Event Notification Report for January 14, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/13/2003 - 01/14/2003
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39512
Rep Org: ROCKBESTOS-SUPRENANT CABLE CORP.
Licensee: ROCKBESTOS-SUPRENANT CABLE CORP.
Region: 1
City: EAST GRANBY State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD C. BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: ROCKBESTOS-SUPRENANT CABLE CORP.
Region: 1
City: EAST GRANBY State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD C. BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/15/2003
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2003
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
JACK FOSTER (NRR)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
JACK FOSTER (NRR)
INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF 10 CFR PART 21 DEFECT/FAILURE TO COMPLY
"The following information is supplied in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.
"I. Name and address of individual informing the Commission:
[Deleted]
"II. Identification of the basic component supplied which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The KXL 760D insulation system (chemically crosslinked only) provided in some of the Firewall III cables manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 may include an alternate resin which was not part of the baseline qualification testing.
"III. Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp., East Granby, CT facility.
"IV. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created:
"Nature of Defect: An alternate resin material may have been substituted in the insulation system for Firewall III cables (chemically crosslinked cables only).
Potential Hazard: The chemically cured insulation system utilizing KXL 760D for cables manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 may not be enveloped by qualification report QR5804.
"V. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
"On the basis of our evaluation it was determined on January 14, 2003 that a defect or failure to comply as defined by 10 CFR 21 existed.
"VI. The number and location of all basic components which contain a defect or falls to comply:
"The number and location of all basic components which may contain a defect or fail to comply is yet to be determined.
"VII. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
"Based on testing and analysis, both resin suppliers indicated that both resins were quite similar and they were not able to distinguish or identify one resin from the other. Documented evidence of their conclusion has been requested. Rockbestos-Surprenant has instituted a similarity analysis program on both resins that is expected to be completed by March 14, 2003. Preliminary test results indicate that the two resins are indistinguishable. A full report will be available upon completion of the similarity analysis program.
" VIII. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers:
"Purchasers will be advised not to install any Firewall III cables that employ the chemically cured insulation material that were manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 until the results of the similarity program are known. Further advice will be provided at that time."
* * * * WRITTEN NOTIFICATION UPDATE RECEIVED BY LETTER ON 2/21/03 BY MIKE RIPLEY * * *
The following changes to Sections VII and VIII were provided in the written notification:
"VII. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
"Rockbestos-Surprenant has implemented a two step process to evaluate the potential effect on baseline qualification arising from use of the alternate resin.
"Step 1:
"Because the two resins are so similar, locating finished cable for testing was not immediately feasible. In order to completely explore this avenue, samples containing both the qualified and alternate resins were sent by Rockbestos-Surprenant to both resin manufacturers to use whatever methods available to differentiate their resin in the finished material. If an analytical method could be found to identify the resin used, Rockbestos-Surprenant would look to the utilities to find inventory containing the alternate resin. Based on the cable available, an appropriate test program could be established to document qualification. Both suppliers have indicated, however, that they were not able to identify their resin in the sample provided.
"Step 2
"Based on the limited availability of the alternate resin (discontinued in 1995) a similarity analysis program has been established by Rockbestos-Surprenant which is running in parallel with Step 1 that will compare the two resins. The program has been designed to address electrical performance, dielectric strength, physical properties, heat aging to end of life condition, irradiation with 200 Mrad exposure, and moisture absorption. FTIR scans will be generated for both finished samples including the starting resins for comparison. Testing is scheduled to be completed by March 14, 2003. Preliminary test results indicate that the two resins are indistinguishable. A frill report will be available upon completion of the test comparison program.
"Additionally, third party testing consideration is being given regarding a proposed test program designed for analysis and identification of the resins. The submitted test program is currently being evaluated by Rockbestos-Surprenant.
" VIII. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers:
"Purchasers are being advised not to install Firewall III cables that employ the chemically cured insulation material that was manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 until the results of the test comparison program are known. Further advice will be provided at that time."
Notified R1 DO (C. Anderson), R2 DO (C. Ogle), R4 DO (J. Madera), R4 DO (K. Kennedy), NRR (J. Foster), NMSS (R. Torres)
"The following information is supplied in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.
"I. Name and address of individual informing the Commission:
[Deleted]
"II. Identification of the basic component supplied which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The KXL 760D insulation system (chemically crosslinked only) provided in some of the Firewall III cables manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 may include an alternate resin which was not part of the baseline qualification testing.
"III. Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp., East Granby, CT facility.
"IV. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created:
"Nature of Defect: An alternate resin material may have been substituted in the insulation system for Firewall III cables (chemically crosslinked cables only).
Potential Hazard: The chemically cured insulation system utilizing KXL 760D for cables manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 may not be enveloped by qualification report QR5804.
"V. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
"On the basis of our evaluation it was determined on January 14, 2003 that a defect or failure to comply as defined by 10 CFR 21 existed.
"VI. The number and location of all basic components which contain a defect or falls to comply:
"The number and location of all basic components which may contain a defect or fail to comply is yet to be determined.
"VII. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
"Based on testing and analysis, both resin suppliers indicated that both resins were quite similar and they were not able to distinguish or identify one resin from the other. Documented evidence of their conclusion has been requested. Rockbestos-Surprenant has instituted a similarity analysis program on both resins that is expected to be completed by March 14, 2003. Preliminary test results indicate that the two resins are indistinguishable. A full report will be available upon completion of the similarity analysis program.
