Event Notification Report for September 29, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/28/2002 - 09/29/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
39229392313930939257
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39229
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HOFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HOFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/29/2002
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 05:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 05:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
GEORGE MCDONALD (R2)
WALTER RODGERS (R2)
GEORGE MCDONALD (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL DUE TO LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL.
While draining the 1"D" steam generator, a reactor trip signal was generated due to a low-low steam generator level. One train of the reactor protection system was being tested, so one trip breaker opened in response to the trip signal. The low-low steam generator level was due to a planned evolution and was a valid signal. There was no safety significance because all control rods were already inserted into the fuel assemblies, the control rods were not latched to the control rod drive system, and the motor generator sets were shutdown by procedure. Although the reactor trip breaker was closed during testing, at no point was control rod withdrawal possible. They are investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified
**** RETRACTION ON 8/28/02 @08:58 BY THAD REAMES TO ARLON COSTA ****
"On September 29, 2002, McGuire Nuclear Station notified the NRC of an inadvertent actuation of the Unit. 1 reactor protection system (RPS) while the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. This occurred when reactor trip breakers unexpectedly opened as a result of a low-low steam generator level reactor trip signal. This event was reported as a valid actuation of the RPS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (iv) (A). Reference Event Report 39229.
Further evaluation determined that the reactor trip signal which opened the reactor trip breakers was an invalid signal since it was not initiated in response to plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the RPS safety function. Therefore, this represented an invalid actuation which is not reportable per 10 CFR 5Q.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). As a result, McGuire is retracting Event Report 39229. Note that McGuire will report this event in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 50.73."
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
While draining the 1"D" steam generator, a reactor trip signal was generated due to a low-low steam generator level. One train of the reactor protection system was being tested, so one trip breaker opened in response to the trip signal. The low-low steam generator level was due to a planned evolution and was a valid signal. There was no safety significance because all control rods were already inserted into the fuel assemblies, the control rods were not latched to the control rod drive system, and the motor generator sets were shutdown by procedure. Although the reactor trip breaker was closed during testing, at no point was control rod withdrawal possible. They are investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified
**** RETRACTION ON 8/28/02 @08:58 BY THAD REAMES TO ARLON COSTA ****
"On September 29, 2002, McGuire Nuclear Station notified the NRC of an inadvertent actuation of the Unit. 1 reactor protection system (RPS) while the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. This occurred when reactor trip breakers unexpectedly opened as a result of a low-low steam generator level reactor trip signal. This event was reported as a valid actuation of the RPS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (iv) (A). Reference Event Report 39229.
Further evaluation determined that the reactor trip signal which opened the reactor trip breakers was an invalid signal since it was not initiated in response to plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the RPS safety function. Therefore, this represented an invalid actuation which is not reportable per 10 CFR 5Q.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). As a result, McGuire is retracting Event Report 39229. Note that McGuire will report this event in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 50.73."
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39231
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 09/30/2002
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 19:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2002
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 19:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM FUNCTION
"This report is being made due to a loss of function of the Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) system. On 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs., an operator on rounds identified that control room envelope boundary door #288-1 was open instead of closed as expected. The door was found to be hung up open due to interference between the bottom door seal and the door stop. The operator closed the door upon discovery. This door is controlled with a key card reader however it can also be opened from both sides with a thumb latch as it is not a security vital door. An initial investigation using the security computer revealed that the Fire Chief accessed the door at 19:04:26 Hrs. during daily door checks and checked it shut at that time. The next card reader activity was at 20:04:50 Hrs. by the operator on rounds who discovered the door open. With the door having been open for other than normal entry/exit, a loss of the control room envelope boundary existed. The control room envelope boundary is required for CREF operability and function. As a result, both subsystems of the CREF system were declared inoperable on 9/29/2002 @ 19:04 Hrs. in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.2 Condition A, Action A.1 and Condition B, Action B. I. Both CREF subsystems were restored to operable and applicable Conditions and Actions exited on 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs when the door was closed. LCO completion times were not exceeded. Deviation/Event Report (DER) NM-2002-4233 was written for event followup and Action Request (ACR) 02-04252 was written to correct the problem with the door hanging up on the door stop. After contacting supporting organizations to determine the reportability of the loss of the control room envelope boundary, this event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made due to a loss of function of the Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) system. On 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs., an operator on rounds identified that control room envelope boundary door #288-1 was open instead of closed as expected. The door was found to be hung up open due to interference between the bottom door seal and the door stop. The operator closed the door upon discovery. This door is controlled with a key card reader however it can also be opened from both sides with a thumb latch as it is not a security vital door. An initial investigation using the security computer revealed that the Fire Chief accessed the door at 19:04:26 Hrs. during daily door checks and checked it shut at that time. The next card reader activity was at 20:04:50 Hrs. by the operator on rounds who discovered the door open. With the door having been open for other than normal entry/exit, a loss of the control room envelope boundary existed. The control room envelope boundary is required for CREF operability and function. As a result, both subsystems of the CREF system were declared inoperable on 9/29/2002 @ 19:04 Hrs. in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.2 Condition A, Action A.1 and Condition B, Action B. I. Both CREF subsystems were restored to operable and applicable Conditions and Actions exited on 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs when the door was closed. LCO completion times were not exceeded. Deviation/Event Report (DER) NM-2002-4233 was written for event followup and Action Request (ACR) 02-04252 was written to correct the problem with the door hanging up on the door stop. After contacting supporting organizations to determine the reportability of the loss of the control room envelope boundary, this event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39309
