Event Notification Report for November 26, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/25/2002 - 11/26/2002
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39406
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FRANZEN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FRANZEN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 11/26/2002
Notification Time: 08:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2002
Event Time: 03:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2002
Notification Time: 08:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2002
Event Time: 03:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
Unit 2 HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) system was declared inoperable at 0342 [CST] due to a failed relay for the MGU (Motor Gear Unit) flow control circuit. The relay is normally energized when the MGU is at the High Speed Stop and is utilized to de-energize the motor gear unit when a limit switch is reached to prevent damage to the MGU motor. The resultant failure affects HPCI such that the MGU will not function from a signal generated by the Flow Indicating Controller. HPCI can be operated manually from [the] Control Room.
The Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
*** EVENT RETRACTION FROM ROBERT BROCH TO ARLON COSTA ON 12/30/02 AT 1326 ***
"On November 26, 2002 at 0724 CST, Dresden Station made an ENS Notification (EN 39406) regarding a High Pressure Coolant Injection inoperability due to a failed relay for the Motor Gear Unit (MGU) flow control circuit. It was reported that the failed relay affected HPCI such that the MGU would not function from a signal generated by the Flow Indicating Controller. The MGU was capable of being operated from the Control Switch in the Control Room at all times. The condition was reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as reduction in accident mitigation capability.
"Upon further evaluation of the issue, the following conclusions were reached: In the event that HPCI would have automatically initiated following the failure of the relay, the Motor Speed Changer (MSC) would have run to the High Speed Stop (HSS). When the turbine reached 4000 rpm and flow increased the MGU would have remained at the HSS. Therefore, HPCI would have continued to operate at 4000 rpm and maximum injection flow (>5000 gpm) until the system restored reactor water level to +48" (at which point the turbine trips) or the Control Room Operator took manual control. It is important to note at this point that even if the flow controller circuitry is operational, the system would have responded in the same manner described above. If no operator action was assumed following the relay failure, HPCI would have increased reactor water level to the high water trip for break sizes within its capability.
"NUREG 1022 states that the intent of the 10 CFR 50.72 and 50 .73 reporting criteria is to capture events where there would have been a failure of a safety system to properly complete a safety function. In the above described condition, the HPCI system was still capable to perform its intended safety function. The system would have automatically started on an initiation signal, come up to speed (4000 rpm), and provided >5000 gpm to the reactor vessel. Additionally, the restart capability of the system was not affected by the relay failure. Therefore, the system would have operated long enough to complete its intended safety function as defined in the safety analysis report.
"Based on the above evaluation, HPCI was capable of performing its functions as specified in the Technical Specifications, the safety analysis report and met all of the operability requirements specified by the plant licensing basis.
Based on these conclusions, EN #39406 is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector and the R3DO(Lanksbury) were notified.
Unit 2 HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) system was declared inoperable at 0342 [CST] due to a failed relay for the MGU (Motor Gear Unit) flow control circuit. The relay is normally energized when the MGU is at the High Speed Stop and is utilized to de-energize the motor gear unit when a limit switch is reached to prevent damage to the MGU motor. The resultant failure affects HPCI such that the MGU will not function from a signal generated by the Flow Indicating Controller. HPCI can be operated manually from [the] Control Room.
The Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
*** EVENT RETRACTION FROM ROBERT BROCH TO ARLON COSTA ON 12/30/02 AT 1326 ***
"On November 26, 2002 at 0724 CST, Dresden Station made an ENS Notification (EN 39406) regarding a High Pressure Coolant Injection inoperability due to a failed relay for the Motor Gear Unit (MGU) flow control circuit. It was reported that the failed relay affected HPCI such that the MGU would not function from a signal generated by the Flow Indicating Controller. The MGU was capable of being operated from the Control Switch in the Control Room at all times. The condition was reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as reduction in accident mitigation capability.
"Upon further evaluation of the issue, the following conclusions were reached: In the event that HPCI would have automatically initiated following the failure of the relay, the Motor Speed Changer (MSC) would have run to the High Speed Stop (HSS). When the turbine reached 4000 rpm and flow increased the MGU would have remained at the HSS. Therefore, HPCI would have continued to operate at 4000 rpm and maximum injection flow (>5000 gpm) until the system restored reactor water level to +48" (at which point the turbine trips) or the Control Room Operator took manual control. It is important to note at this point that even if the flow controller circuitry is operational, the system would have responded in the same manner described above. If no operator action was assumed following the relay failure, HPCI would have increased reactor water level to the high water trip for break sizes within its capability.
"NUREG 1022 states that the intent of the 10 CFR 50.72 and 50 .73 reporting criteria is to capture events where there would have been a failure of a safety system to properly complete a safety function. In the above described condition, the HPCI system was still capable to perform its intended safety function. The system would have automatically started on an initiation signal, come up to speed (4000 rpm), and provided >5000 gpm to the reactor vessel. Additionally, the restart capability of the system was not affected by the relay failure. Therefore, the system would have operated long enough to complete its intended safety function as defined in the safety analysis report.
"Based on the above evaluation, HPCI was capable of performing its functions as specified in the Technical Specifications, the safety analysis report and met all of the operability requirements specified by the plant licensing basis.
Based on these conclusions, EN #39406 is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector and the R3DO(Lanksbury) were notified.
Hospital
Event Number: 39432
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: LAREDO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: LAREDO State: TX
County:
License #: L02192-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: JASON FLEMMING
Licensee: LAREDO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: LAREDO State: TX
County:
License #: L02192-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: JASON FLEMMING
Notification Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON AN I-131 SPILL AT A TEXAS HOSPITAL
"Patient was administered an I-131 capsule for ablation therapy on November 26, 2002. A fragment was dropped on the floor. The fragment was measured to contain 13 millicuries of I-131. A contamination survey of the room determined that an area by the sink and an area by the imaging table revealed contamination. The room was sealed off, contamination by the sink was determined to have contamination in the amount of 2 millirem/hour near the sink and 1.6 millirem /hour near the imaging table. After decontamination the room was re-surveyed with the result of 1.6 millirem/hour near the sink and 0.8 millirem/hour. Wipe tests were sent to the nuclear pharmacy for analysis. Results of the analysis indicated 87,313 dpm near the sink and 1,229 dpm near the imaging table. With readings still above the action limits for contamination the facility closed the room for four (4) weeks. At that time additional wipe tests will be conducted and submitted to the nuclear pharmacy for analysis. Bioassay of personnel performing decontamination were conducted 24-hours after the clean-up with no action required for the clean-up crew. The fragment of the capsule was packaged in a lead container and returned to the nuclear pharmacy for disposal."
"Patient was administered an I-131 capsule for ablation therapy on November 26, 2002. A fragment was dropped on the floor. The fragment was measured to contain 13 millicuries of I-131. A contamination survey of the room determined that an area by the sink and an area by the imaging table revealed contamination. The room was sealed off, contamination by the sink was determined to have contamination in the amount of 2 millirem/hour near the sink and 1.6 millirem /hour near the imaging table. After decontamination the room was re-surveyed with the result of 1.6 millirem/hour near the sink and 0.8 millirem/hour. Wipe tests were sent to the nuclear pharmacy for analysis. Results of the analysis indicated 87,313 dpm near the sink and 1,229 dpm near the imaging table. With readings still above the action limits for contamination the facility closed the room for four (4) weeks. At that time additional wipe tests will be conducted and submitted to the nuclear pharmacy for analysis. Bioassay of personnel performing decontamination were conducted 24-hours after the clean-up with no action required for the clean-up crew. The fragment of the capsule was packaged in a lead container and returned to the nuclear pharmacy for disposal."