Event Notification Report for January 12, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/11/2003 - 01/12/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39503
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MR HARBOR
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MR HARBOR
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 01/12/2003
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2003
Event Time: 13:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2003
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2003
Event Time: 13:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF MET TOWER DATA
"Event: On January 7, 2003 the Primary Meteorological (Met) Tower was removed from service to repair
the 76-meter wind direction function. Removing the primary tower from service results in all
functions (i.e. wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature) being declared INOPERABLE.
On January 12, 2003 at 1310, the 60-meter air temperature for the Back-up Meteorological Tower
was declared INOPERABLE due to faulty readings.
"Effects on Plant: This has resulted in a loss of the capability to determine differential temperature for emergency
assessment (plume}.
"Cause: The cause of the faulty Back-up Met Tower 60-meter temperature indication is under
investigation. The Primary Met tower is INOPERABLE because it is disabled to correct the 76-
meter wind direction function.
"Actions Taken or Planned: 1) The portable meteorological monitoring system is being placed in-service per Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Equipment Control Guideline (ECG) 40.l-B.1. This restores differential temperature monitoring capability. 2) DCPP maintenance personnel have been dispatched to repair either the primary or back-up tower. The plant will remain in a 7 day ECG until either towers air temperature monitoring function has been restored to OPERABLE status."
The NRC Resident Inspector. has been notified.
"Event: On January 7, 2003 the Primary Meteorological (Met) Tower was removed from service to repair
the 76-meter wind direction function. Removing the primary tower from service results in all
functions (i.e. wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature) being declared INOPERABLE.
On January 12, 2003 at 1310, the 60-meter air temperature for the Back-up Meteorological Tower
was declared INOPERABLE due to faulty readings.
"Effects on Plant: This has resulted in a loss of the capability to determine differential temperature for emergency
assessment (plume}.
"Cause: The cause of the faulty Back-up Met Tower 60-meter temperature indication is under
investigation. The Primary Met tower is INOPERABLE because it is disabled to correct the 76-
meter wind direction function.
"Actions Taken or Planned: 1) The portable meteorological monitoring system is being placed in-service per Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Equipment Control Guideline (ECG) 40.l-B.1. This restores differential temperature monitoring capability. 2) DCPP maintenance personnel have been dispatched to repair either the primary or back-up tower. The plant will remain in a 7 day ECG until either towers air temperature monitoring function has been restored to OPERABLE status."
The NRC Resident Inspector. has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39504
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 01/12/2003
Notification Time: 18:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2003
Event Time: 15:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2003
Notification Time: 18:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2003
Event Time: 15:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC SCRAM ON LOWERING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DUE TO FEED PUMP TRIP
"Unit 1 was operating at 94 percent power (presently max power) when 1B Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) low oil pressure annunciator was received coincident with 1B RFP trip at 1552. Reactor water level lowered and initiated an automatic SCRAM as the Reactor Operator was inserting a manual SCRAM at 1553. All systems initiated and isolated as required. A group 6 [containment atmospheric and sampling] and Group 2 [drywell floor equipment drain isolation valves] isolation was received on low Reactor water level and verified. The Emergency Diesel Generators started as expected due to a reverse power lockout of the main generator. After the SCRAM the 1A RFP tripped on high water level. Prior to restarting a RFP a second SCRAM signal was received on low level. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started to restore level while the reactor feed pump was being restarted. The preliminary investigation indicates that the running lube oil pump on the 1B RFP tripped. The standby lube oil pump started however, apparently, did not recover lube oil pressure in time to prevent a trip of 1B RFP."
All control rods properly inserted into the reactor core. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"Unit 1 was operating at 94 percent power (presently max power) when 1B Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) low oil pressure annunciator was received coincident with 1B RFP trip at 1552. Reactor water level lowered and initiated an automatic SCRAM as the Reactor Operator was inserting a manual SCRAM at 1553. All systems initiated and isolated as required. A group 6 [containment atmospheric and sampling] and Group 2 [drywell floor equipment drain isolation valves] isolation was received on low Reactor water level and verified. The Emergency Diesel Generators started as expected due to a reverse power lockout of the main generator. After the SCRAM the 1A RFP tripped on high water level. Prior to restarting a RFP a second SCRAM signal was received on low level. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started to restore level while the reactor feed pump was being restarted. The preliminary investigation indicates that the running lube oil pump on the 1B RFP tripped. The standby lube oil pump started however, apparently, did not recover lube oil pressure in time to prevent a trip of 1B RFP."
All control rods properly inserted into the reactor core. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39505
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RITA BRADDICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RITA BRADDICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 01/13/2003
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2003
Event Time: 23:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2003
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2003
Event Time: 23:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OPEN DUCTWORK ACCESS PANEL PREVENTED MAINTAINING CONTROL ROOM POSITIVE PRESSURE
"On January 12, 2003 at 2304, control room pressure was observed to be negative. At the time the "A" Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system was tagged out for scheduled maintenance. The event was initiated when technicians opened an access panel on the "A" CREF control room air supply duct within the control room boundary to repair a gasket. This resulted in both "A" and "B" trains of CREF unable to perform its design safety function: specifically, maintaining the control room at a 1/8 inch water gauge positive pressure relative to adjacent areas. Without assurance of CREF system providing positive pressure in the control room, mitigating the consequences of an accident could have been prevented. Upon discovering the cause, technicians were ordered to close the access panel. Control room pressure promptly returned to a normal, positive value. Total time at negative pressure was ten minutes. No unexpected response was experienced. In addition to the "A" CREF train, the "A" Hydrogen/Oxygen analyzer was inoperable at the time of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
"On January 12, 2003 at 2304, control room pressure was observed to be negative. At the time the "A" Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system was tagged out for scheduled maintenance. The event was initiated when technicians opened an access panel on the "A" CREF control room air supply duct within the control room boundary to repair a gasket. This resulted in both "A" and "B" trains of CREF unable to perform its design safety function: specifically, maintaining the control room at a 1/8 inch water gauge positive pressure relative to adjacent areas. Without assurance of CREF system providing positive pressure in the control room, mitigating the consequences of an accident could have been prevented. Upon discovering the cause, technicians were ordered to close the access panel. Control room pressure promptly returned to a normal, positive value. Total time at negative pressure was ten minutes. No unexpected response was experienced. In addition to the "A" CREF train, the "A" Hydrogen/Oxygen analyzer was inoperable at the time of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.