Event Notification Report for February 24, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/23/2003 - 02/24/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
39676396143961539616
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39676
Rep Org: DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT
Licensee: DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT
Region: 1
City: NEW CANTERBURY State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT
Region: 1
City: NEW CANTERBURY State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/18/2003
Notification Time: 08:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2003
Notification Time: 08:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
LOST AMERICIUM-241 SEALED SOURCES
On 3/18/2003, NRC Headquarters was informed by the master materials licensee (located in New Cumberland, PA) that on 3/17/2003, it was discovered by the licensee that two Americium-241 sealed sources were unaccounted for. The sources were tracked to a shipment facility at Warner Robbins Air Force Base on 2/24/03, but there is no record that the sources were shipped out of the facility or where they might be stored. The sources are contained in a laser transmitter/receiver and contain 4 microcuries of Americium-241.
* * * * UPDATE FROM D. MACK TO M. RIPLEY 1336 EST ON 03/19/03 * * *
On 03/18/03, NRC Headquarters was informed that the laser transmitter/receiver (S/N 10425) containing both Americium-241 sources was located at Laken Heath Air Force Base in England on 03/18/03. Further investigation continues.
Notified R1DO (P. Eselgroth) and NMSS EO.
On 3/18/2003, NRC Headquarters was informed by the master materials licensee (located in New Cumberland, PA) that on 3/17/2003, it was discovered by the licensee that two Americium-241 sealed sources were unaccounted for. The sources were tracked to a shipment facility at Warner Robbins Air Force Base on 2/24/03, but there is no record that the sources were shipped out of the facility or where they might be stored. The sources are contained in a laser transmitter/receiver and contain 4 microcuries of Americium-241.
* * * * UPDATE FROM D. MACK TO M. RIPLEY 1336 EST ON 03/19/03 * * *
On 03/18/03, NRC Headquarters was informed that the laser transmitter/receiver (S/N 10425) containing both Americium-241 sources was located at Laken Heath Air Force Base in England on 03/18/03. Further investigation continues.
Notified R1DO (P. Eselgroth) and NMSS EO.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39614
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/24/2003
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 11:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2003
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 11:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1117 [CST] on 02/24/2003 with Unit 2 in MODE 3 (Control Rods fully inserted), a full reactor scram signal (RPS) [Reactor Protection System] was received due to low reactor water level. The lowest level observed was 1.6 [inches] with a scram set point of 2 [inches]. All expected PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Systems] Isolations, GROUP 2 (RHR S/D cooling) [Residual Heat Removal], GROUP 3 (RWCU) [Reactor Water Clean-Up), GROUP 6 (Ventilation) & GROUP 8 (TIP) [Transverse Incore Probes] were received along with the auto start of 'B' CREVS [Control Room Emergency Ventilation System] and the three SBGT [Standby Gas Treatment] Trains. This low water level event is believed to be a result of manual closure of 2C RFP [Reactor Feed Pump] Discharge valve (2-FCV-3-5) and the slow response of the RFP BYPASS valve (2-FCV-3-53)
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) as 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of RPS & PCIS as described in (1) & (2) below'."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1117 [CST] on 02/24/2003 with Unit 2 in MODE 3 (Control Rods fully inserted), a full reactor scram signal (RPS) [Reactor Protection System] was received due to low reactor water level. The lowest level observed was 1.6 [inches] with a scram set point of 2 [inches]. All expected PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Systems] Isolations, GROUP 2 (RHR S/D cooling) [Residual Heat Removal], GROUP 3 (RWCU) [Reactor Water Clean-Up), GROUP 6 (Ventilation) & GROUP 8 (TIP) [Transverse Incore Probes] were received along with the auto start of 'B' CREVS [Control Room Emergency Ventilation System] and the three SBGT [Standby Gas Treatment] Trains. This low water level event is believed to be a result of manual closure of 2C RFP [Reactor Feed Pump] Discharge valve (2-FCV-3-5) and the slow response of the RFP BYPASS valve (2-FCV-3-53)
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) as 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of RPS & PCIS as described in (1) & (2) below'."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39615
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SPECTRO ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: MARBLE FALLS State: TX
County:
License #: L-02788-003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: SPECTRO ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: MARBLE FALLS State: TX
County:
License #: L-02788-003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/24/2003
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2003
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE
The following information was obtained from the Texas Department of Health via facsimile:
"Leaking source was discovered during routine servicing of an ASOMA Model 200 analytical instrument, Serial No 4668. The instrument contained a sealed Amersham 13 millicurie, Cm-244 source, Serial No 2695LM, Amersham Model No. CLCL. Last assay date was 08/15/95. Leakage detected was from a routine wipe test which resulted in 0.0077 microcuries of removable contamination. The source is being prepared for return to the manufacturer for evaluation and disposal. All other interior components and exterior surfaces of the instrument were wipe tested and found to have no contamination above the Licensee's minimum detection limit of 360 picocuries."
