Event Notification Report for December 23, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/22/2002 - 12/23/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39467
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRY DOE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRY DOE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 12/23/2002
Notification Time: 02:53 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2002
Event Time: 01:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2002
Notification Time: 02:53 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2002
Event Time: 01:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
J. BRADLEY FEWELL (R1)
J. BRADLEY FEWELL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY MAIN GENERATOR TRIP
Automatic reactor trip caused by main generator backup relay protection trip. The plant currently is stable in mode 3 with Auxiliary Feedwater in service for decay heat removal. All control rods fully inserted, no primary relief valves lifted and no ECCS actuation occurred. The Licensee reports that the electrical grid is stable and all emergency diesels are available.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0913 EST 12/23/02 BRUCE PARRISH TO MIKE NORRIS * * *
The Licensee reported an automatic initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater due to steam generator Lo Lo level (setpoint 27%) during the trip, which is an 8 hour non-emergency notification of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A), Specified System Actuation.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Automatic reactor trip caused by main generator backup relay protection trip. The plant currently is stable in mode 3 with Auxiliary Feedwater in service for decay heat removal. All control rods fully inserted, no primary relief valves lifted and no ECCS actuation occurred. The Licensee reports that the electrical grid is stable and all emergency diesels are available.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 0913 EST 12/23/02 BRUCE PARRISH TO MIKE NORRIS * * *
The Licensee reported an automatic initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater due to steam generator Lo Lo level (setpoint 27%) during the trip, which is an 8 hour non-emergency notification of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A), Specified System Actuation.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39468
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ROGER SHAFFER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ROGER SHAFFER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/23/2002
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2002
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2003
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2002
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITOR CHANNEL OUT OF SERVICE
At 1300 on 12/23/02, it was determined that two vent caps were found removed from the supply and return headers on the right channel of the containment hydrogen monitor, EC-162, which constituted a reportable condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), 8-hour report. This is based on a release path available such that if the hydrogen monitor was placed in service, post-accident, the site release limits could be exceeded. Also, with the openings in the supply and return lines, a valid hydrogen concentration could not be obtained. As a result, operator action to place the hydrogen recombiner in service could have been missed. There are no indications that these caps were removed maliciously or as an act of sabotage. It should be noted that the other (left channel) hydrogen monitor is the preferred monitor to be placed in service due to input to the Emergency Response Data System. Both the 3/8 inch vent caps were re-installed upon discovery.
The licensee stated that no recent maintenance in the area. The last time the vent caps were known to be removed were in May, 2001 for testing. The caps were documented as being re-installed after the test was complete.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/20/03 @ 1041 BY MALONE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT
An analysis has since determined that the potential release from the uninstalled pipe caps and the potential delay in placing a hydrogen recombiner in service are bounded by their respective analyses of record, considering reasonable assumptions of recognition of the condition from available indications.
Consequently, there was no condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Region 3 RDO(Madera) was notified.
At 1300 on 12/23/02, it was determined that two vent caps were found removed from the supply and return headers on the right channel of the containment hydrogen monitor, EC-162, which constituted a reportable condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), 8-hour report. This is based on a release path available such that if the hydrogen monitor was placed in service, post-accident, the site release limits could be exceeded. Also, with the openings in the supply and return lines, a valid hydrogen concentration could not be obtained. As a result, operator action to place the hydrogen recombiner in service could have been missed. There are no indications that these caps were removed maliciously or as an act of sabotage. It should be noted that the other (left channel) hydrogen monitor is the preferred monitor to be placed in service due to input to the Emergency Response Data System. Both the 3/8 inch vent caps were re-installed upon discovery.
The licensee stated that no recent maintenance in the area. The last time the vent caps were known to be removed were in May, 2001 for testing. The caps were documented as being re-installed after the test was complete.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/20/03 @ 1041 BY MALONE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT
An analysis has since determined that the potential release from the uninstalled pipe caps and the potential delay in placing a hydrogen recombiner in service are bounded by their respective analyses of record, considering reasonable assumptions of recognition of the condition from available indications.
Consequently, there was no condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Region 3 RDO(Madera) was notified.