Event Notification Report for April 04, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/03/2003 - 04/04/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39729397303973139732397333973439735
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39729
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 07:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2003
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 07:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF MORE THAN 50% OF THE EMERGENCY SIRENS
The plant has 59 of the 96 offsite notification system sirens out of service due to loss of power caused by ice storms damage to the electrical power supplies. They do not know how soon the sirens will be returned to service.
The NRC Resident Inspector and local government were notified and the state will be informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1436 EDT ON 4/8/03 FROM DOUG PETERSON TO ERIC THOMAS * * *
82 of the 96 offsite notification system sirens are back in service. 13.5% of the sirens remain inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The plant has 59 of the 96 offsite notification system sirens out of service due to loss of power caused by ice storms damage to the electrical power supplies. They do not know how soon the sirens will be returned to service.
The NRC Resident Inspector and local government were notified and the state will be informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1436 EDT ON 4/8/03 FROM DOUG PETERSON TO ERIC THOMAS * * *
82 of the 96 offsite notification system sirens are back in service. 13.5% of the sirens remain inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39730
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 11:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 09:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2003
Notification Time: 11:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 09:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT HAS MORE THAN 50% OF THEIR EMERGENCY SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO ICE STORMS
The licensee received a call from the Oswego county EOC that 25 out of a total of 37 emergency sirens are out of service due to ice storms.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
***UPDATE on 04/10/03 at 1422 hours by T. Page taken by MacKinnon***
"As of April 10, 2003 at 0830, all but 2 of the sirens (out of a total of 37) have been restored to operational status. Efforts are continuing to restore electrical power to the remaining 2 sirens.
"As a result, the conditions under the initial notification was made no longer exist (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) .. Major loss of offsite response capability - due to loss of multiple sirens). This informational notification is provided to update the NRC as to the current conditions." NRC Region 1 Duty Officer ( James Trapp) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
The licensee received a call from the Oswego county EOC that 25 out of a total of 37 emergency sirens are out of service due to ice storms.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
***UPDATE on 04/10/03 at 1422 hours by T. Page taken by MacKinnon***
"As of April 10, 2003 at 0830, all but 2 of the sirens (out of a total of 37) have been restored to operational status. Efforts are continuing to restore electrical power to the remaining 2 sirens.
"As a result, the conditions under the initial notification was made no longer exist (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) .. Major loss of offsite response capability - due to loss of multiple sirens). This informational notification is provided to update the NRC as to the current conditions." NRC Region 1 Duty Officer ( James Trapp) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39731
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BELDEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BELDEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 09:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 09:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOSS OF 27 OUT OF A TOTAL OF 37 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS DUE TO ICE STORM
"This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72.(b)3 (xiii): Eight hour reports - Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability or offsite communications capability.
"The following sequence of events have occurred:
- On 4/3/03, a severe Winter ice storm. Affecting Oswego County, NY began.
- On 4/4/03, Time: 0603, a report from the Oswego Warning Point informed NMP1 Control Room that 14 Emergency Notification Sirens were inoperable.
- On 4/4/03, Time: 0913, a report from the Oswego County Emergency Operations Center informed NMP 1 Control Room that 27 Emergency Notification Sirens were inoperable."
The NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies have been notified.
"This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72.(b)3 (xiii): Eight hour reports - Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability or offsite communications capability.
"The following sequence of events have occurred:
- On 4/3/03, a severe Winter ice storm. Affecting Oswego County, NY began.
- On 4/4/03, Time: 0603, a report from the Oswego Warning Point informed NMP1 Control Room that 14 Emergency Notification Sirens were inoperable.
- On 4/4/03, Time: 0913, a report from the Oswego County Emergency Operations Center informed NMP 1 Control Room that 27 Emergency Notification Sirens were inoperable."
The NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies have been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39732
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Charles Stalzer
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Charles Stalzer
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF GREATER THAN 50% OF EMERGENCY SIRENS
"At 1030 on April 4, 2003 it was reported to the Control Room that greater than 50% siren population coverage was lost. The percent siren coverage population lost is 55.06%. The lost siren coverage is due to weather related power outages. Crews have been dispatched and are working to restore power to the affected sirens.
"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (loss of greater than 50% of emergency sirens). It is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
*** UPDATE FROM RYAN RODE TO ERIC THOMAS AT 1930 EST ON 4/4/03 ***
"At 1432 on 4/4/03, EP Manager informed control room staff that Two Rivers Utilities completed repairs to various sirens. Total loss of coverage has been reduced to 20.23%. NRC Resident, state and local agencies have been notified."
R3DO (B. Clayton) was notified.
"At 1030 on April 4, 2003 it was reported to the Control Room that greater than 50% siren population coverage was lost. The percent siren coverage population lost is 55.06%. The lost siren coverage is due to weather related power outages. Crews have been dispatched and are working to restore power to the affected sirens.
"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (loss of greater than 50% of emergency sirens). It is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
*** UPDATE FROM RYAN RODE TO ERIC THOMAS AT 1930 EST ON 4/4/03 ***
"At 1432 on 4/4/03, EP Manager informed control room staff that Two Rivers Utilities completed repairs to various sirens. Total loss of coverage has been reduced to 20.23%. NRC Resident, state and local agencies have been notified."
