Event Notification Report for February 01, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/31/2003 - 02/01/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39552
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT TEMPLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT TEMPLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/01/2003
Notification Time: 04:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2003
Event Time: 02:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2003
Notification Time: 04:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2003
Event Time: 02:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO CONDENSER TUBE LEAK
"Inserted a manual reactor scram due to a condenser tube leak resulting in high condenser, feedwater and reactor water conductivity. "
All control rods inserted into the core. There were no openings of power-operated relief valves, relief valves, code safeties, or dump valves. Cooldown is being accomplished via the Reactor cleanup to condenser system. All safety systems operated as expected. The switchyard is in a stable condition.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the Licensee.
*** UPDATE ON 2/2/03 AT 0044 EST FROM MARK GILBERT TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FACSIMILE ***
"DAEC [Duane Arnold Energy Center] is making an addendum to EN [Event Number] #39552 made on 2/1/2003 at 0233. EN #39552 reported the insertion of a manual scram due to a condenser tube leak which was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an RPS actuation. Following the insertion of the reactor scram, reactor water level dropped below 170 [inches] and PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Signal] groups 2,3, and 4 were received. All isolations went to completion. The reactor water level drop is normal following a reactor scram due to the void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level was restored. Currently the plant is stable in Mode 4 and maintaining a normal reactor water level band. DAEC is currently making plans to determine the source of the condenser tube leak.
"This addendum report is being made under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section.' as a result of the PCIS groups 2 (Radwaste and TIP [Tranverse Incore Probe] system) and 3 (Containment atmosphere control system)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the addendum by the licensee.
"Inserted a manual reactor scram due to a condenser tube leak resulting in high condenser, feedwater and reactor water conductivity. "
All control rods inserted into the core. There were no openings of power-operated relief valves, relief valves, code safeties, or dump valves. Cooldown is being accomplished via the Reactor cleanup to condenser system. All safety systems operated as expected. The switchyard is in a stable condition.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the Licensee.
*** UPDATE ON 2/2/03 AT 0044 EST FROM MARK GILBERT TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FACSIMILE ***
"DAEC [Duane Arnold Energy Center] is making an addendum to EN [Event Number] #39552 made on 2/1/2003 at 0233. EN #39552 reported the insertion of a manual scram due to a condenser tube leak which was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an RPS actuation. Following the insertion of the reactor scram, reactor water level dropped below 170 [inches] and PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Signal] groups 2,3, and 4 were received. All isolations went to completion. The reactor water level drop is normal following a reactor scram due to the void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level was restored. Currently the plant is stable in Mode 4 and maintaining a normal reactor water level band. DAEC is currently making plans to determine the source of the condenser tube leak.
"This addendum report is being made under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section.' as a result of the PCIS groups 2 (Radwaste and TIP [Tranverse Incore Probe] system) and 3 (Containment atmosphere control system)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the addendum by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39553
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW THURBURN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW THURBURN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/01/2003
Notification Time: 09:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2003
Event Time: 03:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2003
Notification Time: 09:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2003
Event Time: 03:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MAIN GENERATOR LOSS OF EXCITATION CAUSES A TURBINE TRIP THEN A REACTOR TRIP
A loss of main generator excitation caused a turbine trip and, subsequent to that, a reactor trip. During the trip sequence, a non-1E electrical bus experienced low voltage and automatically transferred to an auxiliary bus. During the transfer, both Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) oil pumps tripped causing a trip of both MFPs. The loss of Main Feedwater caused low steam generator levels which initiated the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS). EFAS restored steam generator levels to normal.
All control rods inserted into the core. No power-operated relief valves, relief valves or code safeties lifted during the trip. The plant is removing decay heat via the steam dump to condenser system. The electrical grid is stable. The other at the site was not affected.
The cause of the loss of generator excitation is under investigation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the Licensee.
A loss of main generator excitation caused a turbine trip and, subsequent to that, a reactor trip. During the trip sequence, a non-1E electrical bus experienced low voltage and automatically transferred to an auxiliary bus. During the transfer, both Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) oil pumps tripped causing a trip of both MFPs. The loss of Main Feedwater caused low steam generator levels which initiated the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS). EFAS restored steam generator levels to normal.
All control rods inserted into the core. No power-operated relief valves, relief valves or code safeties lifted during the trip. The plant is removing decay heat via the steam dump to condenser system. The electrical grid is stable. The other at the site was not affected.
The cause of the loss of generator excitation is under investigation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the Licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39554
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/01/2003
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2003
Event Time: 01:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2003
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2003
Event Time: 01:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF A SAFETY FUNCTION DUE TO ALL FOUR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was received from the Licensee via facsimile:
"At 0145 hours [EST] on 2/1/2003, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable following discovery of a Fuel Oil leakage drain path change that was installed to prevent Fuel Oil leakage from reaching the ground water.
"This change involved the installation of plastic sleeves on the fuel oil drains for all four EDGs to reroute the fuel oil drains to a catch basin. The normal drain path is through the RHR [Residual Heat Removal] Complex (which houses the EDGs) drain system to the chemical pond. This change was installed after a crack was discovered in a 21 inch concrete line in the drain path from the RHR Complex Drain Sump to the Chemical Pond. This change was installed on 01/17/03.
