Event Notification Report for February 17, 2003

AGREEMENT STATE - RADIATION WORKER EXCEEDED TEDE DOSE LIMIT

"Description of Incident: On the afternoon of February 14, 2003, DRH received a call from Sonny Mallette with Southern Inspection Services, concerning a radiographer receiving a TEDE for calendar year 2002 exceeding 5 rem. Mr. Mallette stated that the employee had received 4722 mrem [millirem] by the end of the 11th report for 2002, and they had watched his dosimeter readings closely, but when they received the end of year report he had gone over the 5 rem limit [5,066 millirem]. He stated that the dose was received in work situations where shielding and distance are at a minimum. One setup involved shooting up in a oil drilling rig derrick where no shielding is available."

IRRETRIEVABLE SEALED SOURCE

"A 3 Ci [Curie] sealed source of AmBe 241 was lost down [a] hole on February 17, 2003 at a depth of 6600 ft. Attempts were made to retrieve the source but they were unsuccessful. A vented bridge plug was set at 5335 ft and low permeability cement was dumped until 5300 ft. Additional information will be sent at a later date."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF SEPTIC SYSTEM OVERFLOW

"On 2/17/03 at 1058, Xcel Energy Environmental Services completed notification to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) concerning an approximately 300 gallon septic system overflow event. The distribution system appears to be frozen due to cold weather and lack of snow cover, causing the pump discharge to flow out to grade. Spill has been contained and cleanup completed."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF MANUAL VALVES IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

"During the eleventh refueling outage on Unit 2 (2R11), component cooling water (CCW) system manual valve CCW-2-18 was found to have a damaged liner. The subject valve is used to separate the two vital normally cross-tied CCW trains in case of a CCW leak either as an independent event or as a passive failure following a loss of coolant accident. Valve CCW-2-18 would not have performed its licensing/design function of providing CCW train isolation.

"The licensing/design bases for this CCW System, as discussed in table 9.2-7 of the FSAR and in SSER 16, is for a maximum 200 gpm leak to occur. Leakage would be detected by falling level in the CCW surge tank. Because of the remaining 4000 gallons in the CCW surge tank after receipt of the low-level alarm, there would be at least 20 minutes for the operator to isolate the leak before the surge tank is empty. The period is extended if the automatically operated, Design Class II, normal makeup path functions as designed and adds makeup water to the system. PG&E's abnormal operating procedure, OP AP-11, has provision for aligning a 250 gpm Class I supply of water to the CCW surge tank.

"The design/licensing basis of a 200 gpm leak being isolated in 20 minutes assumes that manual valves used during the isolation operation hold and terminate the leak. There is no evidence that PG&E nor the NRC have considered that a leak would not be isolated upon completion of actions to separate the trains. The identified condition, though not believed to represent a safety concern, is different than that discussed in SSER 16. Therefore, the condition is considered to be outside the design basis for the plant."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

8-HOUR NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION DUE AUTOMATIC START AND LOAD OF THE 1B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"While performing maintenance activities to replace a failed undervoltage relay on 1B3 4160 VAC bus, the undervoltage protection triggered a load shed on the 1B3 4160 VAC bus causing a loss of power to the bus and automatic start and load of the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator. Although the potential for this event was previously briefed for the relay replacement, this event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The load shed caused a loss of the 1B motor-generator (MG) set but both MG sets are 100% capacity sets. There were no adverse consequences due to the trip of the 1B MG set.

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION - CARBOLINE COMPANY

The following information was obtained from the vendor via facsimile:

"This letter serves to notify the Commission of a potential safety related noncompliance deviation in a basic component as defined in 10CFR Part 21. The noncompliance involves hard settling of Carboguard 890 Part B; the affected batches are 2A9266L, 2A9275L, and 2H9352L

"The hard settling of Carboguard 890 Part B would result in a mixed product that would have lower pigment volume concentration (PVC) than standard material that has been uniformly dispersed. Potential deficiencies would be a lack of film build during application as a result of a lower initial viscosity and the fact that some particles from the hard settling may have been dispersed into the mixed product. These particles could result in the clogging of spray gun tips or having particles embedded into the applied coating, which are aesthetically unpleasing. Overall the lack of pigment in the coating film affects the application and aesthetic properties of the coating and not the performance properties. The primary criteria for the epoxy coating's performance are that the stoichiometry of epoxy resin to amine curing agent are not changed by more than 10%. Based upon a prior non-nuclear occurrence we know that the hard settling does not alter the stoichiometry of the coating and the cure of the product will be within the parameters designed by the formulating chemist. Based upon prior testing of numerous coatings for use in nuclear power plants we have not seen any detrimental performance when lower PVC coatings were evaluated. Resin rich coatings are typically gloss coatings and they aid in radiation decontamination and chemical resistance. As such, Carboline does not feel that the performance of the coating will be adversely affected.

"A database has been created documenting all shipments of the affected batches made within the 2002 calendar year to present; approximately 30 utilities/customers are affected. All customers who our records indicate have been shipped batches 2A9266L, 2A9275L, and 2H9352L shall be notified promptly. We are requesting that customers review their stock of Carboguard 890 Part B and return the affected batches for replacement.

"In summary, Carboline has taken appropriate corrective action, notified the NRC, and shall notify all customers promptly."

The affected parties are as follows:
Consumers Energy - Palisades Generating Plant
Energy Steel & Supply - 2715 Padan Street, Auburn Hills, MI
Florida Power & Light - 9760 SW 344th St., Florida City, FL
Hutchinson & Gunter - 715 Grpve Street, Greensburg, PA
Imaging & Sensing Technology - IST Conax Nuclear, Inc., Buffalo, NY
Newbury Sandblasting - PO Box 378, Newbury, OH
Nullifire Ltd. - Torrington Avenue, Coventry, UK
Point Beach Nuclear - 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI
Prairie Island - Welch, MN
Ameren/UE-CIPS - Callaway Plant
Duke Energy Corp - Nuclear Assessment Division, SC
Ellis & Watts - 4325 Slick Lane, Bativa, OH
FirstEnergy, Davis-Besse Oak Harbor, OH
Howden Buffalo - New Philadelphia, OH
Omaha Public Power - Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station
Palmer Industrial Coatings - Williamsport, PA
Rotork Controls - Rochester, NY
TXU Electric - Glen Rose, TX