Event Notification Report for January 19, 2003

CA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FOR STOLEN COMPACTION GAUGE

"California received a report on 1/19 at approximately 1600 PST of a stolen Campbell Pacific Nuclear (CPN) MC3 moisture density gauge (serial number N310800424) containing nominally 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241. The gauge was reported stolen overnight 1/18-19/03 from a vehicle parked at a private residence in San Francisco, CA. The gauge was inside a car, covered with a blanket. A car window was broken to gain entry, and the gauge and it's transportation case were stolen. The transportation case, minus the gauge, was found by police in the street approximately one mile away from the scene of the theft. The licensee involved is CA licensee Consolidated Engineering. CA staff are investigating. Local police have been notified. A reward will be offered for return of the gauge."

SUSQUEHANNA UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

The following is taken from a facsimile sent by the licensee:

"At 10:11 hrs on 1/19/2003 Susquehanna Unit 1 began a shut down required by Technical Specifications.

"At 13:06 hrs on 1/16/2003 the 'B' diesel generator was being returned to service following maintenance. This placed Unit 1 and Unit 2 into a 72 hour LCO (3.8.1 Cond. B). During its operability run, the governor exhibited erratic operation and the diesel was shut down. The 'E' diesel generator was re-substituted for the 'B' and an operability run was initiated. During the run, the 'E' diesel generator tripped on reverse power. Station personnel continue to troubleshoot the unrelated problems with the diesel generators. Initial engineering analysis has determined that there is no common mode failure with these 2 problems or with the remaining 3 operable diesel generators.

"The 72 hour LCO for inoperability of 1 Diesel Generator (3.8.1 Cond. B) will expire at 13:06 hrs today. This will require both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to enter LCO 3.8.1 Cond. F, which requires both units to be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within 36 hours.

"An additional ENS report will be made when power reduction begins on Unit 2."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event and plans to make a press release.

* * * UPDATE 1600EST ON 1/19/03 FROM DAVID WALSH TO S. SANDIN * * *

"At 15:38 hrs on 1/19/2003 the 'E' diesel generator was declared operable. This returned the station to 4 operable diesel generators and allowed exiting the LCO 3.8.1 Cond. B and Cond. F. Power reduction on Unit 1 was halted at approximately 50%. Unit 2 remained at 100% power. Current plans are to return Unit 1 to 100% power."

The licensee is reviewing whether a press release will be made. Also, the licensee informed the NRC resident inspector of this update. Notified R1DO(Barkley) and NRR EO(Marsh).

CONTAMINATED, INJURED WORKER TRANSPORTED TO LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITY

The following is taken from a facsimile from the licensee:

"At 1252 today, a worker in a Contaminated Area in Unit 2 Containment became overheated and required medical attention. The first aid team responded and required that the individual be transported while he was still contaminated. The individual has 100K [100,000] dpm by direct frisk on his skin in the area of his face and 10K [10,000] dpm by direct frisk on his clothing he was wearing. He was transported by local Rescue Squad. While in the ambulance he was decontaminated by HP [Health Physics] personnel that were assisting. Medical College of Virginia (MCV) was notified of a potentially contaminated person that was enroute. The individual is still being transported to MCV where he will receive medical treatment. The individual and ambulance are now clean and all contaminated material will be transported back to NAPS [North Anna Power Station]"

The contaminated, injured worker was working on the installation of the blind flange on the fuel transfer tube. The North Anna Unit 2 reactor is refueled.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.

VARIOUS SYSTEM ACTUATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

The following information was received via facsimile:

"At 1255 hrs on January 19, 2003, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 3 with Trains A and D reactor coolant pumps (RCP) running. While placing a surge reactor in the switchyard in service the Unit 1 standby transformer received a lockout and total loss of the North bus.

"Unit 1 experienced a loss of offsite power (LOOP) to ESF Trains B & C. Both the Train B & Train C emergency diesel generators (EDG) started as expected. The Train C sequencer operated as expected and the Train C components automatically loaded, However, the Train B sequencer failed resulting in the manual loading of the Train B components in accordance with station off-normal procedures. This resulted in TS 3.0.3 entry in Unit 1 due to the loss of two (2) offsite power sources and the B train EDG (due to the failure of the B Train sequencer). There was a loss of letdown in Unit 1 when Train C isolated. Letdown was restored at 1313 hrs. At 1345 Unit 1 exited TS 3.0.3 when offsite power was restored to B Train. At 1406, offsite power was restored to C Train. The cause of the fault in the switchyard and failed Train B sequencer are under Investigation.

"In Unit 2, Train A was aligned to the Unit 1 Standby transformer therefore, Unit 2 experienced a LOOP to ESF Train A. Train A emergency diesel generator automatically started and loaded as expected. As a result of the LOOP, Unit 2 experienced a loss of circulating water and loss of condenser vacuum. The Steam Generators (SGs) were already being supplied by the Auxiliary Feedwater system therefore no interruption to SG cooling. In addition, both Train A and Train D reactor coolant pumps tripped resulting in entry into TS 3.4.1.2, action B & C (boron control limitations and ensure Rx trip breakers open). There was a loss of charging due to the LOOP resulting in a Loss of RCP seal injection, however, component cooling water flow to the thermal barrier maintained seal cooling. Charging has been restored to supply seal injection. At 1840, when starting RCP 2A, pressurizer PORV 655A opened and reseated due to a pressure spike. Unit 1 remains at 100% power and Unit 2 remains in Mode 3."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.