R3DO (B. Clayton) was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39733
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES CASHWELL
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES CASHWELL
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 13:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 13:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 22 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AT BRUNSWICK DURING START-UP FROM REFUELING OUTAGE
"On April 4, 2003, during a Unit 2 reactor start up, primary containment group 1 isolation was received which resulted in a reactor scram. Following the scram, reactor water level lowered to approximately 150 inches. This is below the Reactor Water Low Level One set point of 166 inches. As a result of the low water level, primary containment group 2, 6, & 8 isolation signals were received. All required isolations occurred as a result of the Reactor Water Low Level One isolation signal. All control rods fully inserted on the scram. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling was manually started and Reactor water level was restored to the normal band. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling was shutdown after Reactor water level was restored.
"It is believed that the cause of the group 1 isolation signal (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure Scram signal) was an Electro-hydraulic Control (EHC) malfunction that caused the Main Turbine Bypass valves to open. This resulted in the Main Steam Line pressure dropping below the group 1 set point of 850 psig. Investigation is ongoing to determine the exact cause of the EHC malfunction."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"On April 4, 2003, during a Unit 2 reactor start up, primary containment group 1 isolation was received which resulted in a reactor scram. Following the scram, reactor water level lowered to approximately 150 inches. This is below the Reactor Water Low Level One set point of 166 inches. As a result of the low water level, primary containment group 2, 6, & 8 isolation signals were received. All required isolations occurred as a result of the Reactor Water Low Level One isolation signal. All control rods fully inserted on the scram. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling was manually started and Reactor water level was restored to the normal band. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling was shutdown after Reactor water level was restored.
"It is believed that the cause of the group 1 isolation signal (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure Scram signal) was an Electro-hydraulic Control (EHC) malfunction that caused the Main Turbine Bypass valves to open. This resulted in the Main Steam Line pressure dropping below the group 1 set point of 850 psig. Investigation is ongoing to determine the exact cause of the EHC malfunction."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39734
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES CASHWELL
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES CASHWELL
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 18:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 15:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 18:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 15:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL FUEL OIL SPILL
"Operations was notified by site chemistry management that a report of a potential fuel oil spill was being made to the North Carolina Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources, Regional Division of Water Quality. Diesel fuel oil has been identified seeping onto the floor of the Augmented Off-Gas (AOG) building. A diesel fuel oil transfer line from the off-load station to a fuel oil storage tank runs underground in the vicinity of the AOG building and is suspected as the source of the leak. The quantity of the leakage is not known at this time. A follow-up discussion with the Division of Water Quality personnel is scheduled for Monday, April 7, 2003, when more information will be available.
"Initial safety significance of this event is zero because this does not affect operation of the Units."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Operations was notified by site chemistry management that a report of a potential fuel oil spill was being made to the North Carolina Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources, Regional Division of Water Quality. Diesel fuel oil has been identified seeping onto the floor of the Augmented Off-Gas (AOG) building. A diesel fuel oil transfer line from the off-load station to a fuel oil storage tank runs underground in the vicinity of the AOG building and is suspected as the source of the leak. The quantity of the leakage is not known at this time. A follow-up discussion with the Division of Water Quality personnel is scheduled for Monday, April 7, 2003, when more information will be available.
"Initial safety significance of this event is zero because this does not affect operation of the Units."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39735
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE HACKLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE HACKLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/04/2003
Notification Time: 23:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 18:24 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2003
Notification Time: 23:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2003
Event Time: 18:24 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 54 | Power Operation | 20 | Power Operation |
PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"On April 4, 2003, at 1824 PST, with Unit 2 at approximately 54 percent power, operators commenced a shutdown to mode 5 in accordance with technical specification 3.7.5 C. 1, 'Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,' due to two AFW trains determined to be inoperable.
"While trouble-shooting leaking AFW check valves, AFW discharge check valve (FW-2-377) to steam generator (SG) 2-1 was determined to be inoperable due to incorrect installation. Based on radiography, the check valve appears to be installed incorrectly such that it may not allow sufficient AFW flow to SG 2-1. This condition renders two trains of AFW inoperable.
"The two motor-driven and one turbine-driven AFW pumps and their flow paths to the other three SGs remain operable. The system is designed such that design basis decay heat can be removed by a single AFW pump delivering flow to at least two SGs.
"Unit 2 had ended the recent refueling outage on March 25 and had yet to reach full power when this problem was discovered. Check Valve FW-2-377 had been disassembled during this refueling outage."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On April 4, 2003, at 1824 PST, with Unit 2 at approximately 54 percent power, operators commenced a shutdown to mode 5 in accordance with technical specification 3.7.5 C. 1, 'Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,' due to two AFW trains determined to be inoperable.
"While trouble-shooting leaking AFW check valves, AFW discharge check valve (FW-2-377) to steam generator (SG) 2-1 was determined to be inoperable due to incorrect installation. Based on radiography, the check valve appears to be installed incorrectly such that it may not allow sufficient AFW flow to SG 2-1. This condition renders two trains of AFW inoperable.
"The two motor-driven and one turbine-driven AFW pumps and their flow paths to the other three SGs remain operable. The system is designed such that design basis decay heat can be removed by a single AFW pump delivering flow to at least two SGs.
"Unit 2 had ended the recent refueling outage on March 25 and had yet to reach full power when this problem was discovered. Check Valve FW-2-377 had been disassembled during this refueling outage."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.