Event Notification Report for December 01, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/30/2002 - 12/01/2002
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39413
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 12/02/2002
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2002
Event Time: 17:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2002
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2002
Event Time: 17:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STATION STARTUP AND EMERGENCY STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMERS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"Available plant indicators showed that main generator output exceeded 150 MVARs [million volt-amperes reactive] for approximately 4 minutes due to local grid conditions at 17:33 hours on December 1, 2002. The maximum value noted was 155 MVARs. Recent analysis and procedural guidance requires the two offsite power sources, consisting of the Station Startup Service Transformer and the Emergency Station Service Transformer to be declared inoperable above 150 MVARs. The grid operator was contacted and action was taken to lower local MVARs to below the allowed limit. The offsite power sources were declared operable at 17:37 hours."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION FROM COY BLAIR TO MIKE RIPLEY ON 12/6/02 AT 1358 EST * * * *
"EN # 39413 reported declaring both off-site power sources inoperable due to generator MVAR output being above procedural limitations. An updated loadflow analysis was performed to evaluate off-site grid response under the conditions existing at the time of the event. The results of this evaluation demonstrated that procedural MVAR limits were conservative and that off-site power sources remained operable during the period of time that generator MVAR output was above procedural limitations."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (W. Jones).
"Available plant indicators showed that main generator output exceeded 150 MVARs [million volt-amperes reactive] for approximately 4 minutes due to local grid conditions at 17:33 hours on December 1, 2002. The maximum value noted was 155 MVARs. Recent analysis and procedural guidance requires the two offsite power sources, consisting of the Station Startup Service Transformer and the Emergency Station Service Transformer to be declared inoperable above 150 MVARs. The grid operator was contacted and action was taken to lower local MVARs to below the allowed limit. The offsite power sources were declared operable at 17:37 hours."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION FROM COY BLAIR TO MIKE RIPLEY ON 12/6/02 AT 1358 EST * * * *
"EN # 39413 reported declaring both off-site power sources inoperable due to generator MVAR output being above procedural limitations. An updated loadflow analysis was performed to evaluate off-site grid response under the conditions existing at the time of the event. The results of this evaluation demonstrated that procedural MVAR limits were conservative and that off-site power sources remained operable during the period of time that generator MVAR output was above procedural limitations."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (W. Jones).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39414
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GERLING
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GERLING
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 12/02/2002
Notification Time: 01:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2002
Event Time: 21:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2002
Notification Time: 01:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2002
Event Time: 21:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF MAIN GENERATOR LOAD
"At 2154 hours on December 1, 2002, an automatic reactor trip occurred on loss of main generator load. The loss of load trip occurred when the main generator tripped due to a fault in the plant switchyard. The switchyard fault was caused when the ground wire on the 345 KV transmission tower which is immediately adjacent to the plant switchyard fell and came in contact with switchyard 'R' bus. When the main generator tripped, and with the switchyard 'R' bus de-energized as a result of the fault, the cooling tower pumps, condensate pumps, and primary coolant pumps lost power. The steam driven main feedwater pumps tripped due to loss of suction pressure when the condensate pumps tripped. The reactor trip occurred as expected with all full-length control rods fully inserted. With the loss of the main feedwater pumps the auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected and is currently providing core heat removal. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 on natural circulation.
"Palisades Switchyard Configuration
"The Palisades switchyard is comprised of two 345 KV busses, the 'F' (Front) and 'R' (Rear) busses. The plant's Safeguards transformer is fed from the 'F' bus. The plant's vital AC busses are normally aligned to the Safeguards transformer and remained powered throughout the event. The plant's Startup transformer is fed from the 'R' bus. The plant's non-vital AC busses would normally transfer to the Startup transformer on a reactor trip. However, with the 'R' bus deenergized the Startup transformer was not available and therefore power was lost to the cooling tower pumps, condensate pumps, and primary coolant pumps.
"Core Heat Removal
"Core heat removal is being provided by the auxiliary feedwater system with steaming to atmosphere via the atmospheric steam dump valves. The auxiliary feedwater system is comprised of three, full capacity, auxiliary feedwater pumps (two motor driven pumps and one steam driven pump). The motor driven pumps are powered from the plant's vital AC busses. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps are operable and one pump is in service providing core heat removal.
"Extra precautions have been taken to ensure the operability of the auxiliary feedwater pumps and their power supplies, including the vital AC busses, their associated diesel generators, and the offsite circuit from the Safeguards transformer.
"Plant Technical Specifications
"The following three Technical Specification LCO Conditions apply as a result of the loss of the switchyard 'R' bus:
"Condition 3.8.1A, One offsite circuit inoperable.
"Condition 3.4.5A, One required PCS loop inoperable.
"Condition 3.4.5C, No PCS loop OPERABLE."
The Licensee reports that there is no primary to secondary leakage in the steam generators.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 2154 hours on December 1, 2002, an automatic reactor trip occurred on loss of main generator load. The loss of load trip occurred when the main generator tripped due to a fault in the plant switchyard. The switchyard fault was caused when the ground wire on the 345 KV transmission tower which is immediately adjacent to the plant switchyard fell and came in contact with switchyard 'R' bus. When the main generator tripped, and with the switchyard 'R' bus de-energized as a result of the fault, the cooling tower pumps, condensate pumps, and primary coolant pumps lost power. The steam driven main feedwater pumps tripped due to loss of suction pressure when the condensate pumps tripped. The reactor trip occurred as expected with all full-length control rods fully inserted. With the loss of the main feedwater pumps the auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected and is currently providing core heat removal. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 on natural circulation.
"Palisades Switchyard Configuration
"The Palisades switchyard is comprised of two 345 KV busses, the 'F' (Front) and 'R' (Rear) busses. The plant's Safeguards transformer is fed from the 'F' bus. The plant's vital AC busses are normally aligned to the Safeguards transformer and remained powered throughout the event. The plant's Startup transformer is fed from the 'R' bus. The plant's non-vital AC busses would normally transfer to the Startup transformer on a reactor trip. However, with the 'R' bus deenergized the Startup transformer was not available and therefore power was lost to the cooling tower pumps, condensate pumps, and primary coolant pumps.
"Core Heat Removal
"Core heat removal is being provided by the auxiliary feedwater system with steaming to atmosphere via the atmospheric steam dump valves. The auxiliary feedwater system is comprised of three, full capacity, auxiliary feedwater pumps (two motor driven pumps and one steam driven pump). The motor driven pumps are powered from the plant's vital AC busses. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps are operable and one pump is in service providing core heat removal.
"Extra precautions have been taken to ensure the operability of the auxiliary feedwater pumps and their power supplies, including the vital AC busses, their associated diesel generators, and the offsite circuit from the Safeguards transformer.
"Plant Technical Specifications
"The following three Technical Specification LCO Conditions apply as a result of the loss of the switchyard 'R' bus:
"Condition 3.8.1A, One offsite circuit inoperable.
"Condition 3.4.5A, One required PCS loop inoperable.
"Condition 3.4.5C, No PCS loop OPERABLE."
The Licensee reports that there is no primary to secondary leakage in the steam generators.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.