Event Notification Report for April 08, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/07/2003 - 04/08/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39743
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TONY CHITWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TONY CHITWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/08/2003
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2003
Event Time: 14:53 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2003
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2003
Event Time: 14:53 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
The following information was received from the Licensee via facsimile:
"On April 8, 2003 with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system automatically actuated on a valid signal when the solid state protection system (SSPS) was placed in service while the steam generator level was below the AFW actuation set point. The actuation was unplanned.
"S/G [Steam Generator] 2-1 level had been lowered to below the feed ring for work on an AFW system check valve. Operations was performing testing on the AFW system using AFW Pump 2-2, and was going to restore S/G level to normal (approximately 33% narrow range level) during the test. In conjunction with the AFW system testing, SSPS was being placed in service in preparation for an expected Mode 4 transition later in the watch after the AFW system testing was complete. When SSPS was placed in service, the low level in S/G 2-1 made up the coincidence for starting the motor driven AFW pumps. AFW Pump 2-2 was in operation, but AFW Pump 2-3 started in response to the low S/G level. AFW Pump 2-3 was aligned for recirculation flow, and did not feed forward on the automatic start. Operations then restored S/G 2-1 level above the low level trip point and secured AFW Pump 2-3.
"The start of AFW Pump 2-3 on a valid low level signal from S/G 2-1 is reportable as an 8 [hr.] non-emergency
report."
In addition to the AFW actuation, the Licensees did receive a S/G blowdown isolation signal but S/G blowdown was not in service at the time.
The Licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received from the Licensee via facsimile:
"On April 8, 2003 with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system automatically actuated on a valid signal when the solid state protection system (SSPS) was placed in service while the steam generator level was below the AFW actuation set point. The actuation was unplanned.
"S/G [Steam Generator] 2-1 level had been lowered to below the feed ring for work on an AFW system check valve. Operations was performing testing on the AFW system using AFW Pump 2-2, and was going to restore S/G level to normal (approximately 33% narrow range level) during the test. In conjunction with the AFW system testing, SSPS was being placed in service in preparation for an expected Mode 4 transition later in the watch after the AFW system testing was complete. When SSPS was placed in service, the low level in S/G 2-1 made up the coincidence for starting the motor driven AFW pumps. AFW Pump 2-2 was in operation, but AFW Pump 2-3 started in response to the low S/G level. AFW Pump 2-3 was aligned for recirculation flow, and did not feed forward on the automatic start. Operations then restored S/G 2-1 level above the low level trip point and secured AFW Pump 2-3.
"The start of AFW Pump 2-3 on a valid low level signal from S/G 2-1 is reportable as an 8 [hr.] non-emergency
report."
In addition to the AFW actuation, the Licensees did receive a S/G blowdown isolation signal but S/G blowdown was not in service at the time.
The Licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39786
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: M. HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: M. HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/23/2003
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2003
Event Time: 12:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2003
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2003
Event Time: 12:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID UNIT 2 TRAIN "B" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION (CVI) .
On 04/08/03 at 1211 an invalid Unit 2, Train "B", Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) occurred. The actuation was caused by increased sensitivity of radiation monitor 2-RM-90-131 as a result of small perforations in the aluminum foil cover of the detector.
The specific train actuated was Train "B", and the system which received the isolation signal were Containment Ventilation Purge and EXHAUST (already closed) and Radiation Monitoring isolation valves (went closed).
Complete train actuation occurred.
The Containment Ventilation Isolation function was successful.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
On 04/08/03 at 1211 an invalid Unit 2, Train "B", Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) occurred. The actuation was caused by increased sensitivity of radiation monitor 2-RM-90-131 as a result of small perforations in the aluminum foil cover of the detector.
The specific train actuated was Train "B", and the system which received the isolation signal were Containment Ventilation Purge and EXHAUST (already closed) and Radiation Monitoring isolation valves (went closed).
Complete train actuation occurred.
The Containment Ventilation Isolation function was successful.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.