Event Notification Report for March 24, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/23/2003 - 03/24/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
396933969439695396963969239820
Hospital
Event Number: 39693
Rep Org: MONCRIF ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
Licensee: MONCRIF ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
Region: 2
City: FT JACKSON State: SC
County:
License #: 39-14873-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HARRY STEWART
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: MONCRIF ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
Region: 2
City: FT JACKSON State: SC
County:
License #: 39-14873-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HARRY STEWART
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 11:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 11:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
EXTERIOR SURVEY OF PACKAGE CONTAINING TECHNETIUM 99M RESULTED IN A COUNT LEVEL OF 21000 DPM
A package containing technetium - 99m delivered by Syncore (Cardinal Health) of Columbia SC, to Moncrif Army Community Hospital was found to have surface contamination levels of 21,000 dpm on its exterior. The package was opened and it was verified that the metal container was not internally contaminated. The ammo box was placed in a store room to decay. The five (5) capsules containing technetium - 99m were used by the Hospital. The RSO called the vendor and informed them of the surface contamination found on the outside of the package. The RSO will survey the path traveled through the Hospital by the vendor carrying the package to ensure the absence of loose contamination. The RSO will contact the vendor to verify if they had contamination issues with other shipments.
A package containing technetium - 99m delivered by Syncore (Cardinal Health) of Columbia SC, to Moncrif Army Community Hospital was found to have surface contamination levels of 21,000 dpm on its exterior. The package was opened and it was verified that the metal container was not internally contaminated. The ammo box was placed in a store room to decay. The five (5) capsules containing technetium - 99m were used by the Hospital. The RSO called the vendor and informed them of the surface contamination found on the outside of the package. The RSO will survey the path traveled through the Hospital by the vendor carrying the package to ensure the absence of loose contamination. The RSO will contact the vendor to verify if they had contamination issues with other shipments.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39694
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 14:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 14:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO BRUSH FIRE ON COMPANY PROPERTY
"On 3/24/03 at 1455 [EST] the Main Control Room was notified of a brush fire on company property, outside the protected area. County Emergency communications were notified to dispatch a local fire company to extinguish the fire. The fire was not endangering the protected area surrounding the plant and therefore the onsite fire brigade was not activated. No other equipment or company structures were threatened. It was reported that the fire was extinguished at 1526 hours.
"According to station guidelines, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 1512 hours. Due to notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 3/24/03 at 1455 [EST] the Main Control Room was notified of a brush fire on company property, outside the protected area. County Emergency communications were notified to dispatch a local fire company to extinguish the fire. The fire was not endangering the protected area surrounding the plant and therefore the onsite fire brigade was not activated. No other equipment or company structures were threatened. It was reported that the fire was extinguished at 1526 hours.
"According to station guidelines, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 1512 hours. Due to notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39695
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 16:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 16:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
DAVID BARDEN (FEMA)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
DAVID BARDEN (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL BEING TRANSPORTED OFFSITE
"At 4:52 PM EST PPL Susquehanna, LLC, declared an Unusual Event for a contaminated individual transported offsite. The EAL entered was 5.1. The individual had fallen while working in the Unit 2 Drywell of the Primary Containment. Unit 2 is presently in a refuel outage. First Aid personnel were dispatched and treated her injuries. The individual's injuries prevented the removal of all of the protective clothing. Based on the inability to remove the clothing and completely frisk the individual, the individual is being considered contaminated. At 16:57 a local ambulance transported the person offsite en route to a local hospital.
"This Emergency Plan entry is reportable under 10CFR50.72(a)1.
"According to station guidelines, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was also notified of the incident. Due to notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event is also [reportable under ] 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, local authorities, the state and will issue a press release of this incident.
*** UPDATE ON 3/24/03 AT 1948 EST FROM JERRY RINEHART TO ARLON COSTA ***
"At 19:15 EST the Unusual Event was terminated. The individual's PCs [protective clothing] were contaminated to 600 ccpm [corrected counts per minute]. The PCs were removed at the hospital and no other contamination was found. The ambulance and the treatment room at the hospital were also frisked and no contamination was found. The contaminated PCs will be secured by the hospital's Radiation Protection staff and returned to the site tomorrow.
"The individual suffered a broken wrist [and was treated for other minor injuries]."
"All state and local agencies have been advised. A press release will be made."
The Licensee notified the UE termination to the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 4:52 PM EST PPL Susquehanna, LLC, declared an Unusual Event for a contaminated individual transported offsite. The EAL entered was 5.1. The individual had fallen while working in the Unit 2 Drywell of the Primary Containment. Unit 2 is presently in a refuel outage. First Aid personnel were dispatched and treated her injuries. The individual's injuries prevented the removal of all of the protective clothing. Based on the inability to remove the clothing and completely frisk the individual, the individual is being considered contaminated. At 16:57 a local ambulance transported the person offsite en route to a local hospital.
