Event Notification Report for February 27, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/26/2003 - 02/27/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39623396243962539664
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39623
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 02/27/2003
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 13:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2003
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 13:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 58 | Power Operation | 43 | Power Operation |
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF THE #2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"This provides notification of an automatic actuation of the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 1
"On 2/27/2003 at 1301 hours, BVPS Unit No. 1 was at 58 % power following a startup from a recent forced outage. The 'B' Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) tripped on overcurrent shortly after it was started. Concurrent with the MFP trip, the breaker which feeds the non-safety related 'D' bus from the offsite power source also tripped, de-energizing the 'D' bus. [The 'D' bus supplies power to the 'B' MFP.] The loss of the 'D' bus caused the loss of power to the safety related Emergency 'DF' bus, which caused the No. 2 EDG to start and re-energize the Emergency 'DF' bus with all equipment properly loaded.
"Control Room personnel entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1.36.2, 'Loss of 4KV Emergency Bus.' Reactor Power was manually ramped back to 43 % power in response to this transient. Actions are being taken to re-energize the non-safety related 'D' bus from its offsite source. The EDG remains in operation with no abnormalities. The cause of the 'B' MFP trip is being investigated.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an actuation of an emergency diesel generator which is part of the onsite emergency AC electrical power system. The NRC resident has been notified."
"This provides notification of an automatic actuation of the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 1
"On 2/27/2003 at 1301 hours, BVPS Unit No. 1 was at 58 % power following a startup from a recent forced outage. The 'B' Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) tripped on overcurrent shortly after it was started. Concurrent with the MFP trip, the breaker which feeds the non-safety related 'D' bus from the offsite power source also tripped, de-energizing the 'D' bus. [The 'D' bus supplies power to the 'B' MFP.] The loss of the 'D' bus caused the loss of power to the safety related Emergency 'DF' bus, which caused the No. 2 EDG to start and re-energize the Emergency 'DF' bus with all equipment properly loaded.
"Control Room personnel entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1.36.2, 'Loss of 4KV Emergency Bus.' Reactor Power was manually ramped back to 43 % power in response to this transient. Actions are being taken to re-energize the non-safety related 'D' bus from its offsite source. The EDG remains in operation with no abnormalities. The cause of the 'B' MFP trip is being investigated.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an actuation of an emergency diesel generator which is part of the onsite emergency AC electrical power system. The NRC resident has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39624
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 02/27/2003
Notification Time: 19:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 17:31 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2003
Notification Time: 19:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 17:31 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation |
PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"On 02/27/03 at 1731[CST] hours, Point Beach Unit 1 commenced an orderly reactor shutdown in response to TS [Technical Specifications] Action Statement 3.6.3.D.1, which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 6 hours when two containment isolation valves are inoperable for greater than 1 hour. Valves 1SC-953 and 1SC-966B, pressurizer liquid space sampling containment isolation valves, were declared inoperable when leakage was evident past the shut valves. At 1748 hours, the pressurizer liquid space penetration flow path was verified as being isolated by shutting manual valve 1SC-952. The shutdown was terminated at 1751[CST] hours.
"Earlier in the afternoon, it had been reported to the Control Room that the reactor coolant primary sampling containment isolation valves (1SC-955 and 1SC-966C) were leaking through. The penetration flow path for these valves was isolated via shutting valve 1SC-954B. Further investigation revealed that leakage was still present. The leakage was isolated by shutting 1SC-952.
"The 1D Pressurizer Heater Bank tripped during attempt to manually energize pressurizer heaters. Minimum required pressurizer heater capacity is maintained. Investigation is in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 02/27/03 at 1731[CST] hours, Point Beach Unit 1 commenced an orderly reactor shutdown in response to TS [Technical Specifications] Action Statement 3.6.3.D.1, which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 6 hours when two containment isolation valves are inoperable for greater than 1 hour. Valves 1SC-953 and 1SC-966B, pressurizer liquid space sampling containment isolation valves, were declared inoperable when leakage was evident past the shut valves. At 1748 hours, the pressurizer liquid space penetration flow path was verified as being isolated by shutting manual valve 1SC-952. The shutdown was terminated at 1751[CST] hours.
"Earlier in the afternoon, it had been reported to the Control Room that the reactor coolant primary sampling containment isolation valves (1SC-955 and 1SC-966C) were leaking through. The penetration flow path for these valves was isolated via shutting valve 1SC-954B. Further investigation revealed that leakage was still present. The leakage was isolated by shutting 1SC-952.
"The 1D Pressurizer Heater Bank tripped during attempt to manually energize pressurizer heaters. Minimum required pressurizer heater capacity is maintained. Investigation is in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39625
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CRAIG SLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CRAIG SLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/27/2003
Notification Time: 23:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 19:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2003
Notification Time: 23:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 19:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation |
UNIT COMMENCED TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE EDG
"This ENS notification is made to report initiation of a plant shutdown required by the Columbia Generating Station Technical Specifications (TS's) pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). This plant shutdown was initiated due to the inability to restore the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator (DG-1) to operable status prior to exceeding the expiration of the Completion Time of TS LCO 3.8.1, Condition B.4. Columbia Generating Station was granted enforcement discretion (NOED 03-4-001) from compliance with the completion time requirements of TS 3.8.1, Condition B.4, for an eleven-day period beginning on February 16, 2003 and ending February 27, 2003 at 9 p.m. (PST). The enforcement discretion was granted to allow the replacement of a degraded DG-1 generator bearing. Both generator bearings were replaced. However, during post maintenance tests to validate operability of DG-1, vibration levels for the new bearings showed evidence of an increasing trend. Based on this, DG-1 is currently considered inoperable. Even though the current vibration levels are very low, the plant has decided further testing and diagnosis is necessary to support a decision on DG-1 operability. Although the Completion Time of TS 3.8.1, Required Action B.4 expires at 9 p.m., plant shutdown commenced at approximately 7:45 p.m. (PST), on February 27, 2003."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"This ENS notification is made to report initiation of a plant shutdown required by the Columbia Generating Station Technical Specifications (TS's) pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). This plant shutdown was initiated due to the inability to restore the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator (DG-1) to operable status prior to exceeding the expiration of the Completion Time of TS LCO 3.8.1, Condition B.4. Columbia Generating Station was granted enforcement discretion (NOED 03-4-001) from compliance with the completion time requirements of TS 3.8.1, Condition B.4, for an eleven-day period beginning on February 16, 2003 and ending February 27, 2003 at 9 p.m. (PST). The enforcement discretion was granted to allow the replacement of a degraded DG-1 generator bearing. Both generator bearings were replaced. However, during post maintenance tests to validate operability of DG-1, vibration levels for the new bearings showed evidence of an increasing trend. Based on this, DG-1 is currently considered inoperable. Even though the current vibration levels are very low, the plant has decided further testing and diagnosis is necessary to support a decision on DG-1 operability. Although the Completion Time of TS 3.8.1, Required Action B.4 expires at 9 p.m., plant shutdown commenced at approximately 7:45 p.m. (PST), on February 27, 2003."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39664
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DUANE KANITZ
HQ OPS Officer: YAMIR DIAZ
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DUANE KANITZ
HQ OPS Officer: YAMIR DIAZ
Notification Date: 03/13/2003
Notification Time: 11:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 09:28 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2003
Notification Time: 11:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2003
Event Time: 09:28 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION 60 DAY REPORT
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On February 17, 2003, at approximately 0928 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 experienced an invalid actuation (start) of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). EDG 'A' inadvertently started when an Instrument and Control technician, performing the ESFAS train 'A' subgroup relay functional and response time surveillance test, completed a step in the test procedure out of sequence. The technician verified the status of [actuated] an ESFAS relay contact, which generates an EDG start signal, before the 'A' EDG control mode switch was placed in the OFF position.
"This report is not considered an LER.
"EDG 'A' was the specific System and train that actuated.
"EDG 'A' started in the Emergency Mode. The train actuation was complete.
"EDG 'A' started and came up to rated speed and voltage as designed.
"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On February 17, 2003, at approximately 0928 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 experienced an invalid actuation (start) of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). EDG 'A' inadvertently started when an Instrument and Control technician, performing the ESFAS train 'A' subgroup relay functional and response time surveillance test, completed a step in the test procedure out of sequence. The technician verified the status of [actuated] an ESFAS relay contact, which generates an EDG start signal, before the 'A' EDG control mode switch was placed in the OFF position.
"This report is not considered an LER.
"EDG 'A' was the specific System and train that actuated.
"EDG 'A' started in the Emergency Mode. The train actuation was complete.
"EDG 'A' started and came up to rated speed and voltage as designed.
"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.