"While running EDG 11 for post maintenance testing following a scheduled maintenance outage, fuel oil in a drain sleeve backed up and spilled out of a vent on the fuel oil drain header. This spillage resulted in a small lagging fire. EDG 11 was immediately shutdown and the fire was extinguished within a few minutes. No significant damage to EDG 11 was caused by the fire. Since all four EDGs had a similar fuel oil drain configuration, they were declared inoperable at 0145 hours and Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B was entered, which requires restoration of one division of the EDGs within 2 hours.
"At 0329 hours, the normal fuel oil drain configuration was restored for EDG 13 and EDG 14 (Division 2) and Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B was exited. At 0345 hours, the normal fuel oil drain configuration was restored for EDG 12 (Division 1). EDG 11 remains inoperable until the completion of post maintenance testing.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)[(D)] due to all four EDGs being inoperable causing the loss of a safety function."
The fire was extinguished without offsite assistance and there were no injuries due to the fire.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** RETRACTION AT 1118 EST ON 3/13/03 FROM PATRICK FALLON TO ERIC THOMAS ***
"While running EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) 11 for post maintenance testing following a scheduled maintenance outage on February 1, 2003, fuel oil in a drain sleeve backed up and spilled out of a vent on the fuel oil drain header. This spillage resulted in a small fire. The fire caused no damage to EDG 11. Since all four EDGs had a similar temporary fuel oil drain configuration, they were declared inoperable. The normal fuel oil drain configuration was restored within the Completion Time of Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B. Notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to all four EDGs being declared inoperable causing the loss of a safety function.
"The cause of the fire is believed to be excessive fuel oil leaking from the EDG 11 fuel injector compartment onto the exhaust manifold. (The cause was initially reported as normal fuel injector leakage backing up into the fuel oil drain header due to the temporary drain configuration). The injectors allowed an abnormally high rate of fuel oil leakage into the fuel oil drain header for EDG 11 only. The fuel oil drain rates for EDGs 12, 13, and 14 were observed to be normal during subsequent surveillance testing, and within the capability of the temporary fuel oil drain configuration.
"Therefore, EDGs 12, 13, and 14 were capable of performing their safety function and there was no common mode failure, as a result of the temporary drain configuration. This condition is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The original notification, Event Number 39554, is retracted."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received from the Licensee via facsimile:
"At 0145 hours [EST] on 2/1/2003, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable following discovery of a Fuel Oil leakage drain path change that was installed to prevent Fuel Oil leakage from reaching the ground water.
"This change involved the installation of plastic sleeves on the fuel oil drains for all four EDGs to reroute the fuel oil drains to a catch basin. The normal drain path is through the RHR [Residual Heat Removal] Complex (which houses the EDGs) drain system to the chemical pond. This change was installed after a crack was discovered in a 21 inch concrete line in the drain path from the RHR Complex Drain Sump to the Chemical Pond. This change was installed on 01/17/03.
"While running EDG 11 for post maintenance testing following a scheduled maintenance outage, fuel oil in a drain sleeve backed up and spilled out of a vent on the fuel oil drain header. This spillage resulted in a small lagging fire. EDG 11 was immediately shutdown and the fire was extinguished within a few minutes. No significant damage to EDG 11 was caused by the fire. Since all four EDGs had a similar fuel oil drain configuration, they were declared inoperable at 0145 hours and Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B was entered, which requires restoration of one division of the EDGs within 2 hours.
"At 0329 hours, the normal fuel oil drain configuration was restored for EDG 13 and EDG 14 (Division 2) and Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B was exited. At 0345 hours, the normal fuel oil drain configuration was restored for EDG 12 (Division 1). EDG 11 remains inoperable until the completion of post maintenance testing.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)[(D)] due to all four EDGs being inoperable causing the loss of a safety function."
The fire was extinguished without offsite assistance and there were no injuries due to the fire.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** RETRACTION AT 1118 EST ON 3/13/03 FROM PATRICK FALLON TO ERIC THOMAS ***
"While running EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) 11 for post maintenance testing following a scheduled maintenance outage on February 1, 2003, fuel oil in a drain sleeve backed up and spilled out of a vent on the fuel oil drain header. This spillage resulted in a small fire. The fire caused no damage to EDG 11. Since all four EDGs had a similar temporary fuel oil drain configuration, they were declared inoperable. The normal fuel oil drain configuration was restored within the Completion Time of Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B. Notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to all four EDGs being declared inoperable causing the loss of a safety function.
"The cause of the fire is believed to be excessive fuel oil leaking from the EDG 11 fuel injector compartment onto the exhaust manifold. (The cause was initially reported as normal fuel injector leakage backing up into the fuel oil drain header due to the temporary drain configuration). The injectors allowed an abnormally high rate of fuel oil leakage into the fuel oil drain header for EDG 11 only. The fuel oil drain rates for EDGs 12, 13, and 14 were observed to be normal during subsequent surveillance testing, and within the capability of the temporary fuel oil drain configuration.
"Therefore, EDGs 12, 13, and 14 were capable of performing their safety function and there was no common mode failure, as a result of the temporary drain configuration. This condition is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The original notification, Event Number 39554, is retracted."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.