"This Emergency Plan entry is reportable under 10CFR50.72(a)1.
"According to station guidelines, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was also notified of the incident. Due to notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event is also [reportable under ] 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, local authorities, the state and will issue a press release of this incident.
*** UPDATE ON 3/24/03 AT 1948 EST FROM JERRY RINEHART TO ARLON COSTA ***
"At 19:15 EST the Unusual Event was terminated. The individual's PCs [protective clothing] were contaminated to 600 ccpm [corrected counts per minute]. The PCs were removed at the hospital and no other contamination was found. The ambulance and the treatment room at the hospital were also frisked and no contamination was found. The contaminated PCs will be secured by the hospital's Radiation Protection staff and returned to the site tomorrow.
"The individual suffered a broken wrist [and was treated for other minor injuries]."
"All state and local agencies have been advised. A press release will be made."
The Licensee notified the UE termination to the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39696
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 03/25/2003
Notification Time: 01:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 00:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2003
Notification Time: 01:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 00:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
JOHN JOLICOEUR (IRO)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
JOHN JOLICOEUR (IRO)
BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT FOR CRITICALITY CONTROL
At 0030 on 3-24-03, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that nine (9) pallets of process equipment containing less than a safe uranium mass and spaced 2 feet edge to edge were discovered in C-335. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of an equipment group be independently verified and documented to be less than or equal to a safe mass based on the highest assay according to CP2-PO-FO1031. No documentation exists to support that the total uranium mass was verified or independently verified according to CP2-PO-FO1031 in violation of NCSA GEN-010.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 03-0876; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2003-006, NRC Event Worksheet [EN 39696].
Responsible Division: Operations
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Although the total mass of the grouped items was not independently verified to be less than a safe mass, no single pallet contains greater than 35 pounds of uranium. The highest enrichment of any item was 2.0 wt. % 235U. The safe mass for uranium at 2.0 wt. % 235U is approximately 250 pounds.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a safe mass of uranium must be accumulated and then become moderated.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC
Double contingency is maintained by implementation of two controls (verification and independent verification) of mass.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS);
No single pallet has greater than 35 pounds of uranium and the highest assay of any Item is 2.0 wt. % 235U. The safe mass for this assay is 250 pounds.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The first leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of grouped items be verified less than the UH [Uncomplicated Handling] mass limit and documented. No documentation exists that substantiates that this verification was performed; therefore, this control was violated. However, since none of the groups contain greater than a safe mass this parameter was not exceeded.
The second leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of grouped items be independently verified less than the UH mass limit and documented in accordance with CP2-PO-FO1031. No documentation exists that substantiates that this independent verification was performed; therefore, this control was violated.
Even though the mass parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on mass. Since neither control was maintained, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Properly group and document each pallet according to CP2-CO-CN2030.
2. Upon completion of corrective action 1 for each of the 9 pallets, the exclusion zone and postings may be removed.
*** UPDATE ON 3/31/03 AT 2137 EST FROM T. WHITE TO A. COSTA ***
"As a result of further investigation, four additional palettes of process equipment containing less than a safe mass were discovered in C-335 at Col W-26 to W-27 (the original event was in C-335 Col D-2 to D-3). These additional pallets exist in the same state as the original nine. No documentation exists to support that the total uranium mass was verified or independently verified according to CP2-PO-FO1031 in violation of NCSA GEN-010.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 03-0943."
Notified R3DO (Clayton), NMSS EO (Frant) and DIRO (Jolicoeur).
At 0030 on 3-24-03, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that nine (9) pallets of process equipment containing less than a safe uranium mass and spaced 2 feet edge to edge were discovered in C-335. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of an equipment group be independently verified and documented to be less than or equal to a safe mass based on the highest assay according to CP2-PO-FO1031. No documentation exists to support that the total uranium mass was verified or independently verified according to CP2-PO-FO1031 in violation of NCSA GEN-010.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 03-0876; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2003-006, NRC Event Worksheet [EN 39696].
Responsible Division: Operations
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Although the total mass of the grouped items was not independently verified to be less than a safe mass, no single pallet contains greater than 35 pounds of uranium. The highest enrichment of any item was 2.0 wt. % 235U. The safe mass for uranium at 2.0 wt. % 235U is approximately 250 pounds.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a safe mass of uranium must be accumulated and then become moderated.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC
Double contingency is maintained by implementation of two controls (verification and independent verification) of mass.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS);
No single pallet has greater than 35 pounds of uranium and the highest assay of any Item is 2.0 wt. % 235U. The safe mass for this assay is 250 pounds.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The first leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of grouped items be verified less than the UH [Uncomplicated Handling] mass limit and documented. No documentation exists that substantiates that this verification was performed; therefore, this control was violated. However, since none of the groups contain greater than a safe mass this parameter was not exceeded.
