Event Notification Report for November 21, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/20/2002 - 11/21/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
39387393883938939390
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39387
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM GORDON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM GORDON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 00:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 19:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 00:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 19:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Notifications were made to the FBI and Linn County Sheriff by the licensee. There was no impact on plant operations.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
See the HOO Log for additional information.
Notifications were made to the FBI and Linn County Sheriff by the licensee. There was no impact on plant operations.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
See the HOO Log for additional information.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39388
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN W. DAHM
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN W. DAHM
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 00:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 19:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 00:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 19:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OPRM CHANNELS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On November 21, 2002, Detroit Edison received confirmation from General Electric of a non-conservative analysis of OPRM Period Setpoint.
"The non-conservative analysis affected the OPRM [Oscillating Power Range Monitor] Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram setpoint. The RPS setpoint may result in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limits during a thermal-hydraulic instability.
"All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1 Action J requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods have been established, thus the Technical Specification has been satisfied.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
"This report is also being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(vi). Events covered in paragraph (b)(3)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"On November 21, 2002, Detroit Edison received confirmation from General Electric of a non-conservative analysis of OPRM Period Setpoint.
"The non-conservative analysis affected the OPRM [Oscillating Power Range Monitor] Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram setpoint. The RPS setpoint may result in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limits during a thermal-hydraulic instability.
"All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1 Action J requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods have been established, thus the Technical Specification has been satisfied.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
"This report is also being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(vi). Events covered in paragraph (b)(3)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39389
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN DAMPF
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN DAMPF
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 06:27 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 21:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 06:27 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 21:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
VALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING MAINTENANCE
"At 2156, 11/21/02, while performing OSP-SB-0002E, a valid actuation signal was generated that caused the 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker to trip open. The cause of the event was the inadvertent mispositioning of a rotary selector switch utilized in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) circuitry, which enabled the P-10 permissive circuit. Permissive P-10 is normally energized when power increases above 10 percent and this in turn enables a Reactor Trip permissive (P-7) for a low Pressurizer pressure reactor trip which has a setpoint of 1885 psig. Since the plant was in Mode 4 with primary system pressure at 970 psig, a valid Reactor Trip signal was generated and caused the Reactor Trip breaker to open. In addition to tripping the 'B' Reactor Trip breaker, one Source Range detector was de-energized due to energizing the P-10 permissive circuitry. All systems actuated as expected. Performance of OSP-SB-0002B was terminated, the plant was stabilized, a recovery plan was developed, and the procedure was then successfully completed. An Event Review Team (ERT) was assembled to determine the cause of the event. Additional corrective action to be taken will be based upon recommendations provided by the ERT."
The Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.
"At 2156, 11/21/02, while performing OSP-SB-0002E, a valid actuation signal was generated that caused the 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker to trip open. The cause of the event was the inadvertent mispositioning of a rotary selector switch utilized in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) circuitry, which enabled the P-10 permissive circuit. Permissive P-10 is normally energized when power increases above 10 percent and this in turn enables a Reactor Trip permissive (P-7) for a low Pressurizer pressure reactor trip which has a setpoint of 1885 psig. Since the plant was in Mode 4 with primary system pressure at 970 psig, a valid Reactor Trip signal was generated and caused the Reactor Trip breaker to open. In addition to tripping the 'B' Reactor Trip breaker, one Source Range detector was de-energized due to energizing the P-10 permissive circuitry. All systems actuated as expected. Performance of OSP-SB-0002B was terminated, the plant was stabilized, a recovery plan was developed, and the procedure was then successfully completed. An Event Review Team (ERT) was assembled to determine the cause of the event. Additional corrective action to be taken will be based upon recommendations provided by the ERT."
The Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39390
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SOIL AND TESTING INC
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 3329-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SOIL AND TESTING INC
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 3329-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 09:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2002
Event Time: 09:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DOUG BROADUS (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
DOUG BROADUS (NMSS)
STATE LICENSEE REPORTED A CPN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN
State Licensee, Southern California Soil and Testing, Inc. reported that a CPN MC-3, serial # 360203032, moisture/density gauge was stolen from the operator's vehicle in San Diego County. The gauge had been secured to the bed of the truck using a cable and locks. The cable was cut in two places and the gauge was removed. The operator was unsure of the exact location where the theft took place. He made two stops after picking the gauge up from his office, one at his home for 25 mins and one at a 7/11 store at 6:45am. He did not notice the gauge was missing from the back of his truck until an hour later when he checked to see if the gauge had shifted after braking in traffic. The gauge contained 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241:Be. The local law enforcement was notified.
State Licensee, Southern California Soil and Testing, Inc. reported that a CPN MC-3, serial # 360203032, moisture/density gauge was stolen from the operator's vehicle in San Diego County. The gauge had been secured to the bed of the truck using a cable and locks. The cable was cut in two places and the gauge was removed. The operator was unsure of the exact location where the theft took place. He made two stops after picking the gauge up from his office, one at his home for 25 mins and one at a 7/11 store at 6:45am. He did not notice the gauge was missing from the back of his truck until an hour later when he checked to see if the gauge had shifted after braking in traffic. The gauge contained 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241:Be. The local law enforcement was notified.