Event Notification Report for March 07, 2003

FITNESS FOR DUTY FOR ALCOHOL

On 03/07/03 at 1700 hours CT a contract employee was asked to take a for cause test for alcohol. He refused to take the test and he then resigned from his position. At 1731 hours his unescorted access was terminated. The licensee escorted the individual offsite and to his residence. His work record was reviewed and nothing unusual was found.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed by the licensee.

1- HOUR SAFEGUARD REPORT

Discovery of criminal act involving individual granted access to the site. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

**** RETRACTION ON 03/10/03 AT 1555 ET BY TOM VEITCH TAKEN BY MACKINNON ****

After additional review, it was determined that drugs do not fall into the classification of contraband and thus need not be reported under this criterion. R3DO (Ken O'Brien) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

PLANT DECLARED UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO REACTOR TRIP WITH LEAKAGE FROM CHARGING SYSTEM

A reactor automatic trip was received at 1439 EST. The cause of the trip is unknown and investigation continues, although reactor protection system testing was in progress at the time of the trip. All systems responded normally with the exception of the charging system. The licensee declared an unusual event at 1516 EST due to charging pump discharge relief valves lifting thereby creating leakage into the auxiliary building. Preliminarily, the cause of the relief valve discharge was blockage in the normal charging line downstream. Charging flow was reestablished via the alternate flowpath. A minimal radioactive release from the auxiliary building ventilation resulted from the charging system leakage.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. State and local officials were notified and the licensee issued a press release.

* * * UPDATE 0420EST ON 3/8/03 FROM ROBERT MALONEY TO S.SANDIN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0146EST after Unit 2 entered mode 4. The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Shanbaky), EO(Grimes) and FEMA(Stinedurf).

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO INABILITY TO REACH HOT SHUTDOWN WITHIN TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT TIME LIMIT

The licensee declared an unusual event at 2049 EST due to the inability to reach Mode 4 within the Technical Specification action statement time limit of 2049 EST for charging pumps inoperable. The charging pumps were declared inoperable as a result of system complications associated with the reactor trip and charging system leakage occurring at 1439 EST 3/7/03 (see Event # 39644).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 0420EST ON 3/8/03 FROM ROBERT MALONEY TO S.SANDIN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0146EST after Unit 2 entered mode 4. The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Shanbaky), EO(Grimes) and FEMA(Stinedurf).

* * * UPDATE 0944EST ON 3/31/03 FROM STEPHEN BAKER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following information was submitted as an update:

"On March 7, 2003, Millstone Unit No. 2 made a 1-hour report of an Unusual Event declared due to an inability to reach hot shutdown within Tech Spec action statement time limit (Event no. 39645). This notification was made because the required Mode was not reached within the required Tech Spec action time. Three charging pumps were declared inoperable resulting in an entry into TS 3.0.3. The appropriate Mode could not be reached within the time prescribed by the TS due to the inability of the charging system to supply adequate makeup to the RCS through the normal flow path. An alternate alignment was established via HPSI, The limited rate of makeup via this alternate path prevented the plant from reaching Mode 4 within the allowed outage time.

"The criteria for deviation from plant Tech Specs was inappropriately checked off as it was interpreted to mean a violation of plant Tech Specs. Criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(1) 'deviation from the plant's Tech Specs pursuant to § 50.54(x)' did not apply.

"Additionally, criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), loss of safety function, did apply and this event should have been reported under this criterion since three charging pumps were declared inoperable."

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO (Bellamy).

OPEN AUXILIARY BUILDING DOOR COULD HAVE CAUSED A LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FUNCTION

"At 1622 CST on 3/7/03, a Condition Report was written to identify that Auxiliary Building door PW-95-02 was open because a door assist device malfunction prevented closure of the door. This condition existed from 1331 until 1449 on 3/7/03.

"This condition could have resulted in a loss of function of the Secondary Containment since Standby Gas Treatment system may not have been able to draw down pressure in the Auxiliary Building to the required vacuum."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUTOMATIC DIESEL ACTUATION CAUSED BY LOSS OF GENERATION EXCITATION TRIP

"During planned Unit Two manual scram in preparation for refueling outage, all four Emergency Diesel Generators received an auto start signal. Auto start signal was generated from a Primary Generator Lockout caused by a Loss of Generator ExcitatIon Trip. A 1/2 Group 1 signal was also received during the shutdown due to a steam flow trip unit failure, which has been repaired. All other systems operated as designed, scram actions completed, plant stable. The Loss of Excitation Trip should have been blocked by main generator PCB openings. Investigation currently underway to determine cause of Loss of Excitation Trip malfunction."

There was no loss of power. The busses were not loaded after all four diesels started. The diesels operated normally and have been returned to a standby lineup. All other systems operated as required.

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

****RETRACTION on 04/15/03 at 1320 EDT by Charles Elberfeld taken by MacKinnon****

Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the signal that started the EDGs did not meet the definition of a valid signal and so the reporting criterion contained in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) is not applicable to the condition reported on March 8, 2003 (Event Number 39647). Valid actuations of the EDGs are the result of loss of coolant accident signals (from either Unit 1 or 2) or as the result of emergency bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signals. Therefore, the actuation of the EDGs reported as a valid actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) is retracted and is being reported, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73 (a), in this telephone notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation.

EDGs 1, 2, 3, and 4 automatically started and functioned successfully. Because electrical power was never lost to the emergency busses and none of the EDGs loaded to their respective emergency busses, the actuations were considered to be partial.

Safety significance is considered to be minimal. Emergency Diesel Generators started and operated normally. Electrical power was never lost to the emergency busses.

Power Circuit Breaker trip operating mechanism assembly was replaced.
NRC R2DO (Tom Decker) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

SURFACE CONTAMINATION ON AMMO BOX GREATER THAN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS

On March 7 @ 0900 an ammo box was received from Syncor that measured 0.3mr/hr at the surface and had a wipe of approximately 9707 DPM (2200 DPM is acceptable). Syncor was notified of the contamination on the box. The box was put into the hospital's storage area until March 11 when the measurements taken were at background. The box was than returned to Syncor.

* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM R. SOGARD BY M. RIPLEY 1505 EST ON 03/19/03 * * *

After review of applicable reportability criteria and discussions with NRC Region 3, the licensee is retracting this notification. Because the surface contamination criteria for items received is actually 22,000 DPM (vice 2,200 DPM for items being shipped), the box contamination is not reportable by this licensee.

Notified R3DO (J. Creed) and NMSS (F. Brown).

MISSING IODINE-125 SEED

On March 3, 2003 120 Iodine-125 seeds, each with an activity of 0.31millicuries, were implanted in a patient. Four of the seeds were recovered from the bladder and placed in a lead pig. On March 7, 2003 an inventory was taken of the lead pig before shipping the seeds back to the manufacturer. During the inventory check it was discovered that the lead pig only contained 3 Iodine-125 seeds instead of 4. A radiation surveys were taken of the areas where the seeds had been removed and the missing seed was not found.

Notified NMSS EO (F. Brown) and R3DO (K. O'Brien, J. Creed).