Event Notification Report for April 15, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/14/2003 - 04/15/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39758397603976239763
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39758
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSIER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSIER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 04/15/2003
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 02:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2003
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 02:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
DAVID SILK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNPLANNED LOSS OF SPDS/ERDS FOR GREATER THAN 8 HOURS AT SUSQUEHANNA
"On 4/15/03 the Main Control Room received alarms indicating failure of the power supplies to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). At the time the 2 uninterruptible power supplies were crosstied due to maintenance. Investigation into the cause of the failure is ongoing with repairs expected to take longer than 8 hours.
"Currently, Unit 2 is in a refueling outage in Cold Shutdown. Control room indication and the plant computer system is still available with the exception of those points supplied by the SPDS power supply.
"Due to the failure of the SPDS UPS, 12 of approximately 300 inputs to the ERDS system will be displayed as invalid data until the SPDS power is restored.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On 4/15/03 the Main Control Room received alarms indicating failure of the power supplies to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). At the time the 2 uninterruptible power supplies were crosstied due to maintenance. Investigation into the cause of the failure is ongoing with repairs expected to take longer than 8 hours.
"Currently, Unit 2 is in a refueling outage in Cold Shutdown. Control room indication and the plant computer system is still available with the exception of those points supplied by the SPDS power supply.
"Due to the failure of the SPDS UPS, 12 of approximately 300 inputs to the ERDS system will be displayed as invalid data until the SPDS power is restored.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39760
Facility: LACROSSE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] AC (ALLIS CHAMBERS)
NRC Notified By: DANIEL TESSAR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] AC (ALLIS CHAMBERS)
NRC Notified By: DANIEL TESSAR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/15/2003
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 11:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2003
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 11:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2003
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
TERRRY REIS (NRR)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (EDO)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
TERRRY REIS (NRR)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (EDO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
UNUSUAL EVENT
At approximately 1158 CDT, the CO2 system discharged in the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) building. The licensee declared a UE at 1215 CDT because they had to call an offsite fire department for assistance in re-entering the building. The fire department arrived on site at 1233 CDT and promptly entered the 1B EDG building. The cause of the CO2 discharge was high temperature in the building (140 degrees F) caused by a malfunctioning space heater. The licensee exited the UE at 1252 CDT.
At approximately 1158 CDT, the CO2 system discharged in the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) building. The licensee declared a UE at 1215 CDT because they had to call an offsite fire department for assistance in re-entering the building. The fire department arrived on site at 1233 CDT and promptly entered the 1B EDG building. The cause of the CO2 discharge was high temperature in the building (140 degrees F) caused by a malfunctioning space heater. The licensee exited the UE at 1252 CDT.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39762
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/16/2003
Notification Time: 06:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2003
Notification Time: 06:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT FOR CRITICALITY CONTROL
"At 0945 on 4/15/03, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that SX/WA (Seal Exhaust/Wet Air) pump components were discovered outside the C-337 SX/WA FCA (Fissile Control Area) not properly tagged and spaced, as required by NCSA CAS-007. Tagging of items removed from the SX/WA FCA ensure proper identification of potential fissile components requiring spacing controls. Components include used oil solenoid valve, 3 inch elbow, oil mist filter crushing tool, 3 gas ballast pipes and valves, oil level sight glass, oil or water flow sight glass and copper tubing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: While an approved analysis does exist for subcriticality of this upset condition, a control relied upon for double contingency was violated.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to be possible, a second independent and unlikely event would need to occur concurrently with the loss of spacing accident.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing controls on interaction and an independent failure.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Less than the safe mass of uranium at plant maximum assay of 5.5 wt. % U235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction. Components removed from a SX/WA FCA shall be spaced a minimum 2 feet, edge-to-edge from other potentially fissile material or components, the SX/WA components were spaced less than the required 2 foot spacing. Therefore, the control on interaction was violated and the parameter was lost.
The second leg of double contingency is based on the subcriticality of the loss of spacing. The improperly spaced components are of small size and limited uranium loading which are in a configuration that is bounded by calculations performed for the SX/WA station. Therefore, this leg of double contingency is maintained.
Since the interaction parameter was lost; therefore, the double contingency principle was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: See remediation guide.
"At 0945 on 4/15/03, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that SX/WA (Seal Exhaust/Wet Air) pump components were discovered outside the C-337 SX/WA FCA (Fissile Control Area) not properly tagged and spaced, as required by NCSA CAS-007. Tagging of items removed from the SX/WA FCA ensure proper identification of potential fissile components requiring spacing controls. Components include used oil solenoid valve, 3 inch elbow, oil mist filter crushing tool, 3 gas ballast pipes and valves, oil level sight glass, oil or water flow sight glass and copper tubing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: While an approved analysis does exist for subcriticality of this upset condition, a control relied upon for double contingency was violated.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to be possible, a second independent and unlikely event would need to occur concurrently with the loss of spacing accident.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing controls on interaction and an independent failure.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Less than the safe mass of uranium at plant maximum assay of 5.5 wt. % U235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction. Components removed from a SX/WA FCA shall be spaced a minimum 2 feet, edge-to-edge from other potentially fissile material or components, the SX/WA components were spaced less than the required 2 foot spacing. Therefore, the control on interaction was violated and the parameter was lost.
The second leg of double contingency is based on the subcriticality of the loss of spacing. The improperly spaced components are of small size and limited uranium loading which are in a configuration that is bounded by calculations performed for the SX/WA station. Therefore, this leg of double contingency is maintained.
Since the interaction parameter was lost; therefore, the double contingency principle was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: See remediation guide.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39763
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE PACKARD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE PACKARD
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 04/16/2003
Notification Time: 10:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2003
Notification Time: 10:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
DAVID SILK (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
MASSACHUSETTS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON SHIPPING PACKAGE RADIOLOGICAL ISSUE
"On April 15, 2003, a Yellow-III Package containing 30 millicuries (1.1 Gbq) of Co-60 measured 400 millirem/hr on the surface. The Shipper was AEA Technology QSA GMBH, Giesilweg 1, D-38110 Braunschweig, Germany. The carriers included Federal Express Freight and Ground Control. Immediate reporting requirements means investigation is not complete at the time of report."
"On April 15, 2003, a Yellow-III Package containing 30 millicuries (1.1 Gbq) of Co-60 measured 400 millirem/hr on the surface. The Shipper was AEA Technology QSA GMBH, Giesilweg 1, D-38110 Braunschweig, Germany. The carriers included Federal Express Freight and Ground Control. Immediate reporting requirements means investigation is not complete at the time of report."