Event Notification Report for October 29, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/28/2002 - 10/29/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39330
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HOLTZMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HOLTZMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/29/2002
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2002
Event Time: 10:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2002
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2002
Event Time: 10:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFWS) DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 10:27 CST, the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, was declared inoperable due to the potential for fouling of the minimum recirculation orifices for each of the four AFW pumps. The mechanism identified was the potential for foreign materials in the AFW fluid restricting adequate flow through the flow control orifices in the recirculation line. Under such conditions, it is possible that if the discharge valves for the AFW pumps are throttled, adequate flow may be unavailable through the recirculation line and pump damage could occur.
"The potential for this common failure mode was realized while conducting an extent-of-condition evaluation for reduced recirculation flow observed during surveillance testing of the P-38A motor driven AFW pump on October 24, 2002. The flow was less than expected but above the minimum required for pump operability. Upon disassembly of the P-38A flow orifice we discovered a build up of corrosion products in the orifice.
"Both units entered Tech Spec [Action Condition] 3.7.5.E and required action 3.7.5.E.1 which requires immediate steps to restore an AFWS to operable status. Immediate corrective actions have consisted of briefing the on-shift crew (on-coming crews will also be briefed) of the potential consequences of restricted recirculation flow and directing the operators, in the event of a situation requiring AFW flow, to secure a running AFW pump if the pump discharge falls below minimum flow requirements. In addition, information tags have been attached by the AFW pump flow indicators on the main control boards to convey that information. These action were completed at 1305 CST. At that time, with these administrative controls in place, we declared the AFWS back in service. Longer term corrective actions, including permanent procedure changes, are being evaluated."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"At 10:27 CST, the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, was declared inoperable due to the potential for fouling of the minimum recirculation orifices for each of the four AFW pumps. The mechanism identified was the potential for foreign materials in the AFW fluid restricting adequate flow through the flow control orifices in the recirculation line. Under such conditions, it is possible that if the discharge valves for the AFW pumps are throttled, adequate flow may be unavailable through the recirculation line and pump damage could occur.
"The potential for this common failure mode was realized while conducting an extent-of-condition evaluation for reduced recirculation flow observed during surveillance testing of the P-38A motor driven AFW pump on October 24, 2002. The flow was less than expected but above the minimum required for pump operability. Upon disassembly of the P-38A flow orifice we discovered a build up of corrosion products in the orifice.
"Both units entered Tech Spec [Action Condition] 3.7.5.E and required action 3.7.5.E.1 which requires immediate steps to restore an AFWS to operable status. Immediate corrective actions have consisted of briefing the on-shift crew (on-coming crews will also be briefed) of the potential consequences of restricted recirculation flow and directing the operators, in the event of a situation requiring AFW flow, to secure a running AFW pump if the pump discharge falls below minimum flow requirements. In addition, information tags have been attached by the AFW pump flow indicators on the main control boards to convey that information. These action were completed at 1305 CST. At that time, with these administrative controls in place, we declared the AFWS back in service. Longer term corrective actions, including permanent procedure changes, are being evaluated."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39454
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 12/17/2002
Notification Time: 12:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2002
Event Time: 09:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2002
Notification Time: 12:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2002
Event Time: 09:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60 - DAY OPTIONAL 10 CFR 50.73 REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF THE AFW SYSTEM
"60 DAY REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF SPECIFIED SYSTEM - This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system. On October 29, 2002, at 0917, with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power, an invalid signal was generated on Train A of the AFW system during auxiliary safeguards testing. During the performance of resistance checks, technicians reported hearing relay chattering inside the # 1 AFW pump turbine control panel. Following the autostart of the 1A motor driven AFW pump, increased AFW flow was noted for steam generators 1A and 1B. This was indicative that valves in Train A of the AFW system had automatically repositioned, in addition to the 1A motor driven pump automatically starting. The pump was subsequently secured and the AFW system was returned to standby readiness. This was considered a partial system/train actuation. During this event, the AFW system performed as expected. This event was entered into the site specific corrective action program for resolution."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the event by the licensee.
"60 DAY REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF SPECIFIED SYSTEM - This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system. On October 29, 2002, at 0917, with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power, an invalid signal was generated on Train A of the AFW system during auxiliary safeguards testing. During the performance of resistance checks, technicians reported hearing relay chattering inside the # 1 AFW pump turbine control panel. Following the autostart of the 1A motor driven AFW pump, increased AFW flow was noted for steam generators 1A and 1B. This was indicative that valves in Train A of the AFW system had automatically repositioned, in addition to the 1A motor driven pump automatically starting. The pump was subsequently secured and the AFW system was returned to standby readiness. This was considered a partial system/train actuation. During this event, the AFW system performed as expected. This event was entered into the site specific corrective action program for resolution."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the event by the licensee.