Event Notification Report for February 13, 2003

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY AT AMEREN UE CALLAWAY PLANT

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"At 0954 [CST] on February 13, 2003, the Control Room was notified of a personnel injury in the Turbine building. After examination by the site doctor, the individual was transported off site for treatment. Subsequently, on February 18, 2003, the individual was admitted to the hospital for further treatment.

Preliminary investigation indicates that the individual was struck in the face with a flying object. The individual was using a filter change out tool and attempting to disconnect a 2" Camflex plug. The line was apparently pressurized resulting in ejection of the plug toward the individual's face when it was disconnected.

The Missouri Public Service Commission was notified at 2:02 pm CST on February 19,2003 of the serious injury.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the Texas Department of Health via facsimile:

"During routine service of an ASOMA (SPECTRO) Model 200, Serial No 4390, a wipe test was performed on a 20 millicurie Am-241 source, Serial No 13730W. Contamination of 0.035 microcuries was detected on the wipe. The source is an AEA Technology (Amersham) Model AMC.D2 with a source product code AMCK2175. It is encapsulated in an X10/2 capsule. The source was removed and is being returned to the manufacturer for evaluation. All other interior components and exterior surfaces of the instrument were wipe tested and found to have no contamination above the Licensee's minimum detection limit of 360 picocuries. Agency was notified by telephone of the leaking source on February 13, 2003. A written report was sent to this Agency that same date. This incident was closed February 24, 2003. No violations have been cited.

SIGNIFICANT INSERVICE INSPECTION FINDINGS FOR UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBES

The following information was obtained from the Licensee via facsimile:

"On February 13, 2003, during the Unit 2 eleventh refueling outage (2R11), eddy current data on SG [Steam Generator] 2-4 indicated that greater than one percent of the total tubes inspected were defective. Most of the pluggable indications are due to outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC) at the tube support plate intersections. Eddy current examination of these tubes indicated that the ODSCC crack growth rate at the tube support plate exceeded the program predicted growth rates. Preliminary calculations indicated the TS 5.6.10.d.5 limit for probability of burst (POB) was exceeded.

"An additional defective tube in SG 2-4 row 5 tube bend has been identified that will be subject to additional insitu testing. PG&E has expanded the SG inspection scope and identified a team to prepare a root cause determination.

"An NRC teleconference in accordance with TS 5.6.10.d.5 was held on February 13, 2003, at 1000 PST, to provide initial notification of significant findings. Additional teleconferences have been scheduled to provide additional inservice inspection results as they become available.

"The NRC Resident Inspector and an additional onsite Region IV inspector were part of the teleconference presentation cited above."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SAN DIEGO SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILS TO FUNCTION

The following information was obtained via e-mail from California Department of Health Services, Radiological Health Branch:

"At approximately 7:30 am [PST], February 13, 2003, the University of California at San Diego (California Radioactive Materials No. 1339-37) was performing one of the monthly Quality Assurance (QA) tests on their High Dose Rate Afterloader (HDRA). They had a treatment scheduled for later that morning, and the guide tubes and extenders were already attached in preparation for the treatment. During the typical monthly check, the licensee disconnects two of the guide tubes, and attaches the QA catheter, placing one end in the well chamber to measure the source strength, and that is what occurred this time. However, when the channel was set to run the QA test, the operator inadvertently set the wrong channel, and the source was extended into one of the guide tubes, rather than through the QA catheter and into the well chamber. When the operator tried to retract the source, it would not retract.

"The operator used a survey meter at the door of the treatment room to verify the source was still out, and re-confirmed that with the indication on the room monitor. After several attempts to retract the source from the console, the operator entered the room, and placed all the guide tubes into the emergency source pig, and closed the lid. The operator states the dose-rate in the room, with the source in the pig was reduced to approximately 3 milliR/hr at one foot from the pig. He estimates he was within one meter of the unshielded source for no more than 5 seconds, and that his hand was within one foot of the source for approximately 3 seconds. Currently, the licensee estimates the dose to the operator as under 100 millirem whole body. They have sent his dosimeter for emergency processing. It is unknown at this time if he was wearing an extremity dosimeter.

"After placing the guide tubes with the source in the pig, the operator left the room, locked it, and contacted Nucletron Corporation to service the device. The licensee contacted the State of California with this information at approximately 10:30 am PST on February 14, 2003. The State of California is investigating this event, and will provide updated information as needed. This event would be reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2), and to the State of California under the comparable California regulation (17 CCR 30295)."