Event Notification Report for January 20, 2003

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, Incident Investigation Group via facsimile:

"Driver/Operator was at construction site on north side of San Antonio. Reported that he placed the gauge, without transport case, on the tailgate of his company pickup and completed his paperwork in the cab. When [he] completed [the paperwork], he forgot the gauge was still sitting on the tailgate and drove off from the site. Approximately 300 feet down the access road to Loop 1604, he realized that he had not put his gauge away. To return to the site, he had to loop around several access roads to get back to the area. When he arrived back at the construction site, he could not locate the gauge. He called his company for assistance. The company sent other employees to search the entire area without result and then reported the gauge missing to both the Hollywood Park and San Antonio Police Departments. In a call to the Agency [Texas Department of Health] at approximately 7:30 a.m. on January 21, 2003, it was reported that they believe the gauge was found by another contractor who was also departing the site the night before. It is believed that the gauge was put into the back of [the other contractor's] truck. The gauge is a Troxler 3440, Serial Number 30433, with two sealed sources: Cs-137, 8 millicuries, Serial Number 750-4901: and Am-241/Be, 40 millicuries, Serial Number 47-27488. The Radiation Safety Officer called at 10:53 a.m. on January 21, 2003, saying the gauge was recovered at the construction site at 7:30 a.m. this morning (01/21/2003) from another contractor who had found it onsite. The construction superintendent, when notified at home on the evening on January 20, 2003, had located the contractor who found the gauge, and arranged for the pickup this morning. The RSO did not have full details but has the gauge back in his possession. The gauge was visually inspected for damage and no apparent damage was noted. Radiation levels were normal for the gauge. However, a leak test was performed on the gauge. Results are pending. Both Police Departments have been notified of the recovery. It is not known if the helicopter flight was performed during the hours of darkness. [Hollywood Park Police notified the FBI and arranged for a helicopter to search for the gauge with infrared equipment.]"

The vehicle was a company pick-up truck. (No description given or known by reporting official.)

RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST FAILURE

"A non-licensed contract supervisor tested positive during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted." Contact the HOO for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM VALVE PIT PIPING PENETRATION SEAL

"On 1/20/2003 at 1430 hours, the Beaver Valley Power Station control room was notified by Engineering that a penetration seal previously installed in a wall which separates two service water system valve pits may have not been adequate. A review of the supporting analysis shows that this penetration seal may not be qualified to withstand the hydraulic pressure which could result from a postulated internal flooding event occurring due to a service water system pipe failure filling the valve pit and its above compartment prior to operator intervention. A failure of this seal during a postulated internal flooding event may result in the loss of motor operated valve movement in both trains of the service water system that would be needed following a design basis accident (DBA).

"This design basis calculation and the penetration seal capability are continuing to be evaluated. However, this seal could potentially have prevented the service water system from meeting single failure criterion during a postulated service water system pipe failure. Therefore, Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4.1 was entered due to less than two trains of service water system being operable as a conservative decision based upon the limited information immediately available to show acceptable seal integrity at the postulated conditions. The TS Action requires restoration of two independent service water system trains within 72 hours. Actions are in progress to install a qualified seal which will prevent the unacceptable flooding conditions from being able to occur.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety since this seal has been installed for five months and may have invalidated the independence between the two service water system trains. The NRC resident has been notified of the degraded condition."

* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1002 EST ON 3/07/2003 BY WITTER TO CROUCH * * *

"Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 retracts the notification made on 01/20/2003 at 20:13 hrs [EST] regarding the event reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) [ENS #39526]. The previous notification identified a potential issue with a seal penetration which may have invalidated the independence between two Service Water System trains.

"Subsequent analysis of the event identified that the installed penetration seal between the two Service Water System valve pits would have been capable of performing its intended safety function. Therefore, the separation and independence between the two Service Water System trains, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.4.1, would have been satisfied.

"Given that both trains of the Service Water System were able to perform their safety functions, this was not a condition that significantly degraded plant safety."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.