Event Notification Report for October 08, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/07/2002 - 10/08/2002
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39261
Rep Org: ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
Licensee: HARRY W. KUHN, INC.
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01870-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM SEIF
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: HARRY W. KUHN, INC.
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01870-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM SEIF
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 10/09/2002
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2002
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2002
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2002
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOST TROXLER GAUGE
At 1133 EDT, the Illinois Dept. of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) reported that a materials licensee reported that a Troxler Gauge (Model 3440, S/N 24468 with 8 millicuries Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries Americium-241) was lost from the back of a pickup truck while being transported between 7:30 am and 8:00 am on 10/8/02. The licensee reported that the worker picked up the gauge at the licensee's facility, then drove to his residence, and then returned to the licensee's office where he found the gauge missing from the back of the pickup truck. The worker reported to the RSO that the chain and lock for the gauge was lost the previous day (10/7/02). The licensee stated the cause for the loss to be a failure to secure the gauge in the truck. The licensee and IDNS personnel re-traced the route twice and did not find the gauge. The licensee notified the police departments for the cities of West Chicago, Naperville, and Warrenville, IL, NRC Region 3, Troxler, Inc and the Illinois Department of Transportation.
At 1133 EDT, the Illinois Dept. of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) reported that a materials licensee reported that a Troxler Gauge (Model 3440, S/N 24468 with 8 millicuries Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries Americium-241) was lost from the back of a pickup truck while being transported between 7:30 am and 8:00 am on 10/8/02. The licensee reported that the worker picked up the gauge at the licensee's facility, then drove to his residence, and then returned to the licensee's office where he found the gauge missing from the back of the pickup truck. The worker reported to the RSO that the chain and lock for the gauge was lost the previous day (10/7/02). The licensee stated the cause for the loss to be a failure to secure the gauge in the truck. The licensee and IDNS personnel re-traced the route twice and did not find the gauge. The licensee notified the police departments for the cities of West Chicago, Naperville, and Warrenville, IL, NRC Region 3, Troxler, Inc and the Illinois Department of Transportation.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39256
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FRANZEN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FRANZEN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 07:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2002
Event Time: 04:21 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 07:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2002
Event Time: 04:21 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
T. S. REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"During drywell entry prior to D3R17 refueling outage discovered primary system leak on 3A Reactor Recirculation pump discharge loop flow instrument line, this required entry into T.S. 3.4.4 which requires that there is No pressure boundary leakage. This requires that the unit be in MODE 3 in 12 hours and MODE 4 in 36 hours, which is a TS required shutdown."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During drywell entry prior to D3R17 refueling outage discovered primary system leak on 3A Reactor Recirculation pump discharge loop flow instrument line, this required entry into T.S. 3.4.4 which requires that there is No pressure boundary leakage. This requires that the unit be in MODE 3 in 12 hours and MODE 4 in 36 hours, which is a TS required shutdown."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39259
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEONE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEONE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2002
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2002
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM WALL IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN NON-CONFORMANCE WITH DESIGN DRAWINGS
Indian Point Energy Center (Unit .2) is making an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Central Control Room (CCR) south masonry wall was identified as inoperable because a seismic event could cause breaches in the wall that could prevent the Control Room Air Filtration System from performing its design function of limiting operator dose.
The as found condition of the CCR south wall was identified as being in non-conformance with the design drawings. At the top portion of the wall, just above the upper steel channel beam, there are steel angles welded to the lower cord of the CCR roof truss that extend about 1.5 feet towards the south wall. A shelf angle is welded to the ends of the angles that support part of the south wall. This as found condition creates a seismic interaction with the superheater building which transfers load to the south wall through the steel support. Initial analysis indicates that the CCR south wall will remain structurally intact except for several areas in the upper 6 feet of the wall where localized failure could occur. The analysis indicates these localized failures will not cause damage to safety related equipment but may cause loss of the CCR pressure boundary. Corrective action has been initiated to repair the south masonry wall locally and cut the steel causing building interaction between the superheater and control buildings. Corrective action is expected to be complete within approximately 24 hours.
Loss of the CCR pressure boundary renders the Control Room Air Filtration System incapable of performing its safety function because it relies on the pressure boundary to limit in-leakage. The Control Room Air Filtration System was declared inoperable and the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.H was entered at 1330 hours. The action statement allows 3.5 days of continued operation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Indian Point Energy Center (Unit .2) is making an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Central Control Room (CCR) south masonry wall was identified as inoperable because a seismic event could cause breaches in the wall that could prevent the Control Room Air Filtration System from performing its design function of limiting operator dose.
The as found condition of the CCR south wall was identified as being in non-conformance with the design drawings. At the top portion of the wall, just above the upper steel channel beam, there are steel angles welded to the lower cord of the CCR roof truss that extend about 1.5 feet towards the south wall. A shelf angle is welded to the ends of the angles that support part of the south wall. This as found condition creates a seismic interaction with the superheater building which transfers load to the south wall through the steel support. Initial analysis indicates that the CCR south wall will remain structurally intact except for several areas in the upper 6 feet of the wall where localized failure could occur. The analysis indicates these localized failures will not cause damage to safety related equipment but may cause loss of the CCR pressure boundary. Corrective action has been initiated to repair the south masonry wall locally and cut the steel causing building interaction between the superheater and control buildings. Corrective action is expected to be complete within approximately 24 hours.
Loss of the CCR pressure boundary renders the Control Room Air Filtration System incapable of performing its safety function because it relies on the pressure boundary to limit in-leakage. The Control Room Air Filtration System was declared inoperable and the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.H was entered at 1330 hours. The action statement allows 3.5 days of continued operation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.