Event Notification Report for October 04, 2002

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SMALL FIRE IN TURBINE BUILDING

"Press release issued to local media at 0145 CDT 10/4/2002. Press release described response to an electrical component fire that occurred at 0650 CDT 10/4/2002. The fire occurred in a cathodic protection transformer located in the turbine building. The plant fire brigade responded to the scene. Power to the component was secured which extinguished the fire. Plant operation was not affected. The fire was declared out at 0700 CDT 10/4/2002."

The press release was issued to the local paper - Coffey County Republican and local radio KSNP. The New Strawn Fire Department was called, however, the fire was extinguished before they arrived. The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC resident inspector.



* * * UPDATE ON 10/07/02 @ 1321 BY YUNK TO GOULD * * *

Correct time of press release to local media was 1045 CDT on 10/4/2002 not 0145 CDT.

FUEL SUPPORT SIDE ENTRY ORIFICE LOSS COEFFICIENT IN CORE MONITORING SYSTEM DATABANK

"This letter provides notification of a Reportable Condition under 10CFR 21.21(d) for Clinton and Perry 1. The basis for this conclusion is the data used for the fuel support side entry orifice (SEO) loss coefficient in the core monitoring system supplied by GE Nuclear Energy (GE)/Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF). Other plants that have a similar geometry, but for which GE/GNF did not provide the core monitoring system (Grand Gulf and River Bend) have also been informed of this issue.

"The core support structure in a BWR/6 affects the fuel support casting SEO loss coefficient. Bundles may be adjacent to zero, one, or two core support beams depending upon their location as illustrated in Figure 1. The SEO loss coefficient depends upon the number of adjacent core support beams.

"The core monitoring system in the affected plants uses an average SEO loss coefficient for all of the central bundles, and a separate average value for all of the peripheral bundles. This was previously evaluated for GE/GNF 8x8 fuel designs and found to be acceptable. Recent calculations have shown that the Critical Power Ratio (CPR) response for newer GE/GNF fuel designs are more sensitive to the reduced flow in bundles that are adjacent to two core support beams (which have the highest loss coefficient). Thus, the core monitoring system over predicts CPR for these bundles, and thereby, may under predict the margin to the Operating Limit Minimum CPR (OLMCPR). The CPR over prediction is approximately 0.01 in CPR, which reaches the threshold for a reportable condition on a Technical Specification Safety Limit. In actual practice, plants maintain significantly more than 0.01 CPR margin to the OLMCPR, so MCPR Safety Limit protection is not threatened."

TURBINE TRIP CAUSED REACTOR TRIP DURING SHUTDOWN IN PREPARATION FOR REFUELING OUTAGE

"A power reduction was in progress for entry into refueling outage 1R17. A main turbine overspeed trip test was being conducted which resulted in a turbine trip which then caused a reactor trip on RPS".

All rods were automatically inserted into the core with no problems. The trip occurred from 42% reactor power. No safety systems were actuated and all plant systems functioned as designed.

The Resident Inspector was notified.

INFORMATION REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE INCIDENT

"[Radiographer #1 and Radiographer #2] received permission to perform x-ray on small branch connections in the tank dike of Tank 17 at the ExxonMobil refinery in Billings, MT. They had an additional two-inch post stress x-ray. They x-rayed three small branch connections at seven minutes and one at three minutes. They then set up a two-inch spool by attaching it to a pipe support and made their first exposure.

"The second exposure was set up on and made at 10:30am. When the exposure was complete [Radiographer #2] tried to crank the source into the shielded position. The crank would only turn three times before stopping. [Radiographer #1] explained later that the pipe support appeared to be set in the asphalt that it was sitting on. This turned [out] not to be the case. The pipe support was only partly covered by asphalt and became dislodged during their second exposure.

"[Radiographer #2] stated that the pipe stand fell approximately ten seconds before the exposure was complete.

"They then went into emergency procedures.

"They increased their boundary sizes and contacted the RSO Kathy Turner.

Amersham 660B
Camera No. B3125
Source No. 05416B
51 Curies

"[Radiographer #1] has been a radiographer for approximately four years.
[Radiographer #2] has been a radiographer for three months."