC secured, and a reactor feed pump was returned to service. The following isolation signals were received; Groups IB, IIA, IIC, III, VIB, VIC, VIIB, VIIIB, and HVAC. RPV and containment parameters are normal with an RPV cooldown in progress.
"The loss of feed resulted from sequential trips of all 3 reactor feed pumps on low suction pressure due to an apparent isolation of the condensate deep bed demineralizers. The cause is under investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0207 EDT on April 23, 2003, a loss of feedwater occurred on Unit 1. Operators initiated a manual reactor scram at 15 [inches] RPV level (auto scram signal = 12.5 [inches]). The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) systems initiated as designed at -38 [inches], and injected into the RPV. RPV level was restored to the normal band, HPCI and RCIC secured, and a reactor feed pump was returned to service. The following isolation signals were received; Groups IB, IIA, IIC, III, VIB, VIC, VIIB, VIIIB, and HVAC. RPV and containment parameters are normal with an RPV cooldown in progress.
"The loss of feed resulted from sequential trips of all 3 reactor feed pumps on low suction pressure due to an apparent isolation of the condensate deep bed demineralizers. The cause is under investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.