The second leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA GEN-010 requires that the total uranium mass of grouped items be independently verified less than the UH mass limit and documented in accordance with CP2-PO-FO1031. No documentation exists that substantiates that this independent verification was performed; therefore, this control was violated.
Even though the mass parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on mass. Since neither control was maintained, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Properly group and document each pallet according to CP2-CO-CN2030.
2. Upon completion of corrective action 1 for each of the 9 pallets, the exclusion zone and postings may be removed.
*** UPDATE ON 3/31/03 AT 2137 EST FROM T. WHITE TO A. COSTA ***
"As a result of further investigation, four additional palettes of process equipment containing less than a safe mass were discovered in C-335 at Col W-26 to W-27 (the original event was in C-335 Col D-2 to D-3). These additional pallets exist in the same state as the original nine. No documentation exists to support that the total uranium mass was verified or independently verified according to CP2-PO-FO1031 in violation of NCSA GEN-010.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 03-0943."
Notified R3DO (Clayton), NMSS EO (Frant) and DIRO (Jolicoeur).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39692
Rep Org: FRAMATOME ANP
Licensee:
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #: SNM-1168
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL SHARKEY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Licensee:
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #: SNM-1168
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL SHARKEY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
RAD SHIPMENT EXTERNAL LEVELS > LIMITS
While receiving a rad shipment of CRDMs (control rod drive mechanisms) from Arkansas Nuclear One, the receipt survey of the bottom of the package was 380 mrem/hr (millirem/hour) on contact. The remaining five sides of the package each measured less than 200 mrem/hr on contact. Smear surveys of the package were within limits for surface contamination. 2 meter surveys along the outer surface of the vehicle all indicated less than 5 mrem/hr. Surveys behind the cab of the truck were 1 mrem/hr.
The package was placed in a secure, isolated location at the facility.
The licensee has contacted Arkansas Nuclear and TAG Transport, Inc, to discuss how to proceed with this issue.
While receiving a rad shipment of CRDMs (control rod drive mechanisms) from Arkansas Nuclear One, the receipt survey of the bottom of the package was 380 mrem/hr (millirem/hour) on contact. The remaining five sides of the package each measured less than 200 mrem/hr on contact. Smear surveys of the package were within limits for surface contamination. 2 meter surveys along the outer surface of the vehicle all indicated less than 5 mrem/hr. Surveys behind the cab of the truck were 1 mrem/hr.
The package was placed in a secure, isolated location at the facility.
The licensee has contacted Arkansas Nuclear and TAG Transport, Inc, to discuss how to proceed with this issue.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39820
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TROXLER
Region: 2
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: 032-0182-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: TROXLER
Region: 2
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: 032-0182-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 05/02/2003
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2003
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
C. MILLER (NMSS)
F. BROWN (NMSS)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
C. MILLER (NMSS)
F. BROWN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT EXCEEDED LIMITS
On 3/24/03 Troxler Electronic Laboratories of Research Triangle Park, NC received a shipment of two boxes from AEA Technology, Inc. of Burlington, MA. Each box contained fifty 40 millicurie Am-241:Be sources. Following return of a survey meter from calibration, the RSO at Troxler performed a survey of the boxes on 3/31/03 and determined that the radiation levels exceeded limits for the shipment. Each box measured 315 millirem/hr neutron and gamma at the surface (limit of 200 millirem/hr). Additionally, the bill of lading and DOT sticker on each box listed the Transportation Index (TI) at 1.6 which is the limit, however the measured TI was 3.1 (3.0 millirem/hr neutron and 0.1 millirem/hr gamma at 1 meter).
On 3/24/03 Troxler Electronic Laboratories of Research Triangle Park, NC received a shipment of two boxes from AEA Technology, Inc. of Burlington, MA. Each box contained fifty 40 millicurie Am-241:Be sources. Following return of a survey meter from calibration, the RSO at Troxler performed a survey of the boxes on 3/31/03 and determined that the radiation levels exceeded limits for the shipment. Each box measured 315 millirem/hr neutron and gamma at the surface (limit of 200 millirem/hr). Additionally, the bill of lading and DOT sticker on each box listed the Transportation Index (TI) at 1.6 which is the limit, however the measured TI was 3.1 (3.0 millirem/hr neutron and 0.1 millirem/hr gamma at 1 meter).