Event Notification Report for October 17, 2002

24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE NOTIFICATION

"At 1708 on 10-17-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that potentially fissile (PF) waste had been discovered improperly stored at the Wet Air Pump station in the C-333 building. A pile of used absorbent pads was found in the floor at the West Air station. The absorbent pads are used to soak up oil that has leaked from the pumps. These pads should have been placed in an AQ-NCS approved 5.5 gallon drum and controlled as PF waste as they were picked up. This is a violation of the requirements of NCSA GEN-15.

"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified of this event.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The used absorbent pads were accumulated incorrectly; however the uranium concentration for heterogeneous waste is low and a large quantity of heterogeneous fissile material would be required for a criticality to occur.

"PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to be possible, the interaction process condition would also have to be violated. However, the interaction control was maintained and therefore a criticality was not possible.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: The two process conditions relied upon for double contingency for this scenario are interaction and geometry.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEMS(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on a minimum 2 ft. edge-to-edge spacing requirement to ensure double contingency for spacing violations involving waste drums end other items containing fissile/potentially fissile material. This control was not violated.

"The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry controls of the waste when it is placed into an AQ-NCS approved waste drum and the secondary containment pans used to store the drums. Since the waste was accumulated on the floor and not into the NCS-approved container, this control was violated. The process condition was not maintained and double contingency was not maintained

"Since the used absorbent pads were not generated into an AQ-NCS approved waste container, the process condition for waste accumulation was not maintained. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A buffer area has been established to control movement of fissile material within the area. A remediation guide will be prepared by NCS prior to removal of the used absorbent pads.

*****UPDATE ON 10/18/02 AT 2120 FROM BEASLEY TO LAURA*****

"As a result of continued evaluation, it was discovered that the pile of absorbent pads was with 2 feet of the 4 inch diameter wet air header. Therefore the minimum 2-foot spacing control has also been violated. Even though the spacing control was violated, the existing configuration is bounded by analysis, and it is acceptable to continue to use the header piping within 2-feet of the pile of absorbent pads.

"While approved analysis does exist to safely bound the current violation configuration, both controls relied upon for the safe generation and handling of potentially fissile waste material were violated.

"In order for a criticality to be possible, an additional violation would have to occur resulting in an unsafe mass of fissile material accumulating in an unsafe geometry.

"Approved analysis exists which bounds the existing configuration and demonstrates it is subcritical. However, the process conditions for waste accumulation were not maintained. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."

Notified NMSS (HODGES).

POSSIBLE LOST/STOLEN CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR

The licensee is investigating the circumstances involving a chemical agent detector being turned in to the Military Police (MP's) by the spouse of a serviceman stationed at Fort Bragg NC. The CAD, containing 15 millicuries of Ni-63, was being kept at the serviceman's home. The Army is trying to determine if the device was stolen .

SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) IS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE


At 0921 hours on 10/I7/02, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was removed from service as part of preplanned work to facilitate future replacement of the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (FRFCS). Electrical service was also interrupted to the Technical Support Center rendering that emergency response facility (ERF) unavailable for use. Work should be complete by mid afternoon.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

CONDITION WHICH COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During a post maintenance test run of the 2B Diesel Generator following a planned maintenance window, the Diesel Generator reactive load (VARs) was identified to be erratic, as the Diesel Generator was loaded. At 05:15 CDST on 10/17, it was discovered that a potentiometer in the voltage regulating circuit had erratic output. This potentiometer was not worked on during the planned maintenance window. Because this component failure could have prevented the Diesel Generator from performing its design function, and because the 2B Diesel Generator is the emergency power supply for the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), which is a single train safety system, it has been determined that this failure could potentially effect the Safety Function of this system, and is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification."

"Add info on current results/status below.
The required actions of Technical Specification 3.5.1 were entered when the system was made inoperable for the maintenance window on 10/13 at 1900, and are continuing to be followed for the Inoperable High pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), until the Diesel Generator is restored to Operable Status."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM LARRY R. BLUNK TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 12/04/02 AT 1913 EST * * *

"UPDATE INFORMATION: RETRACTION OF NOTIFICATION (EN# 39296)

"THE ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION AND ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE ERRATIC OUTPUT WAS DUE TO A DEGRADED MOTOR OPERATED POTENTIOMETER (MOP). THE ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE ERRATIC OUTPUT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF THE 2B DIESEL GENERATOR HAD BEEN OPERATING IN AN EMERGENCY (I.E. ISOCHRONOUS) MODE. THEREFORE, IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY DEMAND, THE 2B DIESEL GENERATOR WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION ."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident. The Headquarters Operation Officer informed R3DO (Ken Riemer).

COMPROMISE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.

CONTACT HOO FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

MISSING NUCLEAR DENSITY METER

The licensee reported a missing Texas Nuclear Density Meter, Model 5201, serial number B764 and source number GV1731. The meter source contains 100 millicuries of Cs-137. The licensee had already contacted the local police department to report the missing meter. The exact date of loss is not known but the last physical audit performed by the licensee was in January 2002. The meter is used to measure the thickness of the foam density.

HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO LOW INTERNAL BATTERY RESISTANCE

The licensee reported that during a 250 Vdc battery surveillance the internal resistance of cell #18 was greater than the technical specification (TS) limit. As a result, the licensee declared battery bank 1D4 inoperable which also rendered inoperable the HPCI system and any containment isolation valves powered from the battery bank. This included 5 total CIVs [Containment isolation valves] from the following systems: HPCI, RWCU and MSL drain and Torus drain valves. Corrective maintenance was performed on the battery cell and the internal resistance passed the TS limit. HPCI and CIVs were returned to an operable status approximately 3 hours after being declared inoperable. At the time of this event, the RCIC system was inoperable for planned maintenance so the LCO entered for HPCI was more restrictive allowing 12 hours rather than the normal 14 day LCO for HPCI.

*** THIS EVENT WAS RETRACTED AT 1357 ON 11/13/2002 BY CLARE BLEAU TO ERIC THOMAS ***

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"On 10/17/02 Event Notification #39300 was completed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) due to the 250 Volt Station Battery 1D4 being declared inoperable which caused the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system to also be inoperable. At the time that this occurred, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was also inoperable due to preplanned maintenance. This required that a 12 hour to hot shutdown and 36 hour to cold shutdown LCO be entered per Technical Specification 3.5.1.J. Maintenance was performed on battery 1D4 and it was returned to operability. The other related LCOs were also exited prior to plant shutdown.

"An operability evaluation was subsequently completed which determined that 1D4 could have performed its design function with the data taken from STP 3.8.4-05. C&D Technologies has confirmed this. Only one of the two connections needs to be below 50 micro ohms to meet TS 3.8.4.5.

"If all of the discharge current were to pass through the 129 micro ohm connection, the voltage drop would be 0.06 volts. This has no bearing on the design function of the 250 VDC system. 1D4 currently has a design margin of 1.65 (65% excess battery capacity). Therefore, battery 1D4 actually was operable and capable of performing its required safety function. The PCIV [Primary Containment Isolation Valve] LCO 3.6.1.3 was also entered for 250VDC MOVs that are PCIVs. This included the HPCI outboard steam supply valve MO-2239 and the HPCI feedwater injection isolation valve MO-2312. Review of the shift logs and discussion with the shift manager confirmed that these valves were not closed so that HPCI remained available during this event. No LER is required under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D) and the 8-hour Non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) (EN#39300) can be retracted."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

Notified Bruce Burgess, R3DO.