Event Notification Report for January 16, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/15/2003 - 01/16/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39515
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RALPH YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: JASON FLEMMING
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RALPH YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: JASON FLEMMING
Notification Date: 01/16/2003
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2003
Event Time: 16:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2003
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2003
Event Time: 16:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION AT MILLSTONE 3
"This report is being submitted to report an unanalyzed condition that could significantly degrade plant safety in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). As the result of an engineering analysis, it was determined that the fire safe shutdown strategy may not be adequate to ensure that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown for certain fire scenarios.
"On January 16, 2003, with Millstone Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power, and as a result of transient analysis of certain fire shutdown scenarios, it was determined that postulated extended loss of all seal cooling events have the potential for over-pressurization of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) No.1 seal leak-off line. The RCP No. 1 seal return line is designed to recover low pressure and temperature leak-off volume and return it to the volume control tank or charging pump suction. In response to a Cable Spreading Area, Control Room, or Instrument Rack Room fire, operation could be impacted because Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) may not adequately mitigate the scenario where a loss of all RCP seal cooling results in increased RCP seal leakage. This increased seal leakage assumption causes above normal pressure and temperature fluid conditions within the No. 1 seal return line. The over-pressurization that may occur could challenge the seal leak-off line structural integrity and a pressure boundary failure is considered possible. Per BTP 9.5-1, the credited injection pathway needs to be sufficient to preclude draining of the pressurizer below the indicating range. Because this condition would significantly complicate shutdown in the event of fire in these areas, this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"This condition assumes a fire of sufficient magnitude to cause a loss of all AC power which results in an extended loss of all seal cooling. This is considered to be a low probability event.
"Compensatory measures are in place and include continuous fire watches in the Cable Spreading Area and the Instrument Rack Room. The continuous fire watch in the Control Room is satisfied by the presence of the Control Room staff. Additional fire extinguishers in impacted areas are in place. Administrative control requiring prior Shift Manager approval have been implemented to set limits on ignition source permits, use of transient combustibles, and use of flammable liquids within the impacted areas. Compensatory measures will remain until needed EOP revisions, plant modifications, or further analysis are made to address this condition. This condition remains under evaluation in accordance with the Millstone Corrective Action Program."
The Licensee has informed the NRC Resident of this event.
"This report is being submitted to report an unanalyzed condition that could significantly degrade plant safety in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). As the result of an engineering analysis, it was determined that the fire safe shutdown strategy may not be adequate to ensure that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown for certain fire scenarios.
"On January 16, 2003, with Millstone Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power, and as a result of transient analysis of certain fire shutdown scenarios, it was determined that postulated extended loss of all seal cooling events have the potential for over-pressurization of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) No.1 seal leak-off line. The RCP No. 1 seal return line is designed to recover low pressure and temperature leak-off volume and return it to the volume control tank or charging pump suction. In response to a Cable Spreading Area, Control Room, or Instrument Rack Room fire, operation could be impacted because Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) may not adequately mitigate the scenario where a loss of all RCP seal cooling results in increased RCP seal leakage. This increased seal leakage assumption causes above normal pressure and temperature fluid conditions within the No. 1 seal return line. The over-pressurization that may occur could challenge the seal leak-off line structural integrity and a pressure boundary failure is considered possible. Per BTP 9.5-1, the credited injection pathway needs to be sufficient to preclude draining of the pressurizer below the indicating range. Because this condition would significantly complicate shutdown in the event of fire in these areas, this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"This condition assumes a fire of sufficient magnitude to cause a loss of all AC power which results in an extended loss of all seal cooling. This is considered to be a low probability event.
"Compensatory measures are in place and include continuous fire watches in the Cable Spreading Area and the Instrument Rack Room. The continuous fire watch in the Control Room is satisfied by the presence of the Control Room staff. Additional fire extinguishers in impacted areas are in place. Administrative control requiring prior Shift Manager approval have been implemented to set limits on ignition source permits, use of transient combustibles, and use of flammable liquids within the impacted areas. Compensatory measures will remain until needed EOP revisions, plant modifications, or further analysis are made to address this condition. This condition remains under evaluation in accordance with the Millstone Corrective Action Program."
The Licensee has informed the NRC Resident of this event.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39517
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ABB INCORPORATED
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: 03211250000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: ABB INCORPORATED
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: 03211250000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/17/2003
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2003
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2003
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2003
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
LEAKING PROMETHIUM - 147 SOURCE
The licensee informed the Ohio Department of Health on 1/16/03 of a leaking Pm-147 source possibly caused by a defective or failed material. The source had been received by ABB from a customer in Japan (Yokagawa Electric). The source was contained and no spread of contamination was detected. ABB will inform the facility in Japan and properly dispose of the source. The leaking source was a 70 millicurie Pm-147, ABB model S-11.
*****UPDATE BY FAX ON 2/11/03 AT 11:30 FROM MIKE SNEE TO RICH LAURA*****
The leaking source was an ABB model S-20 instead of the earlier reported model S-11.
Notified NMSS (F. Brown) and R3DO (S. Burgess).
The licensee informed the Ohio Department of Health on 1/16/03 of a leaking Pm-147 source possibly caused by a defective or failed material. The source had been received by ABB from a customer in Japan (Yokagawa Electric). The source was contained and no spread of contamination was detected. ABB will inform the facility in Japan and properly dispose of the source. The leaking source was a 70 millicurie Pm-147, ABB model S-11.
*****UPDATE BY FAX ON 2/11/03 AT 11:30 FROM MIKE SNEE TO RICH LAURA*****
The leaking source was an ABB model S-20 instead of the earlier reported model S-11.
Notified NMSS (F. Brown) and R3DO (S. Burgess).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39518
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: GEOTECH ENGINEERING AND TESTING
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L03923-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Licensee: GEOTECH ENGINEERING AND TESTING
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L03923-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 01/17/2003
Notification Time: 12:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2003
Event Time: 16:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2003
Notification Time: 12:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2003
Event Time: 16:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
CATHY HANEY (IAT)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
CATHY HANEY (IAT)
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FOR STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"Event location: Near intersection of Milam and 700 block of Clay Road, Houston, Texas (Downtown)
"Event type: RAM Stolen (Stolen Moisture-Density Gauge)
"Notifications: TDH Medical Duty Officer, TDH/BRC, City of Houston Police Department
"Event description: Driver/operator returned to his vehicle at completion of the work day (construction site for a Houston Metro Station) and discovered the nuclear moisture density gauge and case are missing from his truck. The chain and lock were still attached to the truck. The company believes the gauge handle and latch were pried from the case. The gauge and case are missing. The missing gauge is a Troxler Model 3411B, Serial No. 20098, with two sealed sources: 8 millicuries of Cs-137, Serial No. 751355; and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be, Serial No. 4715582".
"Event location: Near intersection of Milam and 700 block of Clay Road, Houston, Texas (Downtown)
"Event type: RAM Stolen (Stolen Moisture-Density Gauge)
"Notifications: TDH Medical Duty Officer, TDH/BRC, City of Houston Police Department
"Event description: Driver/operator returned to his vehicle at completion of the work day (construction site for a Houston Metro Station) and discovered the nuclear moisture density gauge and case are missing from his truck. The chain and lock were still attached to the truck. The company believes the gauge handle and latch were pried from the case. The gauge and case are missing. The missing gauge is a Troxler Model 3411B, Serial No. 20098, with two sealed sources: 8 millicuries of Cs-137, Serial No. 751355; and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be, Serial No. 4715582".