" VIII. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers:
"Purchasers will be advised not to install any Firewall III cables that employ the chemically cured insulation material that were manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 until the results of the similarity program are known. Further advice will be provided at that time."
* * * * WRITTEN NOTIFICATION UPDATE RECEIVED BY LETTER ON 2/21/03 BY MIKE RIPLEY * * *
The following changes to Sections VII and VIII were provided in the written notification:
"VII. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
"Rockbestos-Surprenant has implemented a two step process to evaluate the potential effect on baseline qualification arising from use of the alternate resin.
"Step 1:
"Because the two resins are so similar, locating finished cable for testing was not immediately feasible. In order to completely explore this avenue, samples containing both the qualified and alternate resins were sent by Rockbestos-Surprenant to both resin manufacturers to use whatever methods available to differentiate their resin in the finished material. If an analytical method could be found to identify the resin used, Rockbestos-Surprenant would look to the utilities to find inventory containing the alternate resin. Based on the cable available, an appropriate test program could be established to document qualification. Both suppliers have indicated, however, that they were not able to identify their resin in the sample provided.
"Step 2
"Based on the limited availability of the alternate resin (discontinued in 1995) a similarity analysis program has been established by Rockbestos-Surprenant which is running in parallel with Step 1 that will compare the two resins. The program has been designed to address electrical performance, dielectric strength, physical properties, heat aging to end of life condition, irradiation with 200 Mrad exposure, and moisture absorption. FTIR scans will be generated for both finished samples including the starting resins for comparison. Testing is scheduled to be completed by March 14, 2003. Preliminary test results indicate that the two resins are indistinguishable. A frill report will be available upon completion of the test comparison program.
"Additionally, third party testing consideration is being given regarding a proposed test program designed for analysis and identification of the resins. The submitted test program is currently being evaluated by Rockbestos-Surprenant.
" VIII. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers:
"Purchasers are being advised not to install Firewall III cables that employ the chemically cured insulation material that was manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 until the results of the test comparison program are known. Further advice will be provided at that time."
Notified R1 DO (C. Anderson), R2 DO (C. Ogle), R4 DO (J. Madera), R4 DO (K. Kennedy), NRR (J. Foster), NMSS (R. Torres)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39507
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALISON MACKELLAR
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALISON MACKELLAR
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 01/14/2003
Notification Time: 04:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2003
Event Time: 01:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2003
Notification Time: 04:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2003
Event Time: 01:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHAFT VIBRATION
"At 0137 hours, with Surry Power Station Unit 1 at 100% reactor power, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to elevated shaft vibrations (alert and danger) on 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump.
"IRPI indication for one control rod indicated 25 steps following the trip. Borated as necessary to ensure adequate shutdown margin. All other control rods fully inserted into the core as designed. The IRPI indication for this rod is trending down at this time. The shutdown margin for Unit 1 was determined to be satisfactory. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator level following the trip. Primary RCS temperature decreased to approximately 541 degrees following the reactor trip and was stabilized at 547 degrees.
"No primary safety or power operated relief valves were actuated during the event. As a result of the loss of turbine load, the secondary power operated relief valves actuated during the transient. No indication of primary to secondary leakage exists, therefore no adverse radiological consequences resulted from this event.
"All electrical busses transferred properly following the trip. #1 EDG was T/O [tagged out] prior to unit trip. All other emergency diesel generators are operable. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. The cause of the event is being investigated.
"Unit 1 is currently at Hot Shutdown with RCS temperature being maintained at approximately 547 degrees. Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains stable at 100% power operations. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
"At 0137 hours, with Surry Power Station Unit 1 at 100% reactor power, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to elevated shaft vibrations (alert and danger) on 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump.
"IRPI indication for one control rod indicated 25 steps following the trip. Borated as necessary to ensure adequate shutdown margin. All other control rods fully inserted into the core as designed. The IRPI indication for this rod is trending down at this time. The shutdown margin for Unit 1 was determined to be satisfactory. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator level following the trip. Primary RCS temperature decreased to approximately 541 degrees following the reactor trip and was stabilized at 547 degrees.
"No primary safety or power operated relief valves were actuated during the event. As a result of the loss of turbine load, the secondary power operated relief valves actuated during the transient. No indication of primary to secondary leakage exists, therefore no adverse radiological consequences resulted from this event.
"All electrical busses transferred properly following the trip. #1 EDG was T/O [tagged out] prior to unit trip. All other emergency diesel generators are operable. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. The cause of the event is being investigated.
"Unit 1 is currently at Hot Shutdown with RCS temperature being maintained at approximately 547 degrees. Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains stable at 100% power operations. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Hospital
Event Number: 39509
Rep Org: ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Licensee: ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: 37-01317-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE OCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Licensee: ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: 37-01317-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE OCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 01/15/2003
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2003
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
ESTIMATED OVEREXPOSURE TO SKIN OR EXTREMITIES > 50 REM
An employee at the hospital was found to have an estimated 6 microcuries of I-131 contamination on his right index finger. It is suspected that he received the contamination while working in the hot lab. Decontamination efforts are in progress at this time. There is no spread of contamination in the hot lab and an investigation is in progress. The estimated exposure to the finger is > 50 Rem.
An employee at the hospital was found to have an estimated 6 microcuries of I-131 contamination on his right index finger. It is suspected that he received the contamination while working in the hot lab. Decontamination efforts are in progress at this time. There is no spread of contamination in the hot lab and an investigation is in progress. The estimated exposure to the finger is > 50 Rem.