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RON VALLECORSA
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RON VALLECORSA
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/21/2002
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 09:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2002
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 09:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY REPORT - INVALID ACTIVATION OF STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
"On September 29, 2002 at 0906 hrs, a pressure transmitter loop channel in the Service Water System was being removed from service as part of an instrument calibration procedure. The transmitter was being electrically disconnected per the procedure, when an inadvertent start of 2SWE-P21A, 'A' Standby Service Water Pump, occurred. The SWE pump started because the technicians inadvertently did not perform a step in the procedure which opens bistables that defeat the actuation of a low pressure signal. The transmitter became deenergized when it's leads were lifted, resulting in an electrical signal which caused the actuation since the signal had not been defeated. Since there was no actual low pressure condition in the system, this was an invalid actuation. Low service water system header pressure is the parameter which would activate this feature and low service water system header pressure was not experienced during this event. A complete actuation of the 'A' train of the Standby Service Water System occurred and the system functioned properly.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2)(iv) (A) since it involved an automatic actuation of an emergency service water system that does not normally run and that serves as an ultimate heat sink as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). This actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and did not occur with this system properly removed from service.
"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report since the automatic actuation of the Standby Service Water pump was not generated by a valid actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident.
"On September 29, 2002 at 0906 hrs, a pressure transmitter loop channel in the Service Water System was being removed from service as part of an instrument calibration procedure. The transmitter was being electrically disconnected per the procedure, when an inadvertent start of 2SWE-P21A, 'A' Standby Service Water Pump, occurred. The SWE pump started because the technicians inadvertently did not perform a step in the procedure which opens bistables that defeat the actuation of a low pressure signal. The transmitter became deenergized when it's leads were lifted, resulting in an electrical signal which caused the actuation since the signal had not been defeated. Since there was no actual low pressure condition in the system, this was an invalid actuation. Low service water system header pressure is the parameter which would activate this feature and low service water system header pressure was not experienced during this event. A complete actuation of the 'A' train of the Standby Service Water System occurred and the system functioned properly.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2)(iv) (A) since it involved an automatic actuation of an emergency service water system that does not normally run and that serves as an ultimate heat sink as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). This actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and did not occur with this system properly removed from service.
"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report since the automatic actuation of the Standby Service Water pump was not generated by a valid actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39257
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THAD REAMES
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THAD REAMES
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 09:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 05:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Notification Time: 09:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2002
Event Time: 05:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE MacDONALD
GEORGE MacDONALD
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
RPS ACTIVATION WHILE SHUTDOWN DUE TO LO-LO STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"On September 29, 2002, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent actuation of the Unit 1 reactor protection system (RPS) while the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. This occurred when the "A" and "B" train main reactor trip breakers opened as a result of an unplanned low-low steam generator level reactor trip signal.
Further evaluation determined that the reactor trip signal which opened the reactor trip breakers was an invalid signal since it was not initiated in response to plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the RPS safety function. Therefore, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). However, as per 10 CFR 50.73(a) (1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation instead of submitting a written LER.
The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event:
-The Unit 1 RPS system including the "A" and "B" train main reactor trip breakers functioned successfully and completely."
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On September 29, 2002, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent actuation of the Unit 1 reactor protection system (RPS) while the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. This occurred when the "A" and "B" train main reactor trip breakers opened as a result of an unplanned low-low steam generator level reactor trip signal.
Further evaluation determined that the reactor trip signal which opened the reactor trip breakers was an invalid signal since it was not initiated in response to plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the RPS safety function. Therefore, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). However, as per 10 CFR 50.73(a) (1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation instead of submitting a written LER.
The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event:
-The Unit 1 RPS system including the "A" and "B" train main reactor trip breakers functioned successfully and completely."
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.