Event Notification Report for February 25, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/24/2003 - 02/25/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
3962239617396183961939759
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39622
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED LESSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED LESSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/26/2003
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 17:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2003
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 17:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SPILL OF BIOCIDE TREATED FIRE PROTECTION WATER
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 02/25/2003, we received a fire panel alarm for X-04 fire pump run with water flow. The source of leakage was identified as a broken sprinkler (40A1) in the MMO building which is located outside our protected area. The leak was isolated and the [fire protection] system was placed back in standby at 1922 [hrs] that same day. The initial alarm was received at 1705.
"On 02/26/2003 at 0915, we notified our contact person (Shannon Kennedy) at the TCEQ [Texas Commission on Environmental Quality] by voice mail. The following release information:
"'Based on the level change of our fire protection tank, CPSES [Comanche Peak Steam and Electric Station] released approx[imately] 11,500 gallons of [fire protection] water to the environment. Of that, approx[imately] 8000 - 9000 gallons were discharged to our lake (Squaw Creek Res[ervoir]). The [fire protection] water contained 50 ppm of biocide and had a pH of 8.5. Based on day light visual inspection of our lake, there was no indication of stressed or dead fish. There was no observed environmental impact.'"
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 02/25/2003, we received a fire panel alarm for X-04 fire pump run with water flow. The source of leakage was identified as a broken sprinkler (40A1) in the MMO building which is located outside our protected area. The leak was isolated and the [fire protection] system was placed back in standby at 1922 [hrs] that same day. The initial alarm was received at 1705.
"On 02/26/2003 at 0915, we notified our contact person (Shannon Kennedy) at the TCEQ [Texas Commission on Environmental Quality] by voice mail. The following release information:
"'Based on the level change of our fire protection tank, CPSES [Comanche Peak Steam and Electric Station] released approx[imately] 11,500 gallons of [fire protection] water to the environment. Of that, approx[imately] 8000 - 9000 gallons were discharged to our lake (Squaw Creek Res[ervoir]). The [fire protection] water contained 50 ppm of biocide and had a pH of 8.5. Based on day light visual inspection of our lake, there was no indication of stressed or dead fish. There was no observed environmental impact.'"
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39617
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 06:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 06:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 06:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 06:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 60 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED PLANT ACCESS DUE TO CAR ACCIDENT ON SITE ACCESS ROAD
"One car accident on access road to plant, however offsite. Degraded emergency responder access."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1059 EST ON 2/25/03 FROM MCILNAY TO RIPLEY * * *
"Upon further review and in accordance with the guidance provided by NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, Section 3.2.13, Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, Turkey Point is retracting the NRC notification made under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) 0656 on February 25, 2003. As discussed in NUREG-1022, Loss of Offsite Response Capability considerations, NRC notification is required when a major loss of offsite response capability occurs. A major loss of offsite response capability is considered to include loss of plant access for other than a short time for events that causes the access road to be impassible. The Turkey Point access road was limited to one lane (out of a normal two lane access) for 79 minutes, but at all times was accessible."
Notified R2 DO (C. Ogle).
"One car accident on access road to plant, however offsite. Degraded emergency responder access."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1059 EST ON 2/25/03 FROM MCILNAY TO RIPLEY * * *
"Upon further review and in accordance with the guidance provided by NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, Section 3.2.13, Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, Turkey Point is retracting the NRC notification made under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) 0656 on February 25, 2003. As discussed in NUREG-1022, Loss of Offsite Response Capability considerations, NRC notification is required when a major loss of offsite response capability occurs. A major loss of offsite response capability is considered to include loss of plant access for other than a short time for events that causes the access road to be impassible. The Turkey Point access road was limited to one lane (out of a normal two lane access) for 79 minutes, but at all times was accessible."
Notified R2 DO (C. Ogle).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39618
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT F. RAY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT F. RAY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 14:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 14:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENT
Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Refer to HOO log for additional details.
Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Refer to HOO log for additional details.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39619
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLIE HOCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLIE HOCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 07:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 07:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
MICHAEL JOHNSON (NRR)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
MICHAEL JOHNSON (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF ALL EMERGENCY SIRENS
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Units 2 and 3 is making an eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"On February 25, 2003, at 0752 hrs [EST] an investigation revealed that the siren control system had apparently become inoperable at approximately 0650 hrs. This condition affected the ability to sound all of the 154 sirens in the four counties of Orange, Putman, Rockland and Westchester for a period of 3 hours and 17 minutes. The siren system was successfully corrected, tested and returned to service at 1016 hrs.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event."
No state, local, or other government agencies were notified.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Units 2 and 3 is making an eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"On February 25, 2003, at 0752 hrs [EST] an investigation revealed that the siren control system had apparently become inoperable at approximately 0650 hrs. This condition affected the ability to sound all of the 154 sirens in the four counties of Orange, Putman, Rockland and Westchester for a period of 3 hours and 17 minutes. The siren system was successfully corrected, tested and returned to service at 1016 hrs.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event."
No state, local, or other government agencies were notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39759
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE TABOR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE TABOR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 04/15/2003
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 21:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2003
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2003
Event Time: 21:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) Report - Invalid Actuation of Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers (SCIDs).
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the following is a report of an invalid actuation of the PCIS and
SCIDs for Units 1 and 2. This notification is provided in lieu of submitting a written LER.
"On February 25, 2003, at approximately 2139 hours, failure of the main stack radiation monitor resulted in a PCIS Group 6 isolation and SCIDs. PCIS Group 6 valves include isolation valves from the Containment Atmosphere Control, Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems. Due to the shared configuration of the main stack radiation monitoring system, these isolations occurred on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. In addition the Standby Gas Treatment system initiated on both Units, as expected for the given plant conditions. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and SCIDs were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open at the time of the event closed). The main stack radiation monitor was subsequently returned to service and the other affected systems returned to their normal operating lineup. No deficiencies or abnormalities were noted during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this 60-Day report.
Discussion of the cause and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the site corrective action program (i.e., AR 85815)."
"60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) Report - Invalid Actuation of Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers (SCIDs).
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the following is a report of an invalid actuation of the PCIS and
SCIDs for Units 1 and 2. This notification is provided in lieu of submitting a written LER.
"On February 25, 2003, at approximately 2139 hours, failure of the main stack radiation monitor resulted in a PCIS Group 6 isolation and SCIDs. PCIS Group 6 valves include isolation valves from the Containment Atmosphere Control, Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems. Due to the shared configuration of the main stack radiation monitoring system, these isolations occurred on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. In addition the Standby Gas Treatment system initiated on both Units, as expected for the given plant conditions. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and SCIDs were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open at the time of the event closed). The main stack radiation monitor was subsequently returned to service and the other affected systems returned to their normal operating lineup. No deficiencies or abnormalities were noted during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this 60-Day report.
Discussion of the cause and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the site corrective action program (i.e., AR 85815)."