The following information was obtained from the Texas Department of Health via facsimile:
"Leaking source was discovered during routine servicing of an ASOMA Model 200 analytical instrument, Serial No 4668. The instrument contained a sealed Amersham 13 millicurie, Cm-244 source, Serial No 2695LM, Amersham Model No. CLCL. Last assay date was 08/15/95. Leakage detected was from a routine wipe test which resulted in 0.0077 microcuries of removable contamination. The source is being prepared for return to the manufacturer for evaluation and disposal. All other interior components and exterior surfaces of the instrument were wipe tested and found to have no contamination above the Licensee's minimum detection limit of 360 picocuries."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39616
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/24/2003
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 15:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2003
Event Time: 15:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2003
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
ZENNOT (EPA)
BOB SUMMER (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
ZENNOT (EPA)
BOB SUMMER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION WITH SAFETY INJECTION
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1548 [EST], on 2/24/03, Beaver Valley Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip and safety injection on low steam line pressure. An automatic main steam line isolation also occurred and all three main steam line isolation valves shut. After the automatic actions occurred, operators noted that all three steam generator pressures appeared normal. Operators were dispatched to investigate in the field and found no indications of a steam leak.
"Emergency procedure E-0, Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, was entered at 1548. At 1600, the Shift Manager declared an unusual event. Initial notifications to state and local agencies were complete at 1609. Per procedure E-0, after meeting Safety Injection termination criteria, the Boron Injection Tank was isolated at 1603 and Safety Injection was terminated.
"Initial review of computer information revealed that closure of the 'C' main steam isolation valve is the probable cause of the reactor trip, safety injection and main steam isolation.
"The gaseous release occurred due to tritium in the secondary and the fact that the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump is in service. No protective action recommendations were made.
"All systems and equipment functioned as designed."
Technical Support Center is staffed but not activated. All control rods inserted into the core. The electrical grid is stable. Unit 1 is stable. Core cooling is being accomplished via auxiliary feedwater and steam generator atmospheric dump valves. There is previously identified steam generator "B" tube leakage of less than 0.1 gallons per day.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1735 EST ON 2/24/03 BY HOWIE CROUCH * * *
The licensee has terminated the Unusual Event. They have re-established a pressurizer steam bubble. The plant and electrical grid is stable. Decay heat removal is via auxiliary feedwater and the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps.
Notified FEMA, EPA, R1DO (Kinneman), DIRO (Mamish) and NRR EO (Reis).
* * * UPDATE AT 0300 EST ON 2/25/03 TO MIKE RIPLEY FROM P. SENA * * *
The licensee updated the event classification 10 CFR sections and current plant status.
"At 1735 [2/24/03], the Unusual Event was terminated. This was based upon termination of the safety injection, completion of emergency operating procedure actions, and stabilization of plant conditions. This was previously communicated to the NRC Operations Center at 1740.
"As of 0245, on 2/25/03, Unit 1 remains in mode 3. Heat removal is via the steam generator atmospheric steam release valves. All main steam isolation valves remain shut as the event investigation continues. The preliminary initiator of the event remains the inadvertent closure of 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valve. The offsite release (due to tritium activity in the secondary) has been calculated and determined to be of minimal/no effect on the public. The projected whole body dose was 5.12E-7 mrem [millirem]. This is equivalent to 3.41 E-6 percent of the yearly Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit."
Notified FEMA, EPA, R1DO (Kinneman), DIRO (Mamish) and NRR EO (Reis)
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1548 [EST], on 2/24/03, Beaver Valley Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip and safety injection on low steam line pressure. An automatic main steam line isolation also occurred and all three main steam line isolation valves shut. After the automatic actions occurred, operators noted that all three steam generator pressures appeared normal. Operators were dispatched to investigate in the field and found no indications of a steam leak.
"Emergency procedure E-0, Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, was entered at 1548. At 1600, the Shift Manager declared an unusual event. Initial notifications to state and local agencies were complete at 1609. Per procedure E-0, after meeting Safety Injection termination criteria, the Boron Injection Tank was isolated at 1603 and Safety Injection was terminated.
"Initial review of computer information revealed that closure of the 'C' main steam isolation valve is the probable cause of the reactor trip, safety injection and main steam isolation.
"The gaseous release occurred due to tritium in the secondary and the fact that the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump is in service. No protective action recommendations were made.
"All systems and equipment functioned as designed."
Technical Support Center is staffed but not activated. All control rods inserted into the core. The electrical grid is stable. Unit 1 is stable. Core cooling is being accomplished via auxiliary feedwater and steam generator atmospheric dump valves. There is previously identified steam generator "B" tube leakage of less than 0.1 gallons per day.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1735 EST ON 2/24/03 BY HOWIE CROUCH * * *
The licensee has terminated the Unusual Event. They have re-established a pressurizer steam bubble. The plant and electrical grid is stable. Decay heat removal is via auxiliary feedwater and the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps.
Notified FEMA, EPA, R1DO (Kinneman), DIRO (Mamish) and NRR EO (Reis).
* * * UPDATE AT 0300 EST ON 2/25/03 TO MIKE RIPLEY FROM P. SENA * * *
The licensee updated the event classification 10 CFR sections and current plant status.
"At 1735 [2/24/03], the Unusual Event was terminated. This was based upon termination of the safety injection, completion of emergency operating procedure actions, and stabilization of plant conditions. This was previously communicated to the NRC Operations Center at 1740.
"As of 0245, on 2/25/03, Unit 1 remains in mode 3. Heat removal is via the steam generator atmospheric steam release valves. All main steam isolation valves remain shut as the event investigation continues. The preliminary initiator of the event remains the inadvertent closure of 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valve. The offsite release (due to tritium activity in the secondary) has been calculated and determined to be of minimal/no effect on the public. The projected whole body dose was 5.12E-7 mrem [millirem]. This is equivalent to 3.41 E-6 percent of the yearly Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit."
Notified FEMA, EPA, R1DO (Kinneman), DIRO (Mamish) and NRR EO (Reis)