Event Notification Report for February 07, 2003

LEAKAGE DISCOVERED FROM HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

"On February 7, 2003, at approximately 17:20 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Unit 2 discovered leakage from the high pressure safety injection system outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident exceeded the safety analysis leakrate limit. The drain valve that was the source of the leakage was promptly tightened to return to within the analysis limit and subsequently repaired to further reduce leakage to a level as low as practicable. There was no release of radioactivity to the environment as a result of this event. There were no adverse safety consequences resulting from the event.

The "loss of safety function" reporting requirement would be triggered by the described condition because the post-LOCA dose calculations assume no more than 1500 ml/hour leakage outside of containment in the 10 CFR 100 siting analysis. At the time of discovery, the leakage was 1715 ml/min (102900 ml/hr). Therefore the safety function to control the release of radioactive material such that the dose to a member of the public would not exceed 10 CFR 100 limits during a potential LOCA was not fulfilled.

At the time of the discovery the condition was promptly corrected so no ENS report was thought to be required, however on further review it was noted that the reporting requirement states "Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented.." and therefore remains immediately reportable even if the condition no longer exists."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

*** RETRACTED ON 4/1/03 AT 1605 EST FROM D. STRAKA TO A. COSTA ***

"This notification is a RETRACTION of the February 7, 2003, ENS #39581 which reported a Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 loss of safety function to control the release of radioactive materials due to leakage from the high pressure safety injection system outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident arid exceed the safety analysis Ieakrate limit.

"At the time of discovery, the leakage was assumed to exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits for dose to a member of the public during a potential LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident]. Therefore the safety function to control the release of radioactive material would not be fulfilled.

"PVNGS [Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station] System Engineering re-evaluated the condition and has concluded that the identified leakage was well within the limiting large break loss of coolant accident analysis and that the 10 CFR 100 limits would not have been exceeded. Therefore, the loss of a safety function DID NOT exist and the condition is not reportable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO A POTENTIAL DISCHARGE OF THE C02 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

"On 2/7/2003 at 1408 hours, the Beaver Valley Power Station control room was notified by Engineering that a potential pressure transient from a discharge of the C02 total flooding fire suppression system in the East and West Cable Vaults at Beaver Valley Unit 1 (BV-1) could result in an unanalyzed condition. This pressure transient could cause the fire barriers within the subject areas to be structurally challenged, resulting in the potential for a postulated fire in one fire area to spread to an adjacent fire area. This condition could invalidate the assumptions made in the BV-1 fire protection safe shutdown analysis per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition was discovered following engineering's evaluation of a Condition Report initiated on 2/5/03 concerning the potential for a C02 discharge in the above areas that could have resulted in a breach of the fire barriers between adjacent fire areas. The automatic C02 suppression system in the East and West Cable Vaults was defeated on 2/5/03 at 2150 hours in response to the initial identified concern and a fire watch was established in the affected areas. These compensatory measures eliminate the potential for C02 overpressure transient condition in the affected areas.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety since a potential discharge of the C02 fire suppression system in response to a postulated fire could have invalidated the assumptions made in the BV-1 fire protection safe shutdown analysis per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. The NRC resident has been notified of